Right to speedy trial - Revision history

Sysop: /* Law enforcement officer witnesses */

2025-09-16T17:48:42Z

Law enforcement officer witnesses

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	===Law enforcement officer witnesses===		===Law enforcement officer witnesses===

			Jensen v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 266, held that the prosecution exercises due diligence for an officer witness when the agency has received and accepted the subpoena, even if the officer is not ultimately given the subpoena by the agency. The decision explicitly says prosecutors are not required to personally contact every police officer served with a subpoena, though of course it’s a very good idea to do so

	Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that absence of officer witness was good cause for continuance of criminal trial beyond statutory deadline, where prosecutor issued subpoena to officer through police department in accordance with statutory procedure, officer apparently did not receive subpoena before going on vacation, and prosecutor was not informed by police department of officer's unavailability until day before trial began; officer was arresting officer in driving under influence (DUI) case, and officer's anticipated return was in few weeks. Jensen v. Superior Court (App. 2 Dist. 2008) 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 160 Cal.App.4th 266, rehearing denied, review denied. Criminal Law Key Number 594(1)		Trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that absence of officer witness was good cause for continuance of criminal trial beyond statutory deadline, where prosecutor issued subpoena to officer through police department in accordance with statutory procedure, officer apparently did not receive subpoena before going on vacation, and prosecutor was not informed by police department of officer's unavailability until day before trial began; officer was arresting officer in driving under influence (DUI) case, and officer's anticipated return was in few weeks. Jensen v. Superior Court (App. 2 Dist. 2008) 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 594, 160 Cal.App.4th 266, rehearing denied, review denied. Criminal Law Key Number 594(1)

Sysop: /* 10-day trailing period */

2025-07-21T13:53:14Z

10-day trailing period

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	===10-day trailing period===		===10-day trailing period===

			Day set for trial means an automatic 10-day period follows. "The 10–day grace period is automatic and the defendant may not rescind it." (''People v. Griffin'' (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740, 1746; accord ''Medina v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1286; Pogosyan v. Appellate Divsion (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1041.)

	The 10–day period does not begin to run until the defendant announces ready for trial on the date to which the trial was continued, or on a later date to which the defendant impliedly or expressly consented if the case was again continued. (Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488–499.)		The 10–day period does not begin to run until the defendant announces ready for trial on the date to which the trial was continued, or on a later date to which the defendant impliedly or expressly consented if the case was again continued. (Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488–499.)

Sysop at 03:49, 16 July 2025

2025-07-16T03:49:01Z

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	''People v. Martinez'' (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 755		''People v. Martinez'' (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 755

	''People v. Nelson'' (2008)		''People v. Nelson'' (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242

Sysop at 03:48, 16 July 2025

2025-07-16T03:48:18Z

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	The '''Right to Speedy Trial''' encompasses several constitutional and statutory rights.		The '''Right to Speedy Trial''' encompasses several constitutional and statutory rights.

			''People v. Martinez'' (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 755

			''People v. Nelson'' (2008)


	==Prosecution's Right to a Speedy Trial==		==Prosecution's Right to a Speedy Trial==

Sysop at 14:48, 14 July 2025

2025-07-14T14:48:49Z

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	The '''Right to Speedy Trial''' encompasses several constitutional and statutory rights.		The '''Right to Speedy Trial''' encompasses several constitutional and statutory rights.

			==Prosecution's Right to a Speedy Trial==

			California Constitution, article I, section 29.

			Added by Proposition 115 in 1990, article I, section 29 of the California Constitution provides, “In a criminal case, the people of the State of California have the right to due process of law and to a speedy and public trial.” (See also Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 286, 299, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434.) Section 987.05, also added by Proposition 115, provides in pertinent part that “In cases where counsel, after making representations that he or she will be ready for ... trial, and without good cause is not ready on the date set, the court may relieve counsel from the case and may impose sanctions upon counsel.”2 Additionally, section 1050, which predates Proposition 115, provides, in pertinent part, that “the people, the defendant, and the victims and other witnesses have the right to an expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both for the prosecution and the defense, to expedite these proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice." ''People v. Cole'' (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1188.

	==Preliminary Hearing Rights==		==Preliminary Hearing Rights==

Sysop: /* 10-day trailing period */

2025-02-16T21:46:38Z

10-day trailing period

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	The 10–day period does not begin to run until the defendant announces ready for trial on the date to which the trial was continued, or on a later date to which the defendant impliedly or expressly consented if the case was again continued. (Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488–499.)		The 10–day period does not begin to run until the defendant announces ready for trial on the date to which the trial was continued, or on a later date to which the defendant impliedly or expressly consented if the case was again continued. (Bryant v. Superior Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 483, 488–499.)

			10 days start from "the defendant's actual readiness for immediate trial, regardless whether an explicit announcement of readiness is made." (''Pogosyan v. Appellate Division'' (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1032.)

	10-day trailing period starts from last day of trial. (''People v. Griffin'' (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740.)		10-day trailing period starts from last day of trial. (''People v. Griffin'' (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1740.)

Sysop: /* Right to speedy trial */

2025-02-16T18:44:46Z

Right to speedy trial

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	Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269		Baustert v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1269

			Court can require the withdrawal of time waiver be made by written notice with two days' notice. (''Daws v. Superior Court'' (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 81.) "Without sufficient notice in advance, the prosecutor—who in many situations will be managing a large inventory of misdemeanor prosecutions—may be forced to agree to a trial date without a full understanding of his or her own availability, or the availability of witnesses." (''Daws v. Superior Court'' (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 81, 87.)

	===10-day trailing period===		===10-day trailing period===

Sysop: /* Statute of Limitations */

2024-12-23T05:11:39Z

Statute of Limitations

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	"The filing of a criminal complaint does not generally commence the prosecution of a felony for statute of limitation purposes and, unless a formal arrest warrant issues or the case is certified to the superior court (see § 859a), the statute of limitation ordinarily continues to run until an information is filed. (''People v. Terry'' (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 764.)		"The filing of a criminal complaint does not generally commence the prosecution of a felony for statute of limitation purposes and, unless a formal arrest warrant issues or the case is certified to the superior court (see § 859a), the statute of limitation ordinarily continues to run until an information is filed. (''People v. Terry'' (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 764.)

	The statute of limitations can change while the old statute of limitations is running. (''People v. Hollie'' (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262.)		The statute of limitations can change while the old statute of limitations is running. (''People v. Hollie'' (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262; People v. Masry (1986) 179 Cal. App. 3d 1149.)

	===Right to speedy trial===		===Right to speedy trial===

Sysop: /* Statute of Limitations */

2024-12-23T05:10:52Z

Statute of Limitations

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	"The filing of a criminal complaint does not generally commence the prosecution of a felony for statute of limitation purposes and, unless a formal arrest warrant issues or the case is certified to the superior court (see § 859a), the statute of limitation ordinarily continues to run until an information is filed. (''People v. Terry'' (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 764.)		"The filing of a criminal complaint does not generally commence the prosecution of a felony for statute of limitation purposes and, unless a formal arrest warrant issues or the case is certified to the superior court (see § 859a), the statute of limitation ordinarily continues to run until an information is filed. (''People v. Terry'' (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 764.)

			The statute of limitations can change while the old statute of limitations is running. (''People v. Hollie'' (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1262.)

	===Right to speedy trial===		===Right to speedy trial===

Sysop: /* Statute of Limitations */

2024-12-23T04:43:24Z

Statute of Limitations

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	The rule seems generally recognized, though with some dissent, that, in computing time, the day of commission of the offense is excluded. (People v. Twedt (1934) 1 Cal.2d 392, 399 [35 P.2d 324, 327]) The last day of the period was the day on which the indictment was returned, and must be included in calculating the time. (People v. Hill (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 147.)		The rule seems generally recognized, though with some dissent, that, in computing time, the day of commission of the offense is excluded. (People v. Twedt (1934) 1 Cal.2d 392, 399 [35 P.2d 324, 327]) The last day of the period was the day on which the indictment was returned, and must be included in calculating the time. (People v. Hill (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 141, 147.)

			"The filing of a criminal complaint does not generally commence the prosecution of a felony for statute of limitation purposes and, unless a formal arrest warrant issues or the case is certified to the superior court (see § 859a), the statute of limitation ordinarily continues to run until an information is filed. (''People v. Terry'' (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 750, 764.)

	===Right to speedy trial===		===Right to speedy trial===