California Criminal Law Wiki - Recent changes [en]

Sentencing

Sysop — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 04:44:44 GMT

Consecutive vs concurrent sentencing

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	But it need not provide reasons for declining to find a case “unusual” so as to rebut any presumptive ineligibility for probation. (People v. Lesnick (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 637, 644.)		But it need not provide reasons for declining to find a case “unusual” so as to rebut any presumptive ineligibility for probation. (People v. Lesnick (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 637, 644.)

			==Consecutive vs concurrent sentencing==

			Rule 4.452 is the Court rule on how to do consecutive sentencing across multiple cases and even multiple counties. We will need abstract of judgment from Riverside County to do the credits and fines. "If a former principal term is made a consecutive subordinate term in the resentencing, it generally will be limited by the “one-third the midterm” rule of section 1170.1(a)."

			In re Reeves, 35 Cal. 4th 765, 773, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 4, 110 P.3d 1218 (2005); People v. Allison, 39 Cal. App. 5th 688, 703, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (1st Dist. 2019) [subsequent court has no jurisdiction to change the consecutive or concurrent sentence structure imposed by the previous court]

			If the court resentences the defendant under California Rules of Court, Rule 4.452, and the defendant already is serving a term in state prison imposed in a different case, the court must calculate all actual time credits earned prior to the re-sentencing, whether earned in state prison or local jail. (People v. Saibu, 191 Cal. App. 4th 1005, 1011–1012, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84 (4th Dist. 2011), reh'g denied, (Feb. 1, 2011) and review denied, (Apr. 27, 2011).) The calculation of conduct credit while in prison should be left to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (People v. Buckhalter, 26 Cal. 4th 20, 26 Cal. 4th 994a, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103 (2001), as modified, (Aug. 29, 2001).)

			PC669(d) When a court imposes a concurrent term of imprisonment and imprisonment for one of the crimes is required to be served in the state prison, the term for all crimes shall be served in the state prison, even if the term for any other offense specifies imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170

			People v. Torres, 213 Cal. App. 4th 1151, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836 (5th Dist. 2013)

	==Prison sentencing==		==Prison sentencing==

Credits

Sysop — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 04:32:51 GMT

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	https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B318732.PDF		https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B318732.PDF

			==Foreign jurisdictions==

			he court also may sentence the California case concurrently with the foreign judgment. “A defendant ordered to serve concurrent terms by a California state court is entitled to be transferred to the foreign jurisdiction if that foreign jurisdiction will not credit him with time served in California. (In re Stoliker (1957) 49 Cal.2d 75, 78, 315 P.2d 12 [a prisoner is entitled to effectuate concurrent sentencing by filing a writ of habeas corpus to seek transfer of custody to federal authorities].) The appellate courts have interpreted this rule to mean that California has a duty to make a defendant available to the foreign authorities. (In re Riddle (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 707, 708, 49 Cal.Rptr. 919; In re Tomlin (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 668, 669, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805 (Tomlin).) This duty is not a matter of judicial or administrative discretion. Further, no formal court order (apart from a concurrent state sentence) is needed to trigger that duty or to effect that transfer. (Id. at p. 671, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805.) However, California cannot compel the foreign jurisdiction to take the defendant into custody. (Ibid.) ¶ In 1963, the State Legislature amended section 2900 to ‘facilitate and implement concurrency [of sentences].’ (Tomlin, supra, 241 Cal.App.2d at p. 670, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805.) Section 2900, subdivision (b)(2) states, in pertinent part: ‘[If] the judge of the California court orders that the California sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence which such person is already serving, the Director of Corrections shall designate the institution of the other jurisdiction as the place for reception of such person within the meaning of the preceding provisions of this section.’” (People v. Antonio, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1064, 1068, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 523 (4th Dist. 2017); emphasis in original.) It is not the duty of the court to order action to be taken by the Director of Corrections. If the director refuses to carry out the statutory duty imposed by section 2900, the defendant should seek administrative relief. (Id., a tp. 1069.)

Fraud

Sysop — Tue, 28 Apr 2026 04:28:55 GMT

Medi-Cal Fraud

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			==Medi-Cal Fraud==

			(4) A person knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice to do either of the following:
			(A) Defraud the Medi-Cal program or any other health care program administered by the department or its agents or contractors.

			Presenting false claims to Medi Cal for services or merchandise, with an intent to defraud, violates Welf. & Inst. Code § 14107(b)(1).1 “An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive another person for the purpose of gaining a material advantage over that person or to induce that person to part with property or later that person's position by some false statement or false representation of act, wrongful concealment or suppression of the truth or by any artifice or act designed to deceive.” Intentional submission of false invoices constitutes Medi Cal fraud.

			People v. Pugh, 104 Cal. App. 4th 66, 72, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (4th Dist. 2002).

			People v. Guzman, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (2d Dist. 2011).

	==Welfare fraud==		==Welfare fraud==
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	Nonentitlement to welfare is an element of the offenses of welfare and food stamp fraud that must be decided as factual question by the jury.		Nonentitlement to welfare is an element of the offenses of welfare and food stamp fraud that must be decided as factual question by the jury.
	People v. Ochoa, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 282 Cal. Rptr. 805 (4th Dist. 1991)		People v. Ochoa, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 282 Cal. Rptr. 805 (4th Dist. 1991)



	A person will not be subject to criminal prosecution for an overpayment or over-issuance of benefits, obtained under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids program or the CalFresh program, for any month in which the county human services agency was in receipt of any Income and Eligibility Verification System data match information indicating any potential for an overpayment or an over-issuance and for which the county human services agency has not provided to the person a timely and adequate notice of action for the collection of the overpayment or the over-issuance. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (j)(1).)		A person will not be subject to criminal prosecution for an overpayment or over-issuance of benefits, obtained under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids program or the CalFresh program, for any month in which the county human services agency was in receipt of any Income and Eligibility Verification System data match information indicating any potential for an overpayment or an over-issuance and for which the county human services agency has not provided to the person a timely and adequate notice of action for the collection of the overpayment or the over-issuance. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (j)(1).)

Mental Disorder Diversion

Sysop — Sat, 25 Apr 2026 01:07:50 GMT

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	Gomez v. Superior Court (Aug. 6, 2025, C102211) - discretion of court		Gomez v. Superior Court (Aug. 6, 2025, C102211) - discretion of court


			''People v. Superior Court'' (2026) 118 Cal.App.4th 1153

			“In my opinion, the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment. Given that his untreated psychiatric disorder was a significant and proximal cause of his behavior at the time of the alleged offense, if his symptoms are under good control with medication and psychosocial support, he would not present an unreasonable risk. If the defendant abstains from substance use, his risk would be further reduced. [¶] ... In my opinion, the defendant would not be at risk of committing any [offenses specified in section 1001.36] if treated in the community and would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Italics added.) Dr. Campbell reserved the right to alter her opinion upon the receipt of information contradicting the information the alternate public defender had given her.


			A hearing on the suitability for diversion “shall be informal and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and argument of counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) “The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant's treatment plan, the defendant's violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153 [342 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 206], review filed (Apr. 14, 2026)

			In Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444, Division Eight of this district reversed an order denying diversion where the trial court found the defendant would present such an unreasonable risk. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, discharge of a firearm with gross negligence, and criminal threats stemming from an incident in which the defendant, an honorably discharged veteran diagnosed with a severe mental disorder, threatened to kill his girlfriend and others nearby, fired a shot into the air, then threw the gun away and turned himself in to law enforcement. The defendant had no prior history of violence. (Id. at pp. 1150–1154, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444.)
			Whitmill distinguished the opinion of Division Six of this district in People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 (Pacheco), which affirmed an order denying diversion in which the trial court concluded that the defendant presented an unreasonable risk to public safety. In Pacheco, Whitmill stated, the defendant “deliberately set a forest fire *208 near a homeless encampment and ranch, which could have created a mass casualty event as it required 15 firefighting units, helicopters, and a specialized airplane. This is unlike [Whitmill] who negligently fired a single shot in the air away from those nearby and then threw the gun away and turned himself in to [law enforcement] with ‘no incident.’ [¶] The expert in Pacheco opined that if the defendant ‘ “does not take his antipsychotic medication as prescribed and/or returns to using methamphetamine, then he would become unstable and psychotic and be likely to reoffend in some bizarre manner.” ’ ” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444.)

Ex post facto

Sysop — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 01:17:02 GMT

Created page with "So definition of ex post facto is more or less: “A law imposes a prohibited disadvantage if it has ‘one or more of the following four effects: it makes criminal acts that were innocent when done; it makes the crime greater or more aggravated than it was when committed; it inflicts a greater punishment for the crime than was available when the crime was committed; or it alters the rules of evidence or the required proof for conviction.’” In re K.J. (2014) 224 Cal...."

New page

So definition of ex post facto is more or less: “A law imposes a prohibited disadvantage if it has ‘one or more of the following four effects: it makes criminal acts that were innocent when done; it makes the crime greater or more aggravated than it was when committed; it inflicts a greater punishment for the crime than was available when the crime was committed; or it alters the rules of evidence or the required proof for conviction.’” In re K.J. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1203 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 484, 489]

So the following paragraph comes from a sentencing book:

The “plead and prove” issue is addressed in People v. Griffis, 212 Cal. App. 4th 956, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508 (3d Dist. 2013). Relying heavily on two California Supreme Court cases, In re Varnell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 70 P.3d 1037 (2003), and People v. Lara, 54 Cal. 4th 896, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169, 281 P.3d 72 (2012), Griffis concludes the exclusions under section 1170(h)(3) are merely “sentencing factors” that do not require pleading and proof. The exclusions set forth in the realignment legislation do not change the amount of time to be served, only where it is to be served. Pleading requirements generally are implied only where additional time in jail is required. The court also determined section 1170(f), concerning the inability to use section 1385 to strike a disqualifying factor, did not imply such a requirement.

So here’s the paragraph from Griffis:

Based on Lara 's explanation of the Ford and Lo Cicero rule, and the Supreme Court's application of that rule in Lara and Varnell, there is no basis for implying a pleading and proof requirement here for a prior conviction used to disqualify a defendant from serving his sentence in jail under the Realignment Act. A prior conviction used to determine where a defendant serves his or her sentence under the Realignment Act—prison or jail—does not operate to increase that sentence, prescribe a minimum term, or entirely preclude probation. It is true a prison sentence under the Realignment Act includes a period of parole, while a jail sentence does not, and it has been said in another context that the imposition of a period of parole constitutes an *964 increase in punishment because “[p]arole entails a significant array of impositions and liberty curtailment ....” (In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 932, 193 Cal.Rptr. 65.) That observation does not inform our inquiry here, however, because the question in this case is not simply whether a prison sentence under the Realignment Act might be characterized, in some manner, as more onerous than a jail sentence of equal length. Rather, the question is one of legislative intent, specifically, did the Legislature intend to require that a prior conviction or other factor disqualifying a defendant from a jail sentence under the Realignment Act be formally pled and proven? In the wake of Varnell and Lara, the answer to that question is plainly “no.”

People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 963–964 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d 508, 512]

There may be a little issue because in this particular case, a commitment to state prison will cause post-release community supervision (PRCS) afterwards.

But there’s a case that says PRCS is not punishment. People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 635, 640-641.

There’s also an interesting paragraphy from People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 677:

“In our view, the sentencing changes created by section 1170, subdivision (h) do not directly affect a defendant's fundamental interest in liberty. His or her statutorily prescribed sentence is no greater under the law as it existed prior to the Act's operative date than under the Act's provisions. [Citations omitted.] We do not believe he or she has a protectable interest in serving that sentence in county jail as opposed to state prison. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, he or she has no fundamental interest in the possibility of a conditional early release via a hybrid sentence. [Citations omitted.]”

So I think the above is a decent argument that if the length of the sentence isn’t increased, and only the location is changed, that it does not violate ex post facto.

Strike

Sysop — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 18:04:55 GMT

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	PC1192.7(c)(23) use of personal weapon does not require that a PC12022(b) be charged. (''People v. Equarte'' (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456.)		PC1192.7(c)(23) use of personal weapon does not require that a PC12022(b) be charged. (''People v. Equarte'' (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456.)

			==Timing of strike==

			The application of the Three Strikes law is triggered by the defendant's conviction of a strike offense prior to the commission of the current felony. (People v. Flood (2003) 108 Cal. App. 4th 504, 507-507.)