Search and Seizure - Revision history

Sysop at 02:28, 30 March 2026

2026-03-30T02:28:34Z

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	2 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 5th Crimes--Property § 309 (2025)		2 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 5th Crimes--Property § 309 (2025)


			==Trying to suppress a PC148, PC69, or VC2800==


			The exclusionary rule should not apply if the effect would be to immunize a defendant from prosecution for a crime of violence committed on a peace officer even if the officer was engaged in an unlawful search or seizure. A criminal defendant who is charged with a crime of violence committed on a peace officer may move to suppress the officer's testimony pursuant to Penal Code § 1538.5. An evidentiary hearing should be conducted (see § 3:16), even though suppression of the officer's testimony about the defendant's violence or resistance is inappropriate. As we explain below, there is authority that 1538.5 does not always mandate an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Chavez, 54 Cal. App. 5th 477, 268 Cal. Rptr. 3d 726 (2d Dist. 2020)). Despite this authority, we would urge the trial court err in permitting an evidentiary hearing. A defendant who successfully convinces the court the officer was not lawfully engaged in the performance of his or her duties (because, for example, the officer was making an unlawful arrest or detention) will have considerably enhanced his or her negotiating position. Indeed, such a finding may result in the People's motion to dismiss the charge(s) involving violence or resistance committed upon the officer.
			For any crime of violence committed upon an officer, the “engaged in the performance of duties” element is part of the corpus delicti of the offense. As such, the People must prove this fact at trial beyond a reasonable doubt. If a magistrate at the hearing on the motion to suppress finds the officer was not engaged in the performance of his or her duties when the defendant allegedly used violence upon the officer, it would be highly unlikely the same evidence would be sufficient to convince a jury at the much higher standard of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Further, as discussed below in People v. Hernandez, 45 Cal. 4th 295, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105, 196 P.3d 806 (2008), even if the People can convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the officer was lawfully engaged in the performance of duties at the time of the defendant's resistance, an appellate court may disagree and reverse the conviction.

			“There are limitations to the exclusionary rule that are largely based on common sense. One such limitation is that the rule does not immunize crimes of violence committed on a peace officer, even if they are preceded by a Fourth Amendment violation.” (In re Richard G., 173 Cal. App. 4th 1252, 1260–1261, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506 (2d Dist. 2009).)

			The minor in Richard G. contended the court erred in not suppressing the testimony of the arresting officer. The minor argued, unsuccessfully, he was not lawfully detained and patted down and therefore, since the detention was unlawful, the court had to suppress the evidence of his resisting. The court affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress and, albeit dictum, held even if the officer conducted an unlawful seizure, suppression would not extend to include the officer's testimony describing the defendant's unlawful conduct. Even if the officer is acting in excess of the fourth amendment, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause or a lawful arrest or search warrant, a citizen has a duty to not “delay, obstruct or resist” or use force or violence upon the officer.
			Beginning with § 1:25, we consider the “fruit of the poisonous tree” line of cases, including how the taint of an illegal search can be dissipated or attenuated. In Richard G., the officer's testimony did not “result from” nor was it “caused by” a fourth amendment violation. Instead, the testimony concerning the defendant's resistance arose from the defendant's intervening, independent conduct. The commission of crime of violence breaks the casual link between an alleged constitutional violation and evidence (testimony) of that crime.

			Similar reasoning may be found in People v. Cox, 168 Cal. App. 4th 702, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 716 (3d Dist. 2008). In this case, the officer sought to detain the defendant for violating a municipal code ordinance that prohibited walking in the street when a sidewalk was available. The appellate court found the California Vehicle Code had preempted the ordinance and therefore the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to support the detention. However, the defendant's resistance to the unlawful detention “dissipated” the taint. “But it would be a curious use of language to say that the officers' detention of defendant (illegal though it might have been) procured the officers' subsequent observations of his resistance to arrest.” A defendant who chooses to flee, or flee and forcefully resist, is exercising a voluntary choice that is independent of the unlawful detention.

			In People v. Hernandez, 45 Cal. 4th 295, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105, 196 P.3d 806 (2008), a Sacramento Sheriff's Deputy observed a vehicle driven by the defendant. The vehicle did not have a license plate but did display a temporary operator's permit. Based on his experience, the officer had the opinion such permits were often either forged or was for a different vehicle. He initiated a traffic stop and the defendant was asked if he was on probation or parole. The defendant admitted he was on probation. The officer ordered him out of the vehicle. When the defendant refused, he was physically removed and, in the process, fought the deputy. Hernandez was charged with felony and misdemeanor resisting arrest, being under the influence of methamphetamine, and driving while under the influence of drugs. He moved to suppress. His argument was that since the stop was unlawful (he had a valid temporary operator's permit), the evidence should be suppressed. The magistrate denied the motion and the defendant was convicted. Hernandez appealed.

			The Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The officer did not have a reasonable suspicion the defendant was violating the law. The conviction for resisting must be reversed since the officer was not lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties. On its own motion, the California Supreme Court granted review thus superseding the intermediate appellate court opinion. However, the state Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as the intermediate appellate court.
			Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court in Hernandez chose not to address whether the sanction of suppression of the officer's testimony concerning the defendant's violent resistance was even applicable. Instead, the court determined the officer was not lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties when he made the traffic stop since he lacked a reasonable suspicion the motorist was in violation of the law. The defendant's motion to suppress was denied by the trial court and the jury found him guilty of both Penal Code § 69 and 148(a)(1). The issue on appeal was whether the officer was acting lawfully when the defendant used force and violence upon him; since the stop was unlawful, the conviction for resisting was reversed. (See also, In re Chase C., 243 Cal. App. 4th 107, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 381 (4th Dist. 2015).)

			Penal Code § 148.9 provides in part: “(a) Any person who falsely represents or identifies himself or herself as another person or a fictitious person to any peace officer …; , upon a lawful detention or arrest of the person, either to evade the process of the court, or to evade the proper identification of the person by the investigating officer is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Italics added.) Hence, as part of the corpus delicti of the offense, the People must prove the officer was acting lawfully at the time the defendant allegedly provided false identification. In the case of In re Voeurn O., 35 Cal. App. 4th 793, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 549 (4th Dist. 1995) (review denied), a police officer was dispatched to an apartment complex to investigate a call concerning “suspicious juveniles loitering.” The officer saw the minor lying on the grass in the middle of the complex and began questioning him. The minor said he was waiting for a friend but could not provide the friend's address. He also gave the officer a false name and address and denied being in a gang. He was released and arrested three weeks later when the police discovered his true identity.
			At the start of his jurisdictional hearing, the minor moved to suppress the false statements on the ground they were the product of an unlawful detention. The juvenile court judge denied the motion finding the minor was not detained at the time he gave the false identification. The judge sustained the petition and the minor appealed. On appeal, the minor did not of course challenge the judge's finding. Indeed, because he was not detained when he gave the false name, he could not be “convicted” of violating Penal Code § 148.9! The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the judgment sustaining the petition.
			If the juvenile court judge had found the officer had indeed detained the minor and the detention was without reasonable suspicion (see §§ 4:13 et seq.), would the exclusionary rule apply to suppress the officer's testimony concerning the false identification? As we explain below, unlike crimes of violence committed upon the officer, the officer's testimony should be suppressed.
			In People v. Walker, 210 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 424 (6th Dist. 2012) (review denied Jan. 30, 2013), the defendant was arrested for violation of Pen. Code § 148.9 (providing false identification). In Walker, a deputy Sheriff stopped the defendant because he generally matched the description of the perpetrator in a recent sexual battery at a light rail station. Walker was asked to provide proof that he had paid fare and he responded by asking why the deputy was singling him out. The deputy indicated to Walker he had the right to ask the defendant for proof of fare and that he resembled a suspect in a sexual battery investigation. The deputy then asked Walker for identification. Walker said he had none. Two other uniformed officers arrived at that time and Walker was looking around. The deputy thought he might run, so he asked Walker to have a seat on a bench on the platform. The defendant was again asked for identification, and he produced a San Jose State University student body card in the name of “Aalim Moor.” The deputy had one of his partners run the name for a warrant check. As a result, the deputies learned Walker had provided false identification and he was arrested for violation of Pen. Code § 148.9. A search of the defendant incident to arrest produced a valid driver's license in Walker's identity.
			Walker moved to suppress the evidence he presented false identification to the officer. Because the officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to support the detention, the false identification should have been suppressed. The trial court denied the motion; the intermediate appellate court reversed. The statute criminalizes a person's false identification of himself or herself to a peace officer “upon a lawful detention or arrest of (that) person.” (Pen. Code, § 148.9.) Since the defendant was not lawfully detained, the production of the false documentation should have been suppressed.
			In People v. Gerberding, 50 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 263 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 2020), a Fresno police officer assigned to the Homeless Task Force, encountered the defendant next to a public sidewalk. Defendant had parked a shopping cart with his personal items on the sidewalk. The officer ordered Geberding to move the cart from the sidewalk based upon a municipal code section. The defendant refused and was arrested for P.C. § 148(a). The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Appellate Division. His conviction was reversed. The officer was mistaken about the law, which clearly applied to “persons” and not possessions hindering or obstructing passage. His mistake of law was not reasonable and hence Geberding's passive resistance to his unlawful arrest was lawful. The officer was not lawfully engaged in the performance of his duties.
			In People v. Chavez, 54 Cal.App.5th 477, 268 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 (2d Dist. 2020), review denied (Dec. 23, 2020) the trial court ruled the defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress. The evidence defendant sought to suppress was obtained as a result of the defendant's resistance to a detention. The trial court held even if the detention was unlawful, an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary if the evidence was obtained as a result of a new and distinct crime committed by the defendant. We discuss Chavez further in § 3:14 and § 3:16. As we explained above, we urge the magistrate hearing a motion to suppress err on the side of allowing the hearing to proceed. Chavez has not been cited as authority in any published opinions.
			The question addressed in People v. Williams, 26 Cal. App. 5th 71, 236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (6th Dist. 2018) was whether a defendant may be convicted of violating Penal Code § 148(a)(1) if the officer uses excessive force after the completed offense of delaying, obstructing, or resisting an officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his or her duties. The appellate court answered the question affirmatively: if the defendant delays, obstructs or resists an officer (who is lawfully engaged in the performance of his or her duties), the defendant may be convicted of violating § 148(a)(1) even if the officer uses excessive force after the completed violation. In accord, see Flynn v. City of Santa Clara, 388 F. Supp. 3d 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
			Finally, another word of caution. In People v. Southard, 62 Cal. App. 5th 424, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (1st Dist. 2021), the defendant was charged with various offenses including Penal Code § 69 and § 148(a). The prosecutor persuaded the judge to include a special instruction that was based upon both Cox and In re Richard G. The instruction read, “An individual’s decision to commit a new and distinct crime, even if made during or immediately after an unlawful detention, is an intervening act sufficient to purge the ‘taint’ of a theoretically illegal detention. If you believe that the defendant was acting lawfully and that the police detained him unlawfully, a defendant’s subsequent conduct in obstructing, resisting, or delaying the officers, if it occurred, can be an independent act that dissipated the taint from the initial unlawful seizure. If there was unlawful detention, you may conclude that a choice to flee or to resist arrest are independent intervening acts sufficiently distinct from an illegal detention to dissipate the taint of an illegal detention.” The appellate court was not impressed. The language was a misstatement of the law in the context of this case. Use of language from a decision involving a motion to suppress as a basis for a special jury instruction was to “court disaster.”

Sysop: /* Hearing on Motion to Suppress */

2026-03-03T14:48:54Z

Hearing on Motion to Suppress

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	==Hearing on Motion to Suppress==		==Hearing on Motion to Suppress==

			Hearsay rules apply during a motion to suppress.


	There are two exceptions to hearsay in hearings under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 that frequently arise: (1) hearsay and opinion are admissible if they relate to a witness's relevant and subjective state of mind (see, for example, People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 320–321, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1973); and (2) hearsay is admissible on the issue of probable cause (see, for example. People v. Magana, 95 Cal. App. 3d 453, 460–461, 157 Cal. Rptr. 173 (2d Dist. 1979); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).		There are two exceptions to hearsay in hearings under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 that frequently arise: (1) hearsay and opinion are admissible if they relate to a witness's relevant and subjective state of mind (see, for example, People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 320–321, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1973); and (2) hearsay is admissible on the issue of probable cause (see, for example. People v. Magana, 95 Cal. App. 3d 453, 460–461, 157 Cal. Rptr. 173 (2d Dist. 1979); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).

Sysop at 22:50, 1 September 2025

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	CAJUR CLPRE § 606		CAJUR CLPRE § 606


			==Crime==

			(1) P.C. 146 makes it a misdemeanor for a public officer, or an impersonator of a public officer, to seize or levy on property or dispossess anyone of land, without the authority to do so. (P.C. 146(b) and (c).)

			(2) P.C. 146a deals with persons who falsely represent a state deputy or clerk (P.C. 146a(a)), or a public officer, investigator, or inspector (P.C. 146a(b)), and in those assumed roles search another's property or obtain anything of value. A person violating P.C. 146a(a) is subject to imprisonment in a county jail for not more than 6 months, a fine of not more than $2,500, or both. (P.C. 146a(a).) A person violating P.C. 146a(b) is subject to imprisonment in a county jail for not more than 1 year, a fine of not more than $2,500, or both, or imprisonment under P.C. 1170(h) (felony punishment). (P.C. 146a(b).)

			2 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 5th Crimes--Property § 309 (2025)

Sysop: /* Return of property */

2025-05-12T02:40:24Z

Return of property

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	The proper avenue of redress is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. (People v. $25,000 United States Currency, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see also People v. Gershenhorn, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d. at p. 126, 37 Cal.Rptr. 176.) Alternatively, the individual may seek return of his or her property in a civil action for recovery of property with an attendant right to appeal from any adverse civil judgment. (See, e.g., Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 611, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876.) (''People v. Hopkins'' (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308.)		The proper avenue of redress is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. (People v. $25,000 United States Currency, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see also People v. Gershenhorn, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d. at p. 126, 37 Cal.Rptr. 176.) Alternatively, the individual may seek return of his or her property in a civil action for recovery of property with an attendant right to appeal from any adverse civil judgment. (See, e.g., Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 611, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876.) (''People v. Hopkins'' (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308.)

			People v. Hopkins, 171 Cal. App. 4th 305, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744 (4th Dist. 2009)

			Chavez v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 4th 104, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 21 (4th Dist. 2004)

			People v. Lamonte, 53 Cal. App. 4th 544, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 810 (4th Dist. 1997).

	Franklin v. Municipal Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 884, 103 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1st Dist. 1972) (conversion)		Franklin v. Municipal Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 884, 103 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1st Dist. 1972) (conversion)

	Ligda v. Edmunds, 16 Cal. App. 3d 715, 94 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1971) (replevin or claim and delivery).		Ligda v. Edmunds, 16 Cal. App. 3d 715, 94 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1971) (replevin or claim and delivery).

			CAJUR CLPRE § 606

Sysop at 14:51, 11 May 2025

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	The proper avenue of redress is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. (People v. $25,000 United States Currency, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see also People v. Gershenhorn, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d. at p. 126, 37 Cal.Rptr. 176.) Alternatively, the individual may seek return of his or her property in a civil action for recovery of property with an attendant right to appeal from any adverse civil judgment. (See, e.g., Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 611, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876.) (''People v. Hopkins'' (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308.)		The proper avenue of redress is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. (People v. $25,000 United States Currency, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see also People v. Gershenhorn, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d. at p. 126, 37 Cal.Rptr. 176.) Alternatively, the individual may seek return of his or her property in a civil action for recovery of property with an attendant right to appeal from any adverse civil judgment. (See, e.g., Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 611, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876.) (''People v. Hopkins'' (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308.)

			Franklin v. Municipal Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 884, 103 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1st Dist. 1972) (conversion)

			Ligda v. Edmunds, 16 Cal. App. 3d 715, 94 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1st Dist. 1971) (replevin or claim and delivery).

Sysop at 14:50, 11 May 2025

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	''People v. Colt'' (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1404		''People v. Colt'' (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1404

			==Return of property==

			The proper avenue of redress is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. (People v. $25,000 United States Currency, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 132, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 637; see also People v. Gershenhorn, supra, 225 Cal.App.2d. at p. 126, 37 Cal.Rptr. 176.) Alternatively, the individual may seek return of his or her property in a civil action for recovery of property with an attendant right to appeal from any adverse civil judgment. (See, e.g., Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123, 113 Cal.Rptr. 102, 520 P.2d 726; People v. Superior Court (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 600, 611, 104 Cal.Rptr. 876.) (''People v. Hopkins'' (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 305, 308.)

Sysop: /* Motion to Suppress */

2025-04-01T01:18:23Z

Motion to Suppress

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	A defendant may use both a post-PX 1538.5(i) and a 995 to challenge a motion to suppress denied at preliminary hearing. (''People v. Kidd'' (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12, overruled on another ground in People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235.)		A defendant may use both a post-PX 1538.5(i) and a 995 to challenge a motion to suppress denied at preliminary hearing. (''People v. Kidd'' (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12, overruled on another ground in People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235.)

			PC1510 only requires the motion be made, not heard, within the timeline. (''Rodriguez v. Superior Court'' (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1453.)

	==Hearing on Motion to Suppress==		==Hearing on Motion to Suppress==

Sysop at 00:59, 1 April 2025

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	As a rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial evidentiary hearing and the court is without jurisdiction to authorize a second evidentiary hearing. (People v. Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 179 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1st Dist. 1981); see also, Madril v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal. Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33 (1975); People v. Dubose, 17 Cal. App. 3d 43, 47, 94 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480-481, 89 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. 1970)). This rule is often referred to as “one bite at the apple.”		As a rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial evidentiary hearing and the court is without jurisdiction to authorize a second evidentiary hearing. (People v. Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 179 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1st Dist. 1981); see also, Madril v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal. Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33 (1975); People v. Dubose, 17 Cal. App. 3d 43, 47, 94 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480-481, 89 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. 1970)). This rule is often referred to as “one bite at the apple.”

	==Hearing on ~~Motino~~ to Suppress==		A defendant may use both a post-PX 1538.5(i) and a 995 to challenge a motion to suppress denied at preliminary hearing. (''People v. Kidd'' (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 12, overruled on another ground in People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235.)

			==Hearing on Motion to Suppress==

	There are two exceptions to hearsay in hearings under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 that frequently arise: (1) hearsay and opinion are admissible if they relate to a witness's relevant and subjective state of mind (see, for example, People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 320–321, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1973); and (2) hearsay is admissible on the issue of probable cause (see, for example. People v. Magana, 95 Cal. App. 3d 453, 460–461, 157 Cal. Rptr. 173 (2d Dist. 1979); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).		There are two exceptions to hearsay in hearings under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 that frequently arise: (1) hearsay and opinion are admissible if they relate to a witness's relevant and subjective state of mind (see, for example, People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 320–321, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1973); and (2) hearsay is admissible on the issue of probable cause (see, for example. People v. Magana, 95 Cal. App. 3d 453, 460–461, 157 Cal. Rptr. 173 (2d Dist. 1979); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).

	==Detention==		==Detention==

			Shining a spotlight on a parked car is not a detention. (''People v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235.)


	A detention may occur for a future crime that is about to occur. (''People v. Ellis'' (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1198; ''People v. Aldridge'' (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 478.)		A detention may occur for a future crime that is about to occur. (''People v. Ellis'' (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1198; ''People v. Aldridge'' (1984) 35 Cal.3d 473, 478.)

Sysop at 00:56, 1 April 2025

2025-04-01T00:56:10Z

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	As a rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial evidentiary hearing and the court is without jurisdiction to authorize a second evidentiary hearing. (People v. Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 179 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1st Dist. 1981); see also, Madril v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal. Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33 (1975); People v. Dubose, 17 Cal. App. 3d 43, 47, 94 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480-481, 89 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. 1970)). This rule is often referred to as “one bite at the apple.”		As a rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial evidentiary hearing and the court is without jurisdiction to authorize a second evidentiary hearing. (People v. Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 179 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1st Dist. 1981); see also, Madril v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal. Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33 (1975); People v. Dubose, 17 Cal. App. 3d 43, 47, 94 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480-481, 89 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. 1970)). This rule is often referred to as “one bite at the apple.”

			==Hearing on Motino to Suppress==

			There are two exceptions to hearsay in hearings under Pen. Code, § 1538.5 that frequently arise: (1) hearsay and opinion are admissible if they relate to a witness's relevant and subjective state of mind (see, for example, People v. Conrad, 31 Cal. App. 3d 308, 320–321, 107 Cal. Rptr. 421 (2d Dist. 1973); and (2) hearsay is admissible on the issue of probable cause (see, for example. People v. Magana, 95 Cal. App. 3d 453, 460–461, 157 Cal. Rptr. 173 (2d Dist. 1979); Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).

	==Detention==		==Detention==

Sysop: /* Motion to Suppress */

2025-04-01T00:55:52Z

Motion to Suppress

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	PC991 motion cannot be used to suppress evidence. (Barajas v. Appellate Division (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 944.)		PC991 motion cannot be used to suppress evidence. (Barajas v. Appellate Division (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 944.)

			As a rule, a defendant is allowed only one pretrial evidentiary hearing and the court is without jurisdiction to authorize a second evidentiary hearing. (People v. Nelson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 978, 981, 179 Cal. Rptr. 195 (1st Dist. 1981); see also, Madril v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 73, 77-78, 123 Cal. Rptr. 465, 539 P.2d 33 (1975); People v. Dubose, 17 Cal. App. 3d 43, 47, 94 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. 1971); People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. App. 3d 477, 480-481, 89 Cal. Rptr. 223 (2d Dist. 1970)). This rule is often referred to as “one bite at the apple.”

	==Detention==		==Detention==