Robbery - Revision history

Sysop: /* Penal Code 591.5 interference with wireless device */

2025-07-07T01:15:54Z

Penal Code 591.5 interference with wireless device

← Older revision		Revision as of 01:15, 7 July 2025
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	Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of intent necessary for a robbery conviction. He argues there was no evidence that he intended to permanently deprive Gregory McClain of his cell phone. Rather, according to appellant, the evidence showed only that he intended to prevent McClain from calling the police. He contends that his conduct was a violation of section 591.5,11 but not a robbery.		Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of intent necessary for a robbery conviction. He argues there was no evidence that he intended to permanently deprive Gregory McClain of his cell phone. Rather, according to appellant, the evidence showed only that he intended to prevent McClain from calling the police. He contends that his conduct was a violation of section 591.5,11 but not a robbery.
	*17 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must “ ‘consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Romero (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 15, 18.) In making this determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (Evid.Code, § 312.) Thus, if the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) Unless it is clearly shown that “on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the [jury's] verdict,” we will not reverse. (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)
			In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must “ ‘consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Romero (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 15, 18.) In making this determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (Evid.Code, § 312.) Thus, if the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) Unless it is clearly shown that “on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the [jury's] verdict,” we will not reverse. (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)
	To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish that the defendant took property from the victim “by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him [or her] of that property.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176–1177; § 211.) The evidence must show that the requisite intent to steal arose either before or during the commission of the act of force. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 170.)(.) “[T]he intent required for robbery ... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643; People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099 [“ ‘[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself, together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.’ [Citation.]”].)		To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish that the defendant took property from the victim “by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him [or her] of that property.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176–1177; § 211.) The evidence must show that the requisite intent to steal arose either before or during the commission of the act of force. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 170.)(.) “[T]he intent required for robbery ... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643; People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099 [“ ‘[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself, together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.’ [Citation.]”].)

	As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 55 (Avery ), the phrase “intent to permanently deprive” is not intended literally, but is merely a shorthand was of describing the intent to steal. The Avery court cited examples, including when the nature of the property is such that even a temporary taking will deprive the owner of its primary economic value, such as goods that are dated or perishable; and when the defendant takes property with the intent to use it and then abandon it in circumstances making it unlikely that the victim will recover it. (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 55–56, citing People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 307–308.) Thus, the intent to permanently deprive can arise when the defendant asserts control over the property in a manner that creates a substantial risk of permanent loss. (People v. Davis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 309; People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 819.)		As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 55 (Avery ), the phrase “intent to permanently deprive” is not intended literally, but is merely a shorthand was of describing the intent to steal. The Avery court cited examples, including when the nature of the property is such that even a temporary taking will deprive the owner of its primary economic value, such as goods that are dated or perishable; and when the defendant takes property with the intent to use it and then abandon it in circumstances making it unlikely that the victim will recover it. (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 55–56, citing People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 307–308.) Thus, the intent to permanently deprive can arise when the defendant asserts control over the property in a manner that creates a substantial risk of permanent loss. (People v. Davis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 309; People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 819.)
	*18 Contrary to appellant's assertions, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that appellant intended to steal McClain's cell phone. McClain testified that he called 911 and was on hold when appellant pointed a gun at his head and demanded his cell phone. McClain gave him the phone but pointed out that other people were also calling 911. Appellant then threw the cell phone about 30 feet away into a bush. The jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant initially intended to permanently deprive McClain of his cell phone, but instead threw the phone and hastily fled with John Doe upon realizing that the arrival of the police was imminent. The fact that McClain later recovered his phone does not negate the reasonable inference that at the time appellant demanded the phone at gunpoint and took it, it was appellant's intention to deprive McClain of it permanently. (See People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584 [although the defendant discarded the wallet when he realized it was empty, it was reasonable to infer that when he took the wallet he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently]; see also In re Albert A. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008[“[T]he return of property previously taken does not compel the conclusion that a defendant intended only to temporarily deprive the owner of the property. [Citations.]”].) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the specific intent to deprive McClain of his cell phone permanently is supported by substantial evidence.
			Contrary to appellant's assertions, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that appellant intended to steal McClain's cell phone. McClain testified that he called 911 and was on hold when appellant pointed a gun at his head and demanded his cell phone. McClain gave him the phone but pointed out that other people were also calling 911. Appellant then threw the cell phone about 30 feet away into a bush. The jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant initially intended to permanently deprive McClain of his cell phone, but instead threw the phone and hastily fled with John Doe upon realizing that the arrival of the police was imminent. The fact that McClain later recovered his phone does not negate the reasonable inference that at the time appellant demanded the phone at gunpoint and took it, it was appellant's intention to deprive McClain of it permanently. (See People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584 [although the defendant discarded the wallet when he realized it was empty, it was reasonable to infer that when he took the wallet he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently]; see also In re Albert A. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008[“[T]he return of property previously taken does not compel the conclusion that a defendant intended only to temporarily deprive the owner of the property. [Citations.]”].) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the specific intent to deprive McClain of his cell phone permanently is supported by substantial evidence.


	People v. Baldenegro (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 10, 2011, No. A126904) 2011 WL 826179, at *16–18		People v. Baldenegro (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 10, 2011, No. A126904) 2011 WL 826179, at *16–18

Sysop at 01:15, 7 July 2025

2025-07-07T01:15:08Z

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	==Community property==		==Community property==
	Taking cell phone that was community property still legally is robbery according to People v. Aguilera (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 489.		Taking cell phone that was community property still legally is robbery according to People v. Aguilera (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 489.

			==Penal Code 591.5 interference with wireless device==

			Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the element of intent necessary for a robbery conviction. He argues there was no evidence that he intended to permanently deprive Gregory McClain of his cell phone. Rather, according to appellant, the evidence showed only that he intended to prevent McClain from calling the police. He contends that his conduct was a violation of section 591.5,11 but not a robbery.
			*17 In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate court must “ ‘consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We consider whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]” (People v. Romero (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 15, 18.) In making this determination, we do not reweigh the evidence; the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded to the evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the trier of fact. (Evid.Code, § 312.) Thus, if the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding will not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318–319.) Unless it is clearly shown that “on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the [jury's] verdict,” we will not reverse. (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429.)
			To prove a robbery, the prosecution must establish that the defendant took property from the victim “by means of force or fear with the specific intent to permanently deprive him [or her] of that property.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1176–1177; § 211.) The evidence must show that the requisite intent to steal arose either before or during the commission of the act of force. (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 170.)(.) “[T]he intent required for robbery ... is seldom established with direct evidence but instead is usually inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the crime. [Citations.]” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 643; People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099 [“ ‘[I]ntent is inherently difficult to prove by direct evidence. Therefore, the act itself, together with its surrounding circumstances must generally form the basis from which the intent of the actor may legitimately be inferred.’ [Citation.]”].)
			As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 55 (Avery ), the phrase “intent to permanently deprive” is not intended literally, but is merely a shorthand was of describing the intent to steal. The Avery court cited examples, including when the nature of the property is such that even a temporary taking will deprive the owner of its primary economic value, such as goods that are dated or perishable; and when the defendant takes property with the intent to use it and then abandon it in circumstances making it unlikely that the victim will recover it. (Avery, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 55–56, citing People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 307–308.) Thus, the intent to permanently deprive can arise when the defendant asserts control over the property in a manner that creates a substantial risk of permanent loss. (People v. Davis, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 309; People v. Mumm (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 812, 819.)
			*18 Contrary to appellant's assertions, the evidence supports a reasonable inference that appellant intended to steal McClain's cell phone. McClain testified that he called 911 and was on hold when appellant pointed a gun at his head and demanded his cell phone. McClain gave him the phone but pointed out that other people were also calling 911. Appellant then threw the cell phone about 30 feet away into a bush. The jury could have reasonably inferred that appellant initially intended to permanently deprive McClain of his cell phone, but instead threw the phone and hastily fled with John Doe upon realizing that the arrival of the police was imminent. The fact that McClain later recovered his phone does not negate the reasonable inference that at the time appellant demanded the phone at gunpoint and took it, it was appellant's intention to deprive McClain of it permanently. (See People v. Carroll (1970) 1 Cal.3d 581, 584 [although the defendant discarded the wallet when he realized it was empty, it was reasonable to infer that when he took the wallet he intended to deprive the owner of it permanently]; see also In re Albert A. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1008[“[T]he return of property previously taken does not compel the conclusion that a defendant intended only to temporarily deprive the owner of the property. [Citations.]”].) Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the specific intent to deprive McClain of his cell phone permanently is supported by substantial evidence.


			People v. Baldenegro (Cal. Ct. App., Mar. 10, 2011, No. A126904) 2011 WL 826179, at *16–18

Sysop: /* Elements of force or fear */

2025-05-18T18:33:31Z

Elements of force or fear

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	[F]ear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774.)		[F]ear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774.)

			“[I]t is settled that a victim of robbery may be unconscious or even dead when the property is taken, so long as the defendant used force against the victim to take the property.” (People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1330, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 793, citing People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 956, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) There is no requirement a victim be aware that someone was taking his or her property. (Jackson, at p. 1330, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 793.) (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 507 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 556, 161 P.3d 58, 84], as modified (Aug. 22, 2007))

	==Aider and abettor==		==Aider and abettor==

Sysop: /* Elements of force or fear= */

2024-04-30T00:08:53Z

Elements of force or fear=

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	Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].		Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].

	==Elements of force or fear===		==Elements of force or fear==

	Fear is sufficient by itself. Stepping back was fear. (''People v. Collins'' (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333.)		Fear is sufficient by itself. Stepping back was fear. (''People v. Collins'' (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333.)

Sysop at 03:49, 22 February 2024

2024-02-22T03:49:35Z

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	[F]ear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774.)		[F]ear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774.)

			==Aider and abettor==

			''People v. Haynes'' (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282

			''People v. Elliott'' (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1633



			==Conspiracy==

	==Attempted Estes robbery==		==Attempted Estes robbery==

Sysop at 03:43, 22 February 2024

2024-02-22T03:43:55Z

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	Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].		Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].

			==Elements of force or fear===

			Fear is sufficient by itself. Stepping back was fear. (''People v. Collins'' (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333.)

			[F]ear means “ ‘sufficient fear to cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property.’ ” (People v. Morehead (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 765, 774.)

	==Attempted Estes robbery==		==Attempted Estes robbery==

Sysop at 17:49, 9 February 2024

2024-02-09T17:49:02Z

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	People v. Hodge 213 Cal.App.4th 531		People v. Hodge 213 Cal.App.4th 531

			==Community property==
			Taking cell phone that was community property still legally is robbery according to People v. Aguilera (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 489.

Sysop at 20:05, 10 January 2023

2023-01-10T20:05:12Z

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	"What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acqusition of the property, but in the escape." (People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) As Estes itself explains: "The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property." (Estes, at p. 27.)		"What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acqusition of the property, but in the escape." (People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) As Estes itself explains: "The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property." (Estes, at p. 27.)

	The concept of an Estes robbery is premised on: "The crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety." (~~Eyes~~, at p. 28.) Because the offense isn't complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of safety, any use of force by the perpetrator before the point of safety is why it is a robbery. Otherwise, if asportation wasn't a required element.		The concept of an Estes robbery is premised on: "The crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety." (Estes, at p. 28.) Because the offense isn't complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of safety, any use of force by the perpetrator before the point of safety is why it is a robbery. Otherwise, if asportation wasn't a required element, then the use of force after the caption does not transform the theft into a robbery. As Robins put it, without an asportation element, then it becomes "simply a theft plus an assault." (Robins, at p. 419.)


	Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].		Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].
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	Accordin to Robins, "What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acquisition of the property, but in the escape.[5] (People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) The typical case starts with a shoplifting and turns into a robbery when the thief is confronted by a LPO, and the thief assaults the LPO in an attempt to get away." (P. 419)		Accordin to Robins, "What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acquisition of the property, but in the escape.[5] (People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) The typical case starts with a shoplifting and turns into a robbery when the thief is confronted by a LPO, and the thief assaults the LPO in an attempt to get away." (P. 419)

			People v. Hodge 213 Cal.App.4th 531

Sysop at 19:16, 10 January 2023

2023-01-10T19:16:04Z

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	"What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acqusition of the property, but in the escape." (People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) As Estes itself explains: "The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property." (Estes, at p. 27.)		"What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acqusition of the property, but in the escape." (People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) As Estes itself explains: "The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property." (Estes, at p. 27.)

	The concept of an Estes robbery is premised on: "The crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety." (Eyes, at p. 28.) Because the offense isn't complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of safety, any use of force by the perpetrator before the point of safety is why it is a robbery.		The concept of an Estes robbery is premised on: "The crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety." (Eyes, at p. 28.) Because the offense isn't complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of safety, any use of force by the perpetrator before the point of safety is why it is a robbery. Otherwise, if asportation wasn't a required element.

	~~People v. Estes explains the above: "“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will~~, ~~accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) It includes two phases: acquiring the property, and carrying it away (in the parlance of legalese: caption and~~ asportation~~)." (People v~~. E

Sysop: Created page with "Under the statute, Penal Code section 211, "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." Under CALCRIM 1600, the elements are: 1. The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own; 2. The property was in the possession of another person; 3. The property was taken from the other person or (his/her) immediate presence; 4. The..."

2023-01-10T19:09:41Z

Created page with "Under the statute, Penal Code section 211, "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear." Under CALCRIM 1600, the elements are: 1. The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own; 2. The property was in the possession of another person; 3. The property was taken from the other person or (his/her) immediate presence; 4. The..."

New page

Under the statute, Penal Code section 211, "Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear."

Under CALCRIM 1600, the elements are:

1. The defendant took property that was not (his/her) own;

2. The property was in the possession of another person;

3. The property was taken from the other person or (his/her) immediate presence;

4. The property was taken against that person’s will;

5. The defendant used force or fear to take the property or to
prevent the person from resisting;

AND

6. When the defendant used force or fear, (he/she) intended (to deprive the owner of the property permanently/ [or] to remove
the property from the owner’s possession for so extended a period of time that the owner would be deprived of a major portion of the value or enjoyment of the property).

Furthermore, the CALCRIM says: "[A person takes something when he or she gains possession of it and
moves it some distance. The distance moved may be short.]"

People v. Gomez explains the theft portion of robbery: "Larceny requires the taking of another's property, with the intent to steal and carry it away. (Citation.) “Taking,” in turn, has two aspects: (1) achieving possession of the property, known as “caption,” and (2) carrying the property away, or “asportation.” (Citation.) Although the slightest movement may constitute asportation (Citation), the theft continues until the perpetrator has reached a place of temporary safety with the property. (Citation).

So robbery is a theft with force. As theft, robbery requires a caption, and an asportation.

"What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acqusition of the property, but in the escape." (People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413, 419, citing People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.) As Estes itself explains: "The crime of robbery includes the element of asportation, the robber's escape with the loot being considered as important in the commission of the crime as gaining possession of the property." (Estes, at p. 27.)

The concept of an Estes robbery is premised on: "The crime of robbery is a continuing offense that begins from the time of the original taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety." (Eyes, at p. 28.) Because the offense isn't complete until the perpetrator reaches a place of safety, any use of force by the perpetrator before the point of safety is why it is a robbery.

People v. Estes explains the above: "“Robbery is the felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another, from his person or immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (§ 211.) It includes two phases: acquiring the property, and carrying it away (in the parlance of legalese: caption and asportation)." (People v. E

Attempted Robbery. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 211; People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443 [285 Cal.Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].

==Attempted Estes robbery==

People v. Robins (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 413

In Robins, the defendant left the store with a bunch of clothing. The loss prevention officer confronted the defendant outside the store. The loss prevention officer caused the defendant to let go of the clothing. The defendant fled the scene.

Accordin to Robins, "What sets an Estes robbery apart from a standard robbery is that force or fear is used not in the acquisition of the property, but in the escape.[5] (People v. Estes, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 28.) The typical case starts with a shoplifting and turns into a robbery when the thief is confronted by a LPO, and the thief assaults the LPO in an attempt to get away." (P. 419)