Sysop at 03:12, 2 February 2026

2026-02-02T03:12:17Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:12, 2 February 2026
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	Under Equal Protection, PC4573.8 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.)		Under Equal Protection, PC4573.8 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.)

			==1170.1(c)==
			In-prison offenses
			An “aggregate term of imprisonment” is a single term and not a series of separate terms. In re Brown (App. 5 Dist. 2024) 325 Cal.Rptr.3d 304. Sentencing and Punishment Key Number 1122

			The term for an in-prison offense does not become part of the aggregate prison term imposed for those offenses which were committed on the outside; instead, the defendant is imprisoned for a total term consisting of the sum of his aggregate sentence computed under the statutory provision governing consecutive sentences for multiple out-of-prison felonies plus the new aggregate term imposed for in-prison felonies. People v. Escobedo (App. 2 Dist. 2023) 311 Cal.Rptr.3d 639, rehearing granted, opinion not citeable, vacated 313 Cal.Rptr.3d 557, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied. Sentencing and Punishment Key Number 637

			Where defendant was convicted of offense committed in prison and subsequently convicted of a second in-prison offense, the Determinate Sentencing Act required a single term, consisting of a principal and a subordinate term, with the single term to run at end of the prison term imposed on the original “outside” offense, in the absence of any showing that defendant had finished his original prison term and begun serving his term for his first in-prison offense when he committed his second in-prison offense, or whether he had actually been paroled, and therefore whether he was serving his original term or any term when he was sentenced for his second in-prison offense. People v. Roseberry (App. 3 Dist. 2020) 271 Cal.Rptr.3d 504, rehearing denied, review denied. Sentencing and Punishment Key Number 637

			Inmate, who was granted parole for first degree murder committed when he was 21 years old under youth offender parole provisions, was not required to serve a consecutive sentence for in-prison offense of battery against non-prisoner committed when inmate was over the age of 26 prior to release; youth offender parole provisions excluded inmates who were convicted of in-prison offenses after age of 26 from benefits of statute only if additional crime had element of malice aforethought or was punishable by life in prison, in-prison crime of battery neither included malice as element nor was punishable by term of life, and youth offender parole scheme was designed to effectuate constitutional prohibition against excessive punishment of youthful offenders. In re Williams (App. 2 Dist. 2018) 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 600. Infants Key Number 3156

			An inmate's in-prison offense is a factor to be considered by the Board of Parole Hearings in determining whether the inmate is suitable for release on parole under the youthful offender parole statute, even though the in-prison offense will not result in a consecutive sentence that must be served before release. In re Williams (App. 2 Dist. 2018) 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 600. Infants Key Number 3156

			Habeas corpus petitioner, who was convicted of felony murder at 19 years old, was not required to serve additional consecutive prison terms for in-prison offenses after he was found suitable for parole under statute governing youth offender parole hearings, and thus petitioner was to be released on parole; statute governing youth offender parole hearings superseded statute establishing consecutive prison terms for in-person offenses, and petitioner committed in-prison offenses before he was 26 years old, malice aforethought was not necessary element of in-prison offenses, and in-prison offenses were not punished by life in prison. In re Jenson (App. 2 Dist. 2018) 233 Cal.Rptr.3d 868. Infants Key Number 3156

			Under the statute providing that a consecutive term of imprisonment for an offense committed in state prison “shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released from prison,” the in-prison offense is treated as a new principal term rather than as a subordinate term to the out-of-prison offense. In re Coleman (App. 1 Dist. 2015) 186 Cal.Rptr.3d 922, 236 Cal.App.4th 1013, review filed, review denied. Sentencing and Punishment Key Number 1130

			A term for an in-prison offense, or multiple in-prison offenses, begins to run at the end of the prison term imposed for the original out-of-prison offenses. In re Tate (App. 5 Dist. 2006) 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 135 Cal.App.4th 756. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 1130

			Trial court erred in sentencing defendant to sentence of four years for conviction of battery by inmate on non-inmate to be served consecutively with sentence already being served, as where sentences for new offenses are to be served consecutively, greatest term of imprisonment will be selected as principal term, with others serving as subordinate terms, consisting of one-third of the statutory middle term. People v. Washington (App. 1 Dist. 1994) 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 27 Cal.App.4th 940, habeas corpus dismissed 1998 WL 164967, reversed and remanded 208 F.3d 832, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 282, 531 U.S. 919, 148 L.Ed.2d 203. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 637

			Defendant's consecutive sentence for battery committed while he was in prison was separate prison term that could be used in enhancing defendant's sentence for subsequent burglary offense, although defendant was never physically released from incarceration before sentence for the in-prison battery commenced. People v. Walkkein (App. 2 Dist. 1993) 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 383, 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, review denied. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 1307

			Section providing for different sentencing treatment for felonies committed while person is confined in state prison did not apply to defendant who had been sentenced for felony and was in county jail, not having been delivered to state prison. People v. Holdsworth (App. 1 Dist. 1988) 244 Cal.Rptr. 782, 199 Cal.App.3d 253, modified. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 94

			Section providing for different sentencing treatment for felonies committed while person is confined in state prison did not apply based on parole hold applicable to defendant located in county jail, even if defendant were subject to parole hold; parole hold could not be equated with delivery of convicted felon to state prison. People v. Holdsworth (App. 1 Dist. 1988) 244 Cal.Rptr. 782, 199 Cal.App.3d 253, modified. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 94

			Section providing for different sentencing treatment of felonies committed while person is confined in state prison did not apply to defendant who was parolee in custody at time of offense on theory defendant's parole status made him state prisoner; constructive or legal custody of defendant was not the issue, for it was place of confinement, rather than status of person confined, that was decisive for purposes of sentencing statute. People v. Holdsworth (App. 1 Dist. 1988) 244 Cal.Rptr. 782, 199 Cal.App.3d 253, modified. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 94

			Judge imposing sentence for single, in-prison offense had discretion to order that new sentence be served concurrently with term for which defendant was then incarcerated. People v. Arant (App. 5 Dist. 1988) 244 Cal.Rptr. 645, 199 Cal.App.3d 294. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 637

			Defendant who resided at church-administered halfway house and participated in work furlough program was “confined in a state prison” for purposes of West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code § 1170.1(c), governing consecutive sentencing of person convicted of one or more felonies committed while confined in state prison. People v. Lamont (App. 5 Dist. 1986) 223 Cal.Rptr. 52, 177 Cal.App.3d 577. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 637

			Defendant's confinement at conservation camp did not preclude his being treated as prisoner confined to state prison for purposes of imposing sentences for offenses committed by persons confined to state prison. People v. Nick (App. 1 Dist. 1985) 210 Cal.Rptr. 137, 164 Cal.App.3d 141. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 637

			Where prison inmate, while serving sentence for second-degree murder of inmate concurrently with initial sentence, was convicted of assault of two inmates, consecutive sentence on assault charge equal to upper-base term could be imposed without violating this section interpreted to require computation of single term of imprisonment for all in-prison offenses which are sentenced consecutively regardless of date of offense. In re Curl (App. 1 Dist. 1983) 196 Cal.Rptr. 766, 149 Cal.App.3d 236. Assault And Battery Key Number 592; Prisons Key Number 436; Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 557

			Where defendant was convicted of offense committed in prison and barely two months later was convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, the Determinate Sentencing Act required a single term, consisting of a principal and a subordinate term, with the single term to run at end of the prison term imposed on the original “outside” offense. People v. McCart (1982) 185 Cal.Rptr. 284, 32 Cal.3d 338, 649 P.2d 926. Sentencing And Punishment Key Number 1064

Sysop: Created page with " ==PC4571== Under Equal Protection, PC4573 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony" meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.) ==PC4573.5== Under Equal Protection, PC4573.5 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.) ==PC4573.8== Under Equal Protection, PC4573.8 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "..."

2023-12-07T23:21:04Z

Created page with " ==PC4571== Under Equal Protection, PC4573 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony" meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.) ==PC4573.5== Under Equal Protection, PC4573.5 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.) ==PC4573.8== Under Equal Protection, PC4573.8 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "..."

New page

==PC4571==

Under Equal Protection, PC4573 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony" meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.)

==PC4573.5==

Under Equal Protection, PC4573.5 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.)

==PC4573.8==

Under Equal Protection, PC4573.8 is 16-2-3 under PC1170(h), even though the statute says "felony," meaning state prison. (''People v. Noyan'' (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657.)

Prison crimes - Revision history

Sysop at 03:12, 2 February 2026