California Criminal Law Wiki - Recent changes [en]

Sentencing

Sysop — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 04:44:44 GMT

Consecutive vs concurrent sentencing

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	But it need not provide reasons for declining to find a case “unusual” so as to rebut any presumptive ineligibility for probation. (People v. Lesnick (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 637, 644.)		But it need not provide reasons for declining to find a case “unusual” so as to rebut any presumptive ineligibility for probation. (People v. Lesnick (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 637, 644.)

			==Consecutive vs concurrent sentencing==

			Rule 4.452 is the Court rule on how to do consecutive sentencing across multiple cases and even multiple counties. We will need abstract of judgment from Riverside County to do the credits and fines. "If a former principal term is made a consecutive subordinate term in the resentencing, it generally will be limited by the “one-third the midterm” rule of section 1170.1(a)."

			In re Reeves, 35 Cal. 4th 765, 773, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 4, 110 P.3d 1218 (2005); People v. Allison, 39 Cal. App. 5th 688, 703, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 321 (1st Dist. 2019) [subsequent court has no jurisdiction to change the consecutive or concurrent sentence structure imposed by the previous court]

			If the court resentences the defendant under California Rules of Court, Rule 4.452, and the defendant already is serving a term in state prison imposed in a different case, the court must calculate all actual time credits earned prior to the re-sentencing, whether earned in state prison or local jail. (People v. Saibu, 191 Cal. App. 4th 1005, 1011–1012, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 84 (4th Dist. 2011), reh'g denied, (Feb. 1, 2011) and review denied, (Apr. 27, 2011).) The calculation of conduct credit while in prison should be left to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. (People v. Buckhalter, 26 Cal. 4th 20, 26 Cal. 4th 994a, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 25 P.3d 1103 (2001), as modified, (Aug. 29, 2001).)

			PC669(d) When a court imposes a concurrent term of imprisonment and imprisonment for one of the crimes is required to be served in the state prison, the term for all crimes shall be served in the state prison, even if the term for any other offense specifies imprisonment in a county jail pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170

			People v. Torres, 213 Cal. App. 4th 1151, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836 (5th Dist. 2013)

	==Prison sentencing==		==Prison sentencing==

Credits

Sysop — Wed, 29 Apr 2026 04:32:51 GMT

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	https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B318732.PDF		https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B318732.PDF

			==Foreign jurisdictions==

			he court also may sentence the California case concurrently with the foreign judgment. “A defendant ordered to serve concurrent terms by a California state court is entitled to be transferred to the foreign jurisdiction if that foreign jurisdiction will not credit him with time served in California. (In re Stoliker (1957) 49 Cal.2d 75, 78, 315 P.2d 12 [a prisoner is entitled to effectuate concurrent sentencing by filing a writ of habeas corpus to seek transfer of custody to federal authorities].) The appellate courts have interpreted this rule to mean that California has a duty to make a defendant available to the foreign authorities. (In re Riddle (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 707, 708, 49 Cal.Rptr. 919; In re Tomlin (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 668, 669, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805 (Tomlin).) This duty is not a matter of judicial or administrative discretion. Further, no formal court order (apart from a concurrent state sentence) is needed to trigger that duty or to effect that transfer. (Id. at p. 671, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805.) However, California cannot compel the foreign jurisdiction to take the defendant into custody. (Ibid.) ¶ In 1963, the State Legislature amended section 2900 to ‘facilitate and implement concurrency [of sentences].’ (Tomlin, supra, 241 Cal.App.2d at p. 670, 50 Cal.Rptr. 805.) Section 2900, subdivision (b)(2) states, in pertinent part: ‘[If] the judge of the California court orders that the California sentence shall run concurrently with the sentence which such person is already serving, the Director of Corrections shall designate the institution of the other jurisdiction as the place for reception of such person within the meaning of the preceding provisions of this section.’” (People v. Antonio, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1064, 1068, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 523 (4th Dist. 2017); emphasis in original.) It is not the duty of the court to order action to be taken by the Director of Corrections. If the director refuses to carry out the statutory duty imposed by section 2900, the defendant should seek administrative relief. (Id., a tp. 1069.)

Fraud

Sysop — Tue, 28 Apr 2026 04:28:55 GMT

Medi-Cal Fraud

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			==Medi-Cal Fraud==

			(4) A person knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice to do either of the following:
			(A) Defraud the Medi-Cal program or any other health care program administered by the department or its agents or contractors.

			Presenting false claims to Medi Cal for services or merchandise, with an intent to defraud, violates Welf. & Inst. Code § 14107(b)(1).1 “An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive another person for the purpose of gaining a material advantage over that person or to induce that person to part with property or later that person's position by some false statement or false representation of act, wrongful concealment or suppression of the truth or by any artifice or act designed to deceive.” Intentional submission of false invoices constitutes Medi Cal fraud.

			People v. Pugh, 104 Cal. App. 4th 66, 72, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (4th Dist. 2002).

			People v. Guzman, 201 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 66 (2d Dist. 2011).

	==Welfare fraud==		==Welfare fraud==
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	Nonentitlement to welfare is an element of the offenses of welfare and food stamp fraud that must be decided as factual question by the jury.		Nonentitlement to welfare is an element of the offenses of welfare and food stamp fraud that must be decided as factual question by the jury.
	People v. Ochoa, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 282 Cal. Rptr. 805 (4th Dist. 1991)		People v. Ochoa, 231 Cal. App. 3d 1413, 282 Cal. Rptr. 805 (4th Dist. 1991)



	A person will not be subject to criminal prosecution for an overpayment or over-issuance of benefits, obtained under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids program or the CalFresh program, for any month in which the county human services agency was in receipt of any Income and Eligibility Verification System data match information indicating any potential for an overpayment or an over-issuance and for which the county human services agency has not provided to the person a timely and adequate notice of action for the collection of the overpayment or the over-issuance. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (j)(1).)		A person will not be subject to criminal prosecution for an overpayment or over-issuance of benefits, obtained under the California Work Opportunity and Responsibility to Kids program or the CalFresh program, for any month in which the county human services agency was in receipt of any Income and Eligibility Verification System data match information indicating any potential for an overpayment or an over-issuance and for which the county human services agency has not provided to the person a timely and adequate notice of action for the collection of the overpayment or the over-issuance. (Welf & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (j)(1).)

Mental Disorder Diversion

Sysop — Sat, 25 Apr 2026 01:07:50 GMT

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	Gomez v. Superior Court (Aug. 6, 2025, C102211) - discretion of court		Gomez v. Superior Court (Aug. 6, 2025, C102211) - discretion of court


			''People v. Superior Court'' (2026) 118 Cal.App.4th 1153

			“In my opinion, the defendant would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric symptoms were controlled with treatment. Given that his untreated psychiatric disorder was a significant and proximal cause of his behavior at the time of the alleged offense, if his symptoms are under good control with medication and psychosocial support, he would not present an unreasonable risk. If the defendant abstains from substance use, his risk would be further reduced. [¶] ... In my opinion, the defendant would not be at risk of committing any [offenses specified in section 1001.36] if treated in the community and would not present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Italics added.) Dr. Campbell reserved the right to alter her opinion upon the receipt of information contradicting the information the alternate public defender had given her.


			A hearing on the suitability for diversion “shall be informal and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay, and argument of counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) “The court may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant's treatment plan, the defendant's violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 1153 [342 Cal.Rptr.3d 199, 206], review filed (Apr. 14, 2026)

			In Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444, Division Eight of this district reversed an order denying diversion where the trial court found the defendant would present such an unreasonable risk. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon, discharge of a firearm with gross negligence, and criminal threats stemming from an incident in which the defendant, an honorably discharged veteran diagnosed with a severe mental disorder, threatened to kill his girlfriend and others nearby, fired a shot into the air, then threw the gun away and turned himself in to law enforcement. The defendant had no prior history of violence. (Id. at pp. 1150–1154, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444.)
			Whitmill distinguished the opinion of Division Six of this district in People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 290 Cal.Rptr.3d 370 (Pacheco), which affirmed an order denying diversion in which the trial court concluded that the defendant presented an unreasonable risk to public safety. In Pacheco, Whitmill stated, the defendant “deliberately set a forest fire *208 near a homeless encampment and ranch, which could have created a mass casualty event as it required 15 firefighting units, helicopters, and a specialized airplane. This is unlike [Whitmill] who negligently fired a single shot in the air away from those nearby and then threw the gun away and turned himself in to [law enforcement] with ‘no incident.’ [¶] The expert in Pacheco opined that if the defendant ‘ “does not take his antipsychotic medication as prescribed and/or returns to using methamphetamine, then he would become unstable and psychotic and be likely to reoffend in some bizarre manner.” ’ ” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155, 303 Cal.Rptr.3d 444.)

Ex post facto

Sysop — Fri, 24 Apr 2026 01:17:02 GMT

Created page with "So definition of ex post facto is more or less: “A law imposes a prohibited disadvantage if it has ‘one or more of the following four effects: it makes criminal acts that were innocent when done; it makes the crime greater or more aggravated than it was when committed; it inflicts a greater punishment for the crime than was available when the crime was committed; or it alters the rules of evidence or the required proof for conviction.’” In re K.J. (2014) 224 Cal...."

New page

So definition of ex post facto is more or less: “A law imposes a prohibited disadvantage if it has ‘one or more of the following four effects: it makes criminal acts that were innocent when done; it makes the crime greater or more aggravated than it was when committed; it inflicts a greater punishment for the crime than was available when the crime was committed; or it alters the rules of evidence or the required proof for conviction.’” In re K.J. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1203 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 484, 489]

So the following paragraph comes from a sentencing book:

The “plead and prove” issue is addressed in People v. Griffis, 212 Cal. App. 4th 956, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508 (3d Dist. 2013). Relying heavily on two California Supreme Court cases, In re Varnell, 30 Cal. 4th 1132, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 619, 70 P.3d 1037 (2003), and People v. Lara, 54 Cal. 4th 896, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 169, 281 P.3d 72 (2012), Griffis concludes the exclusions under section 1170(h)(3) are merely “sentencing factors” that do not require pleading and proof. The exclusions set forth in the realignment legislation do not change the amount of time to be served, only where it is to be served. Pleading requirements generally are implied only where additional time in jail is required. The court also determined section 1170(f), concerning the inability to use section 1385 to strike a disqualifying factor, did not imply such a requirement.

So here’s the paragraph from Griffis:

Based on Lara 's explanation of the Ford and Lo Cicero rule, and the Supreme Court's application of that rule in Lara and Varnell, there is no basis for implying a pleading and proof requirement here for a prior conviction used to disqualify a defendant from serving his sentence in jail under the Realignment Act. A prior conviction used to determine where a defendant serves his or her sentence under the Realignment Act—prison or jail—does not operate to increase that sentence, prescribe a minimum term, or entirely preclude probation. It is true a prison sentence under the Realignment Act includes a period of parole, while a jail sentence does not, and it has been said in another context that the imposition of a period of parole constitutes an *964 increase in punishment because “[p]arole entails a significant array of impositions and liberty curtailment ....” (In re Carabes (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 927, 932, 193 Cal.Rptr. 65.) That observation does not inform our inquiry here, however, because the question in this case is not simply whether a prison sentence under the Realignment Act might be characterized, in some manner, as more onerous than a jail sentence of equal length. Rather, the question is one of legislative intent, specifically, did the Legislature intend to require that a prior conviction or other factor disqualifying a defendant from a jail sentence under the Realignment Act be formally pled and proven? In the wake of Varnell and Lara, the answer to that question is plainly “no.”

People v. Griffis (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 956, 963–964 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d 508, 512]

There may be a little issue because in this particular case, a commitment to state prison will cause post-release community supervision (PRCS) afterwards.

But there’s a case that says PRCS is not punishment. People v. Espinoza (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 635, 640-641.

There’s also an interesting paragraphy from People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 677:

“In our view, the sentencing changes created by section 1170, subdivision (h) do not directly affect a defendant's fundamental interest in liberty. His or her statutorily prescribed sentence is no greater under the law as it existed prior to the Act's operative date than under the Act's provisions. [Citations omitted.] We do not believe he or she has a protectable interest in serving that sentence in county jail as opposed to state prison. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, he or she has no fundamental interest in the possibility of a conditional early release via a hybrid sentence. [Citations omitted.]”

So I think the above is a decent argument that if the length of the sentence isn’t increased, and only the location is changed, that it does not violate ex post facto.

Strike

Sysop — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 18:04:55 GMT

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	PC1192.7(c)(23) use of personal weapon does not require that a PC12022(b) be charged. (''People v. Equarte'' (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456.)		PC1192.7(c)(23) use of personal weapon does not require that a PC12022(b) be charged. (''People v. Equarte'' (1986) 42 Cal.3d 456.)

			==Timing of strike==

			The application of the Three Strikes law is triggered by the defendant's conviction of a strike offense prior to the commission of the current felony. (People v. Flood (2003) 108 Cal. App. 4th 504, 507-507.)

Cruz waiver

Sysop — Thu, 23 Apr 2026 03:38:11 GMT

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	''People v. Rabanales'' (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 494		''People v. Rabanales'' (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 494


			A defendant may wish to be released from custody to “clean up his or her affairs” prior to reporting to jail or state prison. People v. Cruz, 44 Cal. 3d 1247, 1254 n.5, 246 Cal. Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439 (1988), permits the defendant and the court to enter into an agreement that certain sanctions will be imposed if the defendant fails to appear later for sentencing or to commence the custody term. “We do not mean to imply by this holding that a defendant fully advised of his or her rights under section 1192.5 may not expressly waive those rights, such that if the defendant willfully fails to appear for sentencing the trial court may withdraw its approval of the defendant's plea and impose a sentence in excess of the bargained-for-term. Any such waiver, of course, would have to be obtained at the time of the trial court's initial acceptance of the plea, and it must be knowing and intelligent.” (Id., fn. 5.)

			People v. Vargas, 148 Cal. App. 4th 644, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837 (4th Dist. 2007), discusses an alternative form of Cruz waiver, often referred to as a “Vargas waiver.” There, the court told the defendant he would be sentenced to the upper term if he violated any conditions of the release agreement. While the defendant was released, he committed a robbery. The appellate court found no error in the court imposing the upper term solely because of the agreement with the defendant. (Id. at pp. 649–650.) The defendant also argued that it was improper for the court to impose the upper term because of a new law violation when the guilt had not been determined by a jury. The court rejected the claim because the defendant had agreed to the following: “that any willful violation of these terms will be decided by the sentencing judge without a jury and by a preponderance of the evidence. I further understand and agree, that if the court finds any willful violation of these terms, the court will be free to impose any greater sentence than expressly stated in this agreement, up to the maximum penalty for each offense and enhancement to which I am pleading guilty/no contest or admitting, and I will not have any right to withdraw my plea.” (Id. at p. 652; see also People v. Puente, 165 Cal. App. 4th 1143, 1145 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 380 (4th Dist. 2008); People v. Carr, 143 Cal. App. 4th 786, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548 (4th Dist. 2006), reh'g denied, (Oct. 30, 2006).)

			The plea agreement may alternatively provide for increased sentence in the event the defendant fails to appear for sentencing. (People v. Masloski, 25 Cal. 4th 1212, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 484, 25 P.3d 681 (2001).) For example, in People v. Rabanales, 168 Cal. App. 4th 494, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (4th Dist. 2008), habeas corpus dismissed, 2011 WL 1599619 (C.D. Cal. 2011), the defendant pleaded guilty based on an indicated sentence and was released on his own recognizance with a Cruz/Vargas waiver. The defendant subsequently was arrested for domestic violence and returned to court. The prosecutor submitted a police report and the court found the Vargas waiver had been breached and imposed the higher agreed upon sentence. The court upheld the higher sentence and found no violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000).

			Cruz requires the following: “(1) the defendant must be fully advised of his or her rights under section 1192.5, (2) the waiver must be express, (3) the waiver must be obtained at the time of the trial court's initial acceptance of the plea, and (4) the waiver must be knowing and intelligent.” The enhanced punishment may be set aside, however, if the court gives the defendant an incomplete advisement. (See Cruz at p. 1254, fn. 5.)

			The following procedure was determined appropriate in People v. Casillas, 60 Cal. App. 4th 445, 451–452, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 (5th Dist. 1997):

			1. If the defendant fails to appear for sentencing after entering a plea bargain but has made no agreement with the court regarding the consequences of such failure, the court may refuse to follow the plea bargain, but the defendant is entitled to withdraw the plea if the court chooses to impose a different sentence.

			2. The same rule applies when, during plea proceedings but after the parties have negotiated the plea agreement, the court imposes an additional condition providing for the sanction for nonappearance; e.g., the condition is imposed unilaterally by the court and is not a part of the underlying plea agreement. (People v. Vargas, 148 Cal. App. 4th 644, 650–651, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837 (4th Dist. 2007); People v. Jensen, 4 Cal. App. 4th 978, 984, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201 [1st Dist.] 1992); People v. Morris, 97 Cal. App. 3d 358, 364, 158 Cal. Rptr. 722 [1st Dist.] 1979) (abrogation recognized by, People v. Gonzalez, 2005 WL 914492 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2005)).)

			3. If the defendant has specifically negotiated the consequences of non-appearance as part of the plea agreement, the court may impose additional consequences consistent with the terms of the agreement without allowing the defendant to withdraw the plea. (People v. Masloski, 25 Cal. 4th 1212, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 484, 25 P.3d 681 (2001).)

			The procedure discussed in Casillas would be applicable to any condition of release imposed by the court. Typically courts will impose requirements that the defendant return to court or jail at a certain time, not commit any law violations, and return to custody free of any measurable drugs or alcohol. Other conditions could require the defendant to have no contact with the victim, attend a certain number of “self-helps,” check in with the probation officer at specified times, or not leave a certain geographic area. Undoubtedly the court would be free to impose any condition reasonably related to assuring the defendant will return to custody when required and will not cause problems during the short period of release.

			The failure to move to withdraw a plea based on a defective Cruz admonishment waives the right to complain of the increased sentence on appeal. (People v. Murray, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1539, 1546, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (5th Dist. 1995), reh'g denied, (Mar. 23, 1995): “we conclude appellant waived his right to complain about deviations from the plea bargain when he failed to move to withdraw his plea at the sentencing hearing.”)

			If the defendant is to be released from custody, a signed promise to appear back in court is necessary for the future application of the “crime-bail-crime” allegation under section 12022.1 if the defendant subsequently commits a new felony. (People v. Hernandez, 177 Cal. App. 4th 1182, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 548 (5th Dist. 2009).)

			In In re Duval, 44 Cal. App. 5th 401, 257 Cal. Rptr. 3d 557 (4th Dist. 2020), the court found the defendant was entitled to habeas corpus relief challenging the finding of a willful failure to appear at sentencing after a Cruz waiver; willfulness is a requisite finding to set aside the plea agreement under a Cruz waiver.

			Upper term imposed because of a violation of a Cruz waiver. An upper term imposed after a violation of a waver entered under People v. Cruz, 44 Cal. 3d 1247, 246 Cal. Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439 (1988), does not require a decision by a jury, provided the upper term was included in the plea agreement and the defendant agreed the court could impose the term after a violation of the waiver. (People v. Vargas, 148 Cal. App. 4th 644, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 837 (4th Dist. 2007).)

			The defendant cannot withdraw a plea when an express condition subsequent to the bargain occurs, such as defendant's nonappearance at sentencing, and the defendant receives an increased sentence. (People v. Casillas, 60 Cal. App. 4th 445, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 290 (5th Dist. 1997) [relying on People v. Cruz, 44 Cal. 3d 1247, 1254 n.5, 246 Cal. Rptr. 1, 752 P.2d 439 (1988);

Threats

Sysop — Mon, 20 Apr 2026 02:21:42 GMT

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

Show changes

Stalking

Sysop — Sun, 19 Apr 2026 03:18:05 GMT

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	[http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/protem/pubs/stalking.pdf California Judges' Benchguide]		[http://www2.courtinfo.ca.gov/protem/pubs/stalking.pdf California Judges' Benchguide]



			Appellant's argument that the evidence showed only that he had knowledge he was scaring Rizzo, not that he intended to scare her or to hurt her, is also unpersuasive. “ ‘[T]he element of intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.’ (People v. Kuykendall (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 642, 645 [285 P.2d 996]; see also People v. Lyles (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 482, 486 [319 P.2d 745].)” (Falck, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 299, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624.) Appellant not only ignored Rizzo's increasingly impassioned pleas to stop contacting her because he was scaring her, he responded with further contacts, continuing even after the police became involved. There can be no question appellant knew **600 he was causing Rizzo fear. When contacted by the police in August, appellant acknowledged that his messages or artwork might have “upset” Rizzo, and he told her after he talked to the police that he would stop contacting her because he wanted her to feel “happy and safe.” Rizzo told him in September that she had contacted the police because he was frightening and scaring her, and told him again at the bus stop in November that he was scaring her; on the latter occasion, appellant told her he was sorry for scaring her. Appellant maintains that despite his knowledge, he had no intent to instill fear in Rizzo, that he only wanted to reconcile with her. But his persistence in the face of Rizzo's efforts to avoid him and make him understand the degree of fear he was causing her, including going to the police to stop him, amply supports the inference that he intended the result he caused. (Falck, at p. 299, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 [“it can be inferred that appellant intended to cause fear in the victim from the fact that he insisted on maintaining contact with her although she clearly was attempting to avoid him, and although he had been warned away by the police, the court and the victim's husband”]; People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 578, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 [sufficient evidence of intent to cause fear despite absence of express threats and evidence of defendant's affection and concern for victim].)


			People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436, 454 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 585, 599–600], as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 30, 2015)

			We agree with, and adopt, this statutory interpretation as a matter of California law. We thus interpret subdivision (a) of section 646.9 to be satisfied by proof that defendants consciously disregarded a substantial risk that their communications would be viewed as threatening harm.


			People v. Obermueller (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 207, 220 [324 Cal.Rptr.3d 544, 552]

Threats

Sysop — Sun, 19 Apr 2026 02:59:34 GMT

(2)Threat

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	"[T]he words, “I'm going to get you,” “I'll get back to you,” “I'll get you,” may not, standing alone, convey a threat to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury." (''People v. Martinez'' (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218.)		"[T]he words, “I'm going to get you,” “I'll get back to you,” “I'll get you,” may not, standing alone, convey a threat to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury." (''People v. Martinez'' (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1218.)





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	v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013–1014 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464]; see		v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1013–1014 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 464]; see
	People v. Garrett (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 962, 966–967 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].		People v. Garrett (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 962, 966–967 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 33].

			A “threatening statement[ ] that a reasonable listener would understand, in light of the context and surrounding circumstances, to constitute a true threat, namely, ‘a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence’, rather than an expression of jest or frustration”, is not protected speech. (People v. Lowery (2011) 52 Cal.4th 419, 427.) People v. Paigly (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 8, 2025, No. H050724) 2025 WL 2847115, at *3, review denied (Dec. 30, 2025)

			The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument his words were not an attempt to dissuade a witness by threat of force or violence. “The words ‘You punk mother fucker, we'll get you, you've got kids,’ have more than a plain meaning, as do all words. These words also carry with them an inherent baggage of connotation which plainly suggests to the auditor, ‘You are in trouble for testifying so do not let it happen again or things will only get worse.’ The jury could interpret defendant's remarks to [the witness] as a warning or threat not to testify in the future.” (145 Cal.App.3d at p. 989, 193 Cal.Rptr. 684; see also, People v. Thomas (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 511, 513, fn. 3, 148 Cal.Rptr. 52 [the defendant's argument the witness could not be dissuaded from doing what she had already done was based upon **735 the false premise the witness was not a potential future witness].) People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1344 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 734–735]

			The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument his words were not an attempt to dissuade a witness by threat of force or violence. “The words ‘You punk mother fucker, we'll get you, you've got kids,’ have more than a plain meaning, as do all words. These words also carry with them an inherent baggage of connotation which plainly suggests to the auditor, ‘You are in trouble for testifying so do not let it happen again or things will only get worse.’ The jury could interpret defendant's remarks to [the witness] as a warning or threat not to testify in the future.” (145 Cal.App.3d at p. 989, 193 Cal.Rptr. 684; see also, People v. Thomas (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 511, 513, fn. 3, 148 Cal.Rptr. 52 [the defendant's argument the witness could not be dissuaded from doing what she had already done was based upon **735 the false premise the witness was not a potential future witness].) People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1344 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728, 734–735]



	Threatening Hand Gestures Not Verbal Threats Under Penal Code Section 422		Threatening Hand Gestures Not Verbal Threats Under Penal Code Section 422
Line 61:		Line 72:
	394 P.3d 1074].		394 P.3d 1074].

	A gesture without a statement is not a threat, but a "shush" or "sh" is sufficient to be a statement. People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441–1442.		A gesture without a statement is not a threat, but a "shush" or "sh" is sufficient to be a statement. (People v. Franz (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441–1442.)

	====(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat====		====(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat====
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	===Constitutionality===		===Constitutionality===

			True threats are not protected speech. (''Counterman v. Colorado'' (2023) 600 U.S. 66.)

	People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 679 (Penal Code § 422 is not unconstitutionally vague in its language of "willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury")		People v. Maciel (2003) 113 Cal. App. 4th 679 (Penal Code § 422 is not unconstitutionally vague in its language of "willfully threatens to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury")

Obstruction

Sysop — Sun, 19 Apr 2026 02:21:59 GMT

Created page with " ==VC31== ===Constitutionality=== To avoid a violation of the federal and state due process clauses, the statute criminalizing the making of false statements to peace officers “while in the performance” of their duties under the Vehicle Code is deemed to prohibit deceit only as to a material fact pertinent to an investigatory matter undertaken by a peace officer pursuant to the Vehicle Code. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7; Cal. Veh. Code § 31. (P..."

New page

==VC31==

===Constitutionality===

To avoid a violation of the federal and state due process clauses, the statute criminalizing the making of false statements to peace officers “while in the performance” of their duties under the Vehicle Code is deemed to prohibit deceit only as to a material fact pertinent to an investigatory matter undertaken by a peace officer pursuant to the Vehicle Code. U.S. Const. Amend. 14; Cal. Const. art. 1, § 7; Cal. Veh. Code § 31. (People v. Morera-Munoz (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 838.)

Threats

Sysop — Sun, 19 Apr 2026 02:19:44 GMT

Constitutionality

Show changes

Threats

Sysop — Sat, 18 Apr 2026 03:07:49 GMT

Created page with "Section 422 criminalizes threats made to another that are likely to result in death or great bodily injury.36 Section 422 encompasses conduct directed at one specifically identified person.37 Moreover, it requires an actual intent to commit a specific type of harm.38 This statute does not address the situation of cyberbullying in which one person might post disparaging comments about another on the Internet but does not explicitly threaten to harm that person. ==Annoyin..."

New page

Section 422 criminalizes threats made to another that are likely to result in death or great bodily injury.36 Section 422 encompasses conduct directed at one specifically identified person.37 Moreover, it requires an actual intent to commit a specific type of harm.38 This statute does not address the situation of cyberbullying in which one person might post disparaging comments about another on the Internet but does not explicitly threaten to harm that person.

==Annoying phone calls==

===Penal Code 653m(a)===
(a) Every person who, with intent to annoy, telephones or makes contact by means of an electronic communication device with another and addresses to or about the other person any obscene language or addresses to the other person any threat to inflict injury to the person or property of the person addressed or any member of his or her family, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith.

A single use of obscene language or threats.

===Penal Code 653m(b)===
(b) Every person who, with intent to annoy or harass, makes repeated telephone calls or makes repeated contact by means of an electronic communication device, or makes any combination of calls or contact, to another person is, whether or not conversation ensues from making the telephone call or contact by means of an electronic communication device, guilty of a misdemeanor. Nothing in this subdivision shall apply to telephone calls or electronic contacts made in good faith or during the ordinary course and scope of business.

PC653m(b) required repeated telephone conduct.

==Stalking==

Section 646.9 requires a willful, malicious, and repeated following or harassment of another, coupled with a credible threat with an intent to place that person or their family in reasonable fear for their safety. This statute requires that an actual threat of harm be made; malicious teasing or bullying will not suffice.

==Doxxing==

Section 653.2 makes it a misdemeanor for any person who--with intent to place another person or their immediate family in reasonable fear for their safety by means of an electronic communication device and for the purpose of imminently causing unwanted harassment--electronically distributes, publishes, emails, hyperlinks, or makes available for downloading personal identifying information, including, but not limited to, a digital image of another person, or a harassing message about another person, which would likely incite or produce unlawful action. Section 653.2 is too narrow to cover all cyberbullying-type conduct because it requires the dissemination of personal identifying information and is really just a modification of the existing California criminal stalking statute to prohibit “the type of harassment that has become all to[o] commonplace in this digital age, harassment committed using e-mail, cell phone, or some other electronic communication device.” The purpose of section 653.2 is to “simply [[close] an electronic loophole in the stalking statute and [give] law enforcement the ability to hold accountable those who would prey on victims using electronic means.”

==Online impersonation==
Penal Code 528.5

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who knowingly and without consent credibly impersonates another actual person through or on an Internet Web site or by other electronic means for purposes of harming, intimidating, threatening, or defrauding another person is guilty of a public offense punishable pursuant to subdivision (d).

Sentencing

Sysop — Sun, 12 Apr 2026 23:37:00 GMT

Resentencing

@@ Line 743: / Line 743: @@
 ==Resentencing==
-[https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C090767.PDF People v. McMurray (Mar. 30, 2022, C090767)
+[https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/C090767.PDF People v. McMurray (Mar. 30, 2022, C090767)]
 Appellate jurisdiction
@@ Line 750: / Line 750: @@
 People v. Nelms (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1465
 People v. Acosta (1996) 48 Cal.App 4th 411, 427
 ==Upper term==