Driving under the influence - Revision history

Sysop: /* Prior convictions */

2026-03-07T04:11:03Z

Prior convictions

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:11, 7 March 2026
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	==Prior convictions==		==Prior convictions==

			===Pleading and proof at preliminary examinations===

			"Our analysis of California's historical framework for charging a felony by information persuades us that pleading and proof at the preliminary hearing of three 'separate violations .... which resulted in convictions' of DUI is a constitutional and statutory condition precedent to prosecution and punishment of a fourth DUI as a felony." (People v. Casillas (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 171, 174.)

	===Juvenile adjudicaitons===		===Juvenile adjudicaitons===

Sysop: /* One prior need not be before the other */

2026-03-07T04:05:46Z

One prior need not be before the other

← Older revision		Revision as of 04:05, 7 March 2026
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	====One prior need not be before the other====		====One prior need not be before the other====

			"we observe that the statute, by its terms, permits a DUI offense to be charged as a felony if the violation occurred within seven years “of” three or more other separate DUI violations that resulted in convictions, thus allowing convictions for offenses that occurred before or after the offense underlying the present conviction to be used to trigger an enhanced penalty. It would seem that if the Legislature had intended to count only “separate violations” that occurred prior to the offense presently at issue, it would have used the word “after” rather than “of.”" (''People v. Snook'' (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1216.)

	''People v. Baez'' (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 197		''People v. Baez'' (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 197

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:48:57Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:48, 3 November 2023
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	===Vehicular Manslaughter===		===Vehicular Manslaughter===

	Contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38; (''People v. Wattier'' (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948 [exclusion of victim not wearing seatbelt proper]; ''People v. Autry'' (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351; ''People v. Marlin'' (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559.)		Contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38; (''People v. Wattier'' (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948 [exclusion of victim not wearing seatbelt proper]; ''People v. Autry'' (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351; ''People v. Marlin'' (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559; People v. Rodgers (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 166; People v. Jackson [2021 WL 790330]; People v. Harris (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 419; People v. Lett (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 917.)

	PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.		PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:41:54Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:41, 3 November 2023
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	12 hour educational component		12 hour educational component

			Proof of completion of classes not required. (''People v. Johnson'' (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 286.)

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:37:26Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:37, 3 November 2023
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	Lightning		Lightning


			As recently summarized in People v. Talamantes (1992) 11 Cal.App. 4th 968, 973, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 311, these cases have relied on some or all of the following factors in upholding such convictions: (1) blood alcohol level above the .08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving. (People v. Autry (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351, 358 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 138])

	===Multiple convictions for same offense===		===Multiple convictions for same offense===

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:30:04Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:30, 3 November 2023
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	===Vehicular Manslaughter===		===Vehicular Manslaughter===

	Contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38; (''People v. Wattier'' (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948 [exclusion of victim not wearing seatbelt proper]; ''People v. Autry'' (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351.)		Contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38; (''People v. Wattier'' (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948 [exclusion of victim not wearing seatbelt proper]; ''People v. Autry'' (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351; ''People v. Marlin'' (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559.)

	PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.		PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:25:29Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:25, 3 November 2023
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	===Vehicular Manslaughter===		===Vehicular Manslaughter===

			Contributory negligence is not a defense. People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38; (''People v. Wattier'' (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948 [exclusion of victim not wearing seatbelt proper]; ''People v. Autry'' (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 351.)

	PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.		PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-11-03T03:11:57Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

@@ Line 98: / Line 98: @@
 § 4:7. Second Degree Murder: Implied Malice Vehicular Murder (Watson Murder)
 The appellate court in People v. Murphy, 80 Cal. App. 5th 713, 717-719, 733, 295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (2d Dist. 2022) affirmed the conviction for implied malice vehicular murder, often referred to as Watson murder, named after People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. 1981). In Murphy, the defendant, after smoking marijuana, drove his car roughly 90 miles per hour through a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupants. The court discussed the requisite standard as follows:
 Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with express or implied malice aforethought. Malice is “express” when a person manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of another human being; it is implied when there was no considerable provocation or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
 Implied malice has both a physical and mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance of an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. The mental component is the requirement that the defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life. That is, malice may be implied when the defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. Implied malice is determined by examining the defendant's subjective mental state to see if the defendant appreciated the risk of the defendant's actions. Malice may be found even if the act results in a death that is accidental. It is unnecessary that implied malice be proven by an admission or other direct evidence of the defendant's mental state; like all other elements of a crime, implied malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
 To support a finding of implied malice, the evidence must establish the defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of the act's danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger. This conscious disregard for the danger to life distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence, which involves the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. Phrased in everyday language, the state of mind of a person who acts with conscious disregard for life is, ‘I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don't care if someone is hurt or killed.’ The state of mind of the person who acts with conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, ‘I don't care what happens.’ The standard for implied malice is subjective and requires the defendant appreciate the risk involved.
 (Murphy, supra, 80 Cal. App. 5th at p. 726 (internal citations, quotes, and brackets omitted).)
 ===Multiple convictions for same offense===

Sysop: /* Vehicular Manslaughter */

2023-10-27T03:47:16Z

Vehicular Manslaughter

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:47, 27 October 2023
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	===Vehicular Manslaughter===		===Vehicular Manslaughter===

	PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.		PC191.5(a) with gross negligence. Under 191.5(c)(1) 4-6-10 state prison straight felony.

	PC191.5(b) ~~without~~ gross negligence. 16-2-~~4 state prison wobbler~~.		PC191.5(a) with gross negligence with prior DUI conviction. Under 191.5(d), 15-to-life.

	PC192(c)		PC191.5(b) without gross negligence. 16-2-4 1170(h) wobbler.

			PC192(c)(1) with gross negligence. PC193(c)(1) 2-4-6 state prison wobbler

			PC192(c)(2) without gross negligence. PC193(c)(2) one-year max misdemeanor

			§ 4:7. Second Degree Murder: Implied Malice Vehicular Murder (Watson Murder)
			The appellate court in People v. Murphy, 80 Cal. App. 5th 713, 717-719, 733, 295 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887 (2d Dist. 2022) affirmed the conviction for implied malice vehicular murder, often referred to as Watson murder, named after People v. Watson, 30 Cal. 3d 290, 300, 179 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. 1981). In Murphy, the defendant, after smoking marijuana, drove his car roughly 90 miles per hour through a red light and collided with another vehicle, killing its occupants. The court discussed the requisite standard as follows:
			Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with express or implied malice aforethought. Malice is “express” when a person manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of another human being; it is implied when there was no considerable provocation or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.
			Implied malice has both a physical and mental component. The physical component is satisfied by the performance of an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life. The mental component is the requirement that the defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life. That is, malice may be implied when the defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human life. Implied malice is determined by examining the defendant's subjective mental state to see if the defendant appreciated the risk of the defendant's actions. Malice may be found even if the act results in a death that is accidental. It is unnecessary that implied malice be proven by an admission or other direct evidence of the defendant's mental state; like all other elements of a crime, implied malice may be proven by circumstantial evidence.
			To support a finding of implied malice, the evidence must establish the defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of the act's danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger. This conscious disregard for the danger to life distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence, which involves the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. Phrased in everyday language, the state of mind of a person who acts with conscious disregard for life is, ‘I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don't care if someone is hurt or killed.’ The state of mind of the person who acts with conscious indifference to the consequences is simply, ‘I don't care what happens.’ The standard for implied malice is subjective and requires the defendant appreciate the risk involved.
			(Murphy, supra, 80 Cal. App. 5th at p. 726 (internal citations, quotes, and brackets omitted).)

	===Multiple convictions for same offense===		===Multiple convictions for same offense===

Sysop: /* Enhancements */

2023-06-20T02:40:15Z

Enhancements

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:40, 20 June 2023
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	''In re F.H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1465		''In re F.H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1465

			Vehicle Code section 23558 [+ 1 year per victim (maximum 3 years)]:
			Causing bodily injury or death to more than one victim in violating Vehicle
			Code section 23153, or Penal Code section 191.5 or 192.5(a). The jury must
			determine which persons are subject to the enhancement. (People v. Gibson
			(1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 284.)

			Vehicle Code section 23566(c) [+ 3 years]: Conviction of section 23153 with
			four specified prior convictions within 10 years and proximate causation of
			GBI.

	===Vehicular Manslaughter===		===Vehicular Manslaughter===
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	Driving under the influence of alcohol is not a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence of both alcohol and drugs. (See ''People v. Cady'' (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 134 [VC23153(a) is not LIO of VC23153(f).)		Driving under the influence of alcohol is not a lesser-included offense of driving under the influence of both alcohol and drugs. (See ''People v. Cady'' (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 134 [VC23153(a) is not LIO of VC23153(f).)

	==Prior convictions==		==Prior convictions==