Homicide - Revision history

Sysop: /* PC1385.1 */

2025-07-31T00:43:30Z

PC1385.1

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:43, 31 July 2025
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	LWOP for a murder is not cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment. (''Harris v. Wright'' (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 581.)		LWOP for a murder is not cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment. (''Harris v. Wright'' (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 581.)

			LWOP is not cruel or unusual under California Constitution. (''People v. Christensen'' (July 30, 2025, G062920).)

	==Statutes==		==Statutes==

Sysop: /* Special circumstances */

2025-05-25T05:19:30Z

Special circumstances

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	Above doesn't apply to kidnapping or arson, which is why there's CALCRIM No. 731 and No. 732.		Above doesn't apply to kidnapping or arson, which is why there's CALCRIM No. 731 and No. 732.

			The People must plead and prove, and the court must find sufficient cause to believe, a special circumstance allegation is true. (Ramos v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 33, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Cal. 1982); Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 954-955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1st Dist. 1979).

	===Unanimity===		===Unanimity===

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-25T02:27:36Z

First-degree murder

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	===First-degree murder===		===First-degree murder===

			Key number 350H key number 1681

	"All murder . . . that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former Section 288a . . . is murder of the first degree." (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).)		"All murder . . . that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former Section 288a . . . is murder of the first degree." (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).)

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-25T02:24:49Z

First-degree murder

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	For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, ''People v. Nieves'' (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, ''People v. Mendoza'' (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, ''People v. Oliver'' (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 920.)		For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, ''People v. Nieves'' (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, ''People v. Mendoza'' (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, ''People v. Oliver'' (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 920.)

			"New subparagraph (17)(M) eliminated the independent felonious purpose requirement for both kidnapping and arson felony murder special circumstances. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 608–609, fn. 4, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 267 P.3d 1135.) Thus, after the enactment of subparagraph (M), even if a kidnapping or arson is committed primarily for the purpose of facilitating a murder, the special circumstance may be found true. (Ibid.)" (People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 254.)

			"Since the purpose of subparagraph (M) was to overrule Green 's independent purpose requirement and create special circumstance liability where kidnapping and arson are incidental to the murder or, stated another way, where the murder is accomplished by way of kidnapping or arson, we agree both the actual killer and the accomplice must have the intent to kill." (People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 255.)

	Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984		Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984

Sysop: /* Felony-murder */

2025-05-25T02:07:21Z

Felony-murder

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	"[A] concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance." (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511.)		"[A] concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance." (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511.)

			Felony-murder rule

			As defendant correctly points out, subsequent to Valasquez we stated in both People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 59, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, and People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, 322, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883, quoting Green, that a valid conviction of the underlying crime is a “necessary condition” to finding a related special circumstance allegation true. That statement was made in an entirely different context, however, and does not preclude upholding a special circumstance when the notice given by the charge was adequate, the instructions given to the jury required that all of the elements of the underlying crime be found to exist, and the jury was correctly instructed that the defendant's guilt of that crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In those circumstances the jury's attention is focused directly on the crime and it is proven according to the general law. The return of only a special circumstances verdict confirming the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of the crime is a defect in form not substance.22 The instructions on *424 these matters given the 927 jury in this case were adequate in all respects.23 No demonstrable prejudice to defendant resulted from the failure to charge him with the additional crimes of robbery, kidnapping and rape. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 926–927, as modified on denial of reh'g (May 19, 1988).)

			An intent to rob will not support a conviction of felony murder if it arose after the infliction of the fatal wound



			"An intent to rob will not support a conviction of felony murder if it arose after the infliction of the fatal wound." People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9, disapproved of other grounuds by In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535.)



	===First-degree murder===		===First-degree murder===

Sysop: /* Special Circumstances */

2025-05-25T02:06:06Z

Special Circumstances

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	==Special Circumstances==		==Special Circumstances==

			Special circumstance of arson is for PC451(b), not PC451(a). PC451(a) and PC451(b) have different elements. So setting arson of car killing person was not PC451(b). (''People v. Debose'' (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177

			“The arson special circumstance thus applies only to arson of an inhabited structure or inhabited property.” (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 606, fn. 13.)

			Robertson explains Green rule. (''People v. Robertson'' (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21.)

			People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, is an example of Green rule, in which arson was supposed to cause other family members to come out, not just kill the target.

	===PC1385.1===		===PC1385.1===

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-19T01:25:47Z

First-degree murder

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	"To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder." (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).)		"To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder." (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).)

	For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, ''People v. Nieves'' (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, ''People v. Mendoza'' (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130.)		For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, ''People v. Nieves'' (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, ''People v. Mendoza'' (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, ''People v. Oliver'' (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 920.)

	Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984		Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-19T00:52:30Z

First-degree murder

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:52, 19 May 2025
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	"To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder." (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).)		"To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder." (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).)

	For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1.		For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, ''People v. Nieves'' (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, ''People v. Mendoza'' (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130.)

	Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984		Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-19T00:45:07Z

First-degree murder

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:45, 19 May 2025
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	For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1.		For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1.

	Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083		Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984

	Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder		Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder

Sysop: /* First-degree murder */

2025-05-19T00:41:45Z

First-degree murder

← Older revision		Revision as of 00:41, 19 May 2025
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	For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1.		For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read ''People v. Brooks'' (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1.

			Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083

	Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder		Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder