Asset Forfeiture - Revision history

Sysop at 18:37, 13 March 2025

2025-03-13T18:37:59Z

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	Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,		Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,

			==California Retail Food Code==

			Health and Safety Code section 114393

			(a) Based upon inspection findings or other evidence, an enforcement officer may impound food, equipment, or utensils that are found to be, or suspected of being, unsanitary or in such disrepair that food, equipment, or utensils may become contaminated or adulterated, and inspect, impound, or inspect and impound any utensil that is suspected of releasing lead or cadmium in violation of Section 108860. The enforcement officer may attach a tag to the food, equipment, or utensils that shall be removed only by the enforcement officer following verification that the condition has been corrected.

			(b) No food, equipment, or utensils impounded pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be used unless the impoundment has been released.

			(c) Within 30 days, the enforcement agency that has impounded the food, equipment, or utensils pursuant to subdivision (a) shall commence proceedings to release the impounded materials or to seek administrative or legal remedy for its disposition.

Sysop: /* Constitutional rights */

2025-03-07T05:01:13Z

Constitutional rights

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	"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)		"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)




	Fifth Amendment right in forfeiture proceedings		Fifth Amendment right in forfeiture proceedings

	''Wolhstrom v. Buchanan'' (1994) 884 P.2d 687, 693; 180 Ariz. 389, 395.		''Wolhstrom v. Buchanan'' (1994) 884 P.2d 687, 693; 180 Ariz. 389, 395.

			''U.S. v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 4003-4005 5th Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.'' (2d Cir. 1995) 55 F.3d 78, 86-87.)

			Adverse inference

			United States v. Real Prop. Known & Numbered as Rural Route 1, Box 137 (6th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 845, 851.

			United States v. Prop. Located at 15 Black Ledge Drive (2d Cir. 1990) 897 F.2d 97, 103.

			United States v. $57,790,000 in U.S. Currency, 2007 WL 433198 (S.D. Cal. Jan 29, 2007) 01CV414-BTM

	==Secondary Sources==		==Secondary Sources==

	Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,		Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,

Sysop: /* Fifth Amendment */

2025-03-06T04:16:45Z

Fifth Amendment

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	"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)		"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)

			Fifth Amendment right in forfeiture proceedings

			''Wolhstrom v. Buchanan'' (1994) 884 P.2d 687, 693; 180 Ariz. 389, 395.

	==Secondary Sources==		==Secondary Sources==

	Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,		Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,

Sysop: /* Constitutional rights */

2025-03-06T04:00:39Z

Constitutional rights

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	==Constitutional rights==		==Constitutional rights==

			===Fifth Amendment===

			350Ek33

	"Conversely, the Fifth Amendment's Self–Incrimination Clause, which is textually limited to “criminal case [s],” has been applied in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only where the forfeiture statute had made the culpability of the owner relevant, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721–722, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1045, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971), or where the owner faced the possibility of subsequent criminal proceedings, see Boyd, 116 U.S., at 634, 6 S.Ct., at 534; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253–254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (discussing Boyd)." (Austin v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. 602, 608, fn. 4.)		"Conversely, the Fifth Amendment's Self–Incrimination Clause, which is textually limited to “criminal case [s],” has been applied in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only where the forfeiture statute had made the culpability of the owner relevant, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721–722, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1045, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971), or where the owner faced the possibility of subsequent criminal proceedings, see Boyd, 116 U.S., at 634, 6 S.Ct., at 534; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253–254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (discussing Boyd)." (Austin v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. 602, 608, fn. 4.)


	"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)		"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)

Sysop at 03:58, 6 March 2025

2025-03-06T03:58:17Z

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	Fourth Amendment still applies in civil asset forfeiture. (''One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Com. of Pa.'' (1965) 380 U.S. 693.)		Fourth Amendment still applies in civil asset forfeiture. (''One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Com. of Pa.'' (1965) 380 U.S. 693.)

			==Constitutional rights==

			"Conversely, the Fifth Amendment's Self–Incrimination Clause, which is textually limited to “criminal case [s],” has been applied in civil forfeiture proceedings, but only where the forfeiture statute had made the culpability of the owner relevant, see United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721–722, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 1045, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971), or where the owner faced the possibility of subsequent criminal proceedings, see Boyd, 116 U.S., at 634, 6 S.Ct., at 534; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 253–254, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 2644, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980) (discussing Boyd)." (Austin v. United States (1993) 509 U.S. 602, 608, fn. 4.)

			"Moreover, a defendant does not risk incriminating himself by claiming that he owns property that is subject to forfeiture. A defendant's claim of ownership at a pre-trial suppression hearing of property that he contends was unlawfully seized may not be used to prove the defendant's guilt. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394, 88 S.Ct. 967, 976, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). For the same reason, a defendant's claim of ownership of property that was subject to forfeiture may not be used for that purpose." (U.S. v. Cretacci (9th Cir. 1995) 62 F.3d 307, 311.)

	==Secondary Sources==		==Secondary Sources==

	Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,		Witkin California Procedure, Actions, section 74,

Sysop at 04:42, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T04:42:32Z

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	*7 The normal practice of the office of the Solano County District Attorney, as described and exemplified by the facts of this case, satisfies the requirements of Cuevas and Ramirez. Police officers are serving notice, not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the district attorney after a deputy in that office initiates forfeiture proceedings and instructs law enforcement to serve the notice. During the particular transactions at issue here, Olsen documented initiation of the forfeitures, and we may presume that he followed the normal official procedures of the district attorney's office in directing that the ensuing notices issue and be served.		*7 The normal practice of the office of the Solano County District Attorney, as described and exemplified by the facts of this case, satisfies the requirements of Cuevas and Ramirez. Police officers are serving notice, not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the district attorney after a deputy in that office initiates forfeiture proceedings and instructs law enforcement to serve the notice. During the particular transactions at issue here, Olsen documented initiation of the forfeitures, and we may presume that he followed the normal official procedures of the district attorney's office in directing that the ensuing notices issue and be served.

			evidence that Olsen reviewed the details of the arrest, decided to initiate proceedings and, pursuant to standard procedures, directed the officers to serve Vandenburgh with the district attorney's preprinted notice filled in with case-specific facts that Olsen and the law enforcement officer had discussed (and which Olsen elsewhere documented). In our view, these procedures satisfy the requirements that the prosecuting agency initiate forfeiture proceedings and provide notice, and they establish that the law enforcement officers were properly acting on behalf of the district attorney's office rather than on their own behalf in serving the notice.

	=Narcotics=		=Narcotics=

Sysop at 04:41, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T04:41:37Z

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	910On this record, we agree. Cuevas establishes, and Ramirez confirms, that only prosecuting agencies—not law enforcement officers—have authority to initiate forfeiture proceedings, and law enforcement officers lack authority to “serve notice in their own right.” (Cuevas, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 1327–1328 & fn. 8, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325; accord Ramirez, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 & fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) But they also recognize that, once the appropriate prosecuting agency has initiated proceedings, notice may be served by law enforcement officers, not on their own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency. As Ramirez explains, although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)		910On this record, we agree. Cuevas establishes, and Ramirez confirms, that only prosecuting agencies—not law enforcement officers—have authority to initiate forfeiture proceedings, and law enforcement officers lack authority to “serve notice in their own right.” (Cuevas, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 1327–1328 & fn. 8, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325; accord Ramirez, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 & fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) But they also recognize that, once the appropriate prosecuting agency has initiated proceedings, notice may be served by law enforcement officers, not on their own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency. As Ramirez explains, although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)

			Solano County's standard procedure for civil asset forfeiture proceedings involves the arresting agency calling an available deputy district attorney at or near the time of the arrest to describe the circumstances of the case. The deputy district attorney then either approves or declines initiation of proceedings. And, if the deputy district attorney approves and initiates proceedings, “an officer from the arresting agency is instructed to immediately serve the suspect ... with an executed [notice of seizure].” The notice is a form issued in the name of the District Attorney's office and a local law enforcement agency, and it attributes the initiation of forfeiture proceedings to a named deputy district attorney (here Olsen). The form is not signed by that attorney, nor by anyone else before it is served, but we do not find a requirement in the statute for an attorney's signature in order for a notice to be valid. Olsen's records showed that, on both occasions at issue here, he approved initiation of civil asset forfeiture proceedings and documented his conversation with the police officer, including the basis for and timing of his decision to initiate proceedings. The notices in both instances relate that, at a specified date and time, Olsen initiated forfeiture of specified currency found at a particular location based on a specific alleged drug crime.
			*7 The normal practice of the office of the Solano County District Attorney, as described and exemplified by the facts of this case, satisfies the requirements of Cuevas and Ramirez. Police officers are serving notice, not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the district attorney after a deputy in that office initiates forfeiture proceedings and instructs law enforcement to serve the notice. During the particular transactions at issue here, Olsen documented initiation of the forfeitures, and we may presume that he followed the normal official procedures of the district attorney's office in directing that the ensuing notices issue and be served.

Sysop at 04:39, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T04:39:22Z

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	Following Cuevas, the same court in Ramirez v. Tulare County District Attorney's Office (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 911, 917, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512 (Ramirez) again emphasized that nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings initiated by peace officers rather than prosecuting agencies are invalid. Three separate cases were at issue in the appeal. In each case, a law enforcement officer issued a notice of forfeiture proceedings, and no one in the local district attorney's office signed the notice or reviewed the evidence before execution of the notice. (Id. at pp. 918–922, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) Under the forfeiture statutes as interpreted by the court in Cuevas, the law enforcement officers could not validly initiate forfeiture proceedings, the purported proceedings were “ ‘invalid in the first instance,’ ” and the defendants could pursue return of their property in the trial court without having first filed a claim. (Id. at pp. 930–932, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512; § 11488.5, subd. (a)(1).) In reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)		Following Cuevas, the same court in Ramirez v. Tulare County District Attorney's Office (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 911, 917, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512 (Ramirez) again emphasized that nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings initiated by peace officers rather than prosecuting agencies are invalid. Three separate cases were at issue in the appeal. In each case, a law enforcement officer issued a notice of forfeiture proceedings, and no one in the local district attorney's office signed the notice or reviewed the evidence before execution of the notice. (Id. at pp. 918–922, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) Under the forfeiture statutes as interpreted by the court in Cuevas, the law enforcement officers could not validly initiate forfeiture proceedings, the purported proceedings were “ ‘invalid in the first instance,’ ” and the defendants could pursue return of their property in the trial court without having first filed a claim. (Id. at pp. 930–932, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512; § 11488.5, subd. (a)(1).) In reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)

			According to the People, Olsen's actions in reviewing the matters with the police officers and approving the initiation of proceedings were sufficient to satisfy the dictates of Cuevas and Ramirez.
			910On this record, we agree. Cuevas establishes, and Ramirez confirms, that only prosecuting agencies—not law enforcement officers—have authority to initiate forfeiture proceedings, and law enforcement officers lack authority to “serve notice in their own right.” (Cuevas, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at 1327–1328 & fn. 8, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325; accord Ramirez, supra, 9 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 & fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) But they also recognize that, once the appropriate prosecuting agency has initiated proceedings, notice may be served by law enforcement officers, not on their own behalf but on behalf of the prosecuting agency. As Ramirez explains, although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)



	=Narcotics=		=Narcotics=

Sysop at 04:36, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T04:36:56Z

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	“All state Civil Asset Forfeiture cases in Solano County are initiated by the District Attorney's Office,” according to Olsen. Someone from the arresting agency calls a deputy district attorney at or near the time of an arrest and describes the circumstances of the case. The deputy district attorney then approves or declines the initiation of civil asset forfeiture proceedings. “If Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings are approved and initiated by a Deputy District Attorney, an officer from the arresting agency is instructed to immediately serve the suspect and/or interested party” with an executed notice of seizure, which recites the date and location of the seizure, the applicable Health and Safety Code section, the name of the approving deputy district attorney, and detailed instructions on how to file a claim, along with a blank claim form. “After telephonically reviewing the matter, I approved the initiation of Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings.” He documented the interaction on a one-page “asset forfeiture initiation form.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) A police officer served notice of the seizure on Vandenburgh on October 22, 2020. The notice was on a form apparently generated by the district attorney's office, with the name of the Solano County District Attorney in the heading. It informed Vandenburgh that deputy district attorney Olsen had initiated forfeiture proceedings and that Vandenburgh had 30 days to file a verified claim to the property. It appears that a police officer filled in blank lines on the forms to specify the name of the police agency, the property seized, the date, time, and place of the seizure, the statute allegedly violated, and Olsen's name. The notice does not appear to have included a copy of the asset forfeiture initiation form Olsen had filled out.		“All state Civil Asset Forfeiture cases in Solano County are initiated by the District Attorney's Office,” according to Olsen. Someone from the arresting agency calls a deputy district attorney at or near the time of an arrest and describes the circumstances of the case. The deputy district attorney then approves or declines the initiation of civil asset forfeiture proceedings. “If Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings are approved and initiated by a Deputy District Attorney, an officer from the arresting agency is instructed to immediately serve the suspect and/or interested party” with an executed notice of seizure, which recites the date and location of the seizure, the applicable Health and Safety Code section, the name of the approving deputy district attorney, and detailed instructions on how to file a claim, along with a blank claim form. “After telephonically reviewing the matter, I approved the initiation of Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings.” He documented the interaction on a one-page “asset forfeiture initiation form.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) A police officer served notice of the seizure on Vandenburgh on October 22, 2020. The notice was on a form apparently generated by the district attorney's office, with the name of the Solano County District Attorney in the heading. It informed Vandenburgh that deputy district attorney Olsen had initiated forfeiture proceedings and that Vandenburgh had 30 days to file a verified claim to the property. It appears that a police officer filled in blank lines on the forms to specify the name of the police agency, the property seized, the date, time, and place of the seizure, the statute allegedly violated, and Olsen's name. The notice does not appear to have included a copy of the asset forfeiture initiation form Olsen had filled out.

			Section 11488, subdivision (a) of the Health and Safety Code permits a peace officer who makes an arrest for certain drug crimes to seize the controlled substances and any money involved in an illegal drug transaction. (§§ 11488, subd. (a), 11470, subds. (a)—(f).) The Attorney General or the district attorney may then institute forfeiture proceedings. (§§ 11488.1, 11488.2; Cuevas v. Superior Court (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1320–1321, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 (Cuevas).) The statute provides for either judicial forfeiture or, for personal property of no more than $25,000 in value, administrative or nonjudicial forfeiture. (Cuevas, at p. 1321, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325; see §§ 11488.4, subd. (a) [judicial forfeiture], 11488.4, subd. (j) [nonjudicial forfeiture].) At issue here are the requirements for nonjudicial forfeiture.

			For nonjudicial forfeiture, section 11488.4, subdivision (j) provides that the Attorney General or district attorney may order the forfeiture and “shall provide notice of proceedings under this subdivision.” The notice must specify the property and its value, the date and place of its seizure, and the violation of law alleged with respect to it. (Ibid.) The notice must include instructions on how to file a claim to the property pursuant to section 11488.5. (§ 11488.4, subd. (j)(5)(A).) And this notice must comply with subdivision (c) of section 11488.4, which provides that “the Attorney General or district attorney shall make service of process upon every individual designated in a receipt issued for the property seized,” as well as on other interested persons. (§ 11488.4, subds. (c), (j).) The prosecuting agency must also provide notice through publication in a newspaper of general circulation. (§ 11488.4, subds. (e), (j).) Then section 11488.5 sets forth a procedure and timelines for a person who claims an interest in the property to recover it. If no claim is timely filed, the Attorney General or district attorney must prepare a written declaration of forfeiture and dispose of the property according to law. (§ 11488.4, subd. (j)(5)(B).) If a claim is timely filed, the Attorney General or district attorney must file a petition for judicial forfeiture within 30 days. (§ 11488.4, subd. (j)(5)(C).) At a hearing on that petition, there is a rebuttable presumption that the person to whom a receipt was issued is the property owner. (§ 11488, subd. (c).)

			In a caveat important to the case before us, however, the Cuevas court added, “We do not hold that [the police officer], if the forfeiture decision had been made by an appropriate prosecuting agency, could not have properly served the notice of forfeiture on behalf of the prosecuting agency in the role of process server. [Citation.] Rather, his service of the notice of forfeiture was invalid because an appropriate prosecuting agency did not initiate it, and neither he nor the [police department] had the authority to initiate the process or serve notice in their own right.” (Cuevas, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at p. 1328, fn. 8, 165 Cal.Rptr.3d 325.)

			Following Cuevas, the same court in Ramirez v. Tulare County District Attorney's Office (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 911, 917, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512 (Ramirez) again emphasized that nonjudicial forfeiture proceedings initiated by peace officers rather than prosecuting agencies are invalid. Three separate cases were at issue in the appeal. In each case, a law enforcement officer issued a notice of forfeiture proceedings, and no one in the local district attorney's office signed the notice or reviewed the evidence before execution of the notice. (Id. at pp. 918–922, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.) Under the forfeiture statutes as interpreted by the court in Cuevas, the law enforcement officers could not validly initiate forfeiture proceedings, the purported proceedings were “ ‘invalid in the first instance,’ ” and the defendants could pursue return of their property in the trial court without having first filed a claim. (Id. at pp. 930–932, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512; § 11488.5, subd. (a)(1).) In reaching this conclusion, however, the court noted that although police officers lack authority to initiate proceedings and issue notice on their own, they “may serve a notice issued by the Attorney General or district attorney.” (Ramirez, at p. 931, fn. 18, 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 512.)

	=Narcotics=		=Narcotics=

Sysop at 04:32, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T04:32:10Z

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	''People v. Superior Court of Solano County (Vandenburgh)'' (January 23, 2025, A170818) __ Cal.App.5th ___		''People v. Superior Court of Solano County (Vandenburgh)'' (January 23, 2025, A170818) __ Cal.App.5th ___

			“All state Civil Asset Forfeiture cases in Solano County are initiated by the District Attorney's Office,” according to Olsen. Someone from the arresting agency calls a deputy district attorney at or near the time of an arrest and describes the circumstances of the case. The deputy district attorney then approves or declines the initiation of civil asset forfeiture proceedings. “If Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings are approved and initiated by a Deputy District Attorney, an officer from the arresting agency is instructed to immediately serve the suspect and/or interested party” with an executed notice of seizure, which recites the date and location of the seizure, the applicable Health and Safety Code section, the name of the approving deputy district attorney, and detailed instructions on how to file a claim, along with a blank claim form. “After telephonically reviewing the matter, I approved the initiation of Civil Asset Forfeiture proceedings.” He documented the interaction on a one-page “asset forfeiture initiation form.” (Capitalization & boldface omitted.) A police officer served notice of the seizure on Vandenburgh on October 22, 2020. The notice was on a form apparently generated by the district attorney's office, with the name of the Solano County District Attorney in the heading. It informed Vandenburgh that deputy district attorney Olsen had initiated forfeiture proceedings and that Vandenburgh had 30 days to file a verified claim to the property. It appears that a police officer filled in blank lines on the forms to specify the name of the police agency, the property seized, the date, time, and place of the seizure, the statute allegedly violated, and Olsen's name. The notice does not appear to have included a copy of the asset forfeiture initiation form Olsen had filled out.