Theft - Revision history

Sysop: /* Vehicles */

2024-10-13T20:44:29Z

Vehicles

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	==Vehicles==		==Vehicles==

			Under People v. Bullard (2020) 9 Cal.5th 94, "a conviction [] based on posttheft driving (i.e., driving separated from the vehicle's taking by a substantial break)" is a felony regardless of value. Or PC496d(a) is a felony regardless of value. (People v. Orozco (2020) 9 Cal.5th 111.)

	===Trailers===		===Trailers===

Sysop at 00:07, 1 July 2024

2024-07-01T00:07:59Z

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	Defendant, by entering vehicle, threatening to kill driver and passengers if driver did not take him where he wanted to go, telling driver, at gunpoint, when to speed up and slow down, when to get on the freeway and when to get off, and where and when to turn, committed kidnapping for carjacking.		Defendant, by entering vehicle, threatening to kill driver and passengers if driver did not take him where he wanted to go, telling driver, at gunpoint, when to speed up and slow down, when to get on the freeway and when to get off, and where and when to turn, committed kidnapping for carjacking.

			==Vehicles==

			===Trailers===

			According to CALCRIM 1820, "A vehicle includes a (passenger vehicle/motorcycle/motor scooter/bus/schoolbus/commercial vehicle/truck tractor/ [and] trailer/ [and]semitrailer/."

			According to Vehicle Code section 670, "A “vehicle” is a device by which any person or property may be propelled, moved, or drawn upon a highway, excepting a device moved exclusively by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks."

			According to People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, "In conclusion, because the language of Vehicle Code section 10851 clearly proscribes the unlawful taking of a “vehicle,” and because a trailer qualifies as a “vehicle” under Vehicle Code section 670, defendant was properly convicted of both unlawfully taking Martenez's truck and his attached trailer."

Sysop at 20:17, 29 October 2023

2023-10-29T20:17:07Z

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	==Dual convictions==		==Dual convictions==

			"Participation in larceny or theft as precluding conviction for receiving or concealing the stolen property" 29 A.L.R. 5th 59

	In fact, dual convictions under these statutes are barred only when a defendant is convicted of a theft offense under section 10851(a)—i.e., of “taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.” (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 111 P.3d 310; People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 401, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 765.) But if a defendant is convicted under section 10851(a) for a nontheft offense—either joyriding or posttheft driving—dual convictions are permissible. (Ibid.) (''People v. Jackson'' (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 380, fn.10.)		In fact, dual convictions under these statutes are barred only when a defendant is convicted of a theft offense under section 10851(a)—i.e., of “taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.” (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 111 P.3d 310; People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 401, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 765.) But if a defendant is convicted under section 10851(a) for a nontheft offense—either joyriding or posttheft driving—dual convictions are permissible. (Ibid.) (''People v. Jackson'' (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 380, fn.10.)

Sysop at 03:46, 5 August 2023

2023-08-05T03:46:33Z

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			==Dual convictions==

			In fact, dual convictions under these statutes are barred only when a defendant is convicted of a theft offense under section 10851(a)—i.e., of “taking a car with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession.” (Garza, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 876, 28 Cal.Rptr.3d 335, 111 P.3d 310; People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 401, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 765.) But if a defendant is convicted under section 10851(a) for a nontheft offense—either joyriding or posttheft driving—dual convictions are permissible. (Ibid.) (''People v. Jackson'' (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 371, 380, fn.10.)

			If, on the other hand, a section 10851(a) conviction is based on posttheft driving, a separate conviction under section 496(a) for receiving the same vehicle as stolen property is not precluded. (''People v. Garza'' (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 876.)

	The elements of theft by larceny are well settled: the offense is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. (See, e.g., People v. Earle (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 476, 477–478, 35 Cal.Rptr. 265; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–116, 236 P. 944; CALJIC No. 14.02; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) pp. 292–335 (hereafter Perkins).) The act of taking personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass2 unless the owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally3 or the taker has a legal right to take the property. (Perkins, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The intent to steal or animus furandi is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently *298 1168 deprive the owner of possession. (Id. at pp. 326–327.) And if the taking has begun, the slightest movement of the property constitutes a carrying away or asportation. (Id. at pp. 323–325.)		The elements of theft by larceny are well settled: the offense is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. (See, e.g., People v. Earle (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 476, 477–478, 35 Cal.Rptr. 265; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–116, 236 P. 944; CALJIC No. 14.02; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) pp. 292–335 (hereafter Perkins).) The act of taking personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass2 unless the owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally3 or the taker has a legal right to take the property. (Perkins, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The intent to steal or animus furandi is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently *298 1168 deprive the owner of possession. (Id. at pp. 326–327.) And if the taking has begun, the slightest movement of the property constitutes a carrying away or asportation. (Id. at pp. 323–325.)

Sysop: /* Receiving stolen property */

2023-07-31T04:09:43Z

Receiving stolen property

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	There are two limited exceptions to the common law rule: “(1) when the acts of receiving or concealment are completely divorced from the theft, as where the thief disposes of the property and then, in a separate transaction, receives it again, and (2) when the thief is a co-conspirator of the receiver.” (People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 371, fn. 5, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, citing People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706.) Neither exception applies here. (''People v. ~~Allen~~ (1999) fn. 10.)		There are two limited exceptions to the common law rule: “(1) when the acts of receiving or concealment are completely divorced from the theft, as where the thief disposes of the property and then, in a separate transaction, receives it again, and (2) when the thief is a co-conspirator of the receiver.” (People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 371, fn. 5, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, citing People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706.) Neither exception applies here. (''People v. Smith'' (1999) fn. 10.)

	==Intent==		==Intent==

Sysop: /* Receiving stolen property */

2023-07-31T04:09:20Z

Receiving stolen property

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	Receiving stolen property is a violation of section 496. That section, however, can also be violated by concealing or withholding stolen property. Semantically, a thief is capable of “concealing” or “withholding.” Nevertheless, in People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832, the court held that a defendant could not be convicted for both stealing and concealing or withholding the same property. It explained: “To conceal 371 and withhold is the *496 thief's purpose from the very moment that he gains possession of the property. It is part and parcel of the theft. But such concealment and withholding is not that envisaged by section 496.” (Id., at p. 183, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832.) Rather, section 496 “is directed at the traditional ‘fence’ and at those who lurk in the background of criminal ways in order to provide the thieves with a market or depository for their loot. Such offenses are essentially different from the actual theft of property....” (Id.)5 Again, the rule was based on a statutory construction of section 496. (''People v. Strong'' (1994).)		Receiving stolen property is a violation of section 496. That section, however, can also be violated by concealing or withholding stolen property. Semantically, a thief is capable of “concealing” or “withholding.” Nevertheless, in People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832, the court held that a defendant could not be convicted for both stealing and concealing or withholding the same property. It explained: “To conceal 371 and withhold is the *496 thief's purpose from the very moment that he gains possession of the property. It is part and parcel of the theft. But such concealment and withholding is not that envisaged by section 496.” (Id., at p. 183, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832.) Rather, section 496 “is directed at the traditional ‘fence’ and at those who lurk in the background of criminal ways in order to provide the thieves with a market or depository for their loot. Such offenses are essentially different from the actual theft of property....” (Id.)5 Again, the rule was based on a statutory construction of section 496. (''People v. Strong'' (1994).)


			There are two limited exceptions to the common law rule: “(1) when the acts of receiving or concealment are completely divorced from the theft, as where the thief disposes of the property and then, in a separate transaction, receives it again, and (2) when the thief is a co-conspirator of the receiver.” (People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 371, fn. 5, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 494, citing People v. Jaramillo (1976) 16 Cal.3d 752, 759, fn. 8, 129 Cal.Rptr. 306, 548 P.2d 706.) Neither exception applies here. (''People v. Allen (1999) fn. 10.)

	==Intent==		==Intent==

Sysop at 04:08, 31 July 2023

2023-07-31T04:08:18Z

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	The elements of theft by larceny are well settled: the offense is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. (See, e.g., People v. Earle (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 476, 477–478, 35 Cal.Rptr. 265; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–116, 236 P. 944; CALJIC No. 14.02; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) pp. 292–335 (hereafter Perkins).) The act of taking personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass2 unless the owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally3 or the taker has a legal right to take the property. (Perkins, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The intent to steal or animus furandi is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently *298 1168 deprive the owner of possession. (Id. at pp. 326–327.) And if the taking has begun, the slightest movement of the property constitutes a carrying away or asportation. (Id. at pp. 323–325.)		The elements of theft by larceny are well settled: the offense is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. (See, e.g., People v. Earle (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 476, 477–478, 35 Cal.Rptr. 265; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–116, 236 P. 944; CALJIC No. 14.02; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) pp. 292–335 (hereafter Perkins).) The act of taking personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass2 unless the owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally3 or the taker has a legal right to take the property. (Perkins, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The intent to steal or animus furandi is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently *298 1168 deprive the owner of possession. (Id. at pp. 326–327.) And if the taking has begun, the slightest movement of the property constitutes a carrying away or asportation. (Id. at pp. 323–325.)

			==Receiving stolen property==

			Receiving stolen property is a violation of section 496. That section, however, can also be violated by concealing or withholding stolen property. Semantically, a thief is capable of “concealing” or “withholding.” Nevertheless, in People v. Tatum (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 179, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832, the court held that a defendant could not be convicted for both stealing and concealing or withholding the same property. It explained: “To conceal 371 and withhold is the *496 thief's purpose from the very moment that he gains possession of the property. It is part and parcel of the theft. But such concealment and withholding is not that envisaged by section 496.” (Id., at p. 183, 25 Cal.Rptr. 832.) Rather, section 496 “is directed at the traditional ‘fence’ and at those who lurk in the background of criminal ways in order to provide the thieves with a market or depository for their loot. Such offenses are essentially different from the actual theft of property....” (Id.)5 Again, the rule was based on a statutory construction of section 496. (''People v. Strong'' (1994).)

	==Intent==		==Intent==

Sysop at 03:55, 31 July 2023

2023-07-31T03:55:48Z

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			The elements of theft by larceny are well settled: the offense is committed by every person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property, and (6) carries the property away. (See, e.g., People v. Earle (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 476, 477–478, 35 Cal.Rptr. 265; People v. Edwards (1925) 72 Cal.App. 102, 112–116, 236 P. 944; CALJIC No. 14.02; Perkins & Boyce, Criminal Law (3d ed.1982) pp. 292–335 (hereafter Perkins).) The act of taking personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass2 unless the owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally3 or the taker has a legal right to take the property. (Perkins, supra, at pp. 303–304.) The intent to steal or animus furandi is the intent, without a good faith claim of right, to permanently *298 1168 deprive the owner of possession. (Id. at pp. 326–327.) And if the taking has begun, the slightest movement of the property constitutes a carrying away or asportation. (Id. at pp. 323–325.)

	==Intent==		==Intent==
	Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868 [no requirement to intend to steal specific property]; People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 317-219 [theft crimes generally require only the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of property].		Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868 [no requirement to intend to steal specific property]; People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 317-219 [theft crimes generally require only the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of property].

Sysop: /* Value */

2023-07-31T03:54:07Z

Value

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	People v. Portillo, 91 Cal. App. 5th 577, 308 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (2023), review filed (June 21, 2023)		People v. Portillo, 91 Cal. App. 5th 577, 308 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (2023), review filed (June 21, 2023)

			Defendant contends his conviction must be reversed because the prosecution failed to establish that he knew, or had any reason to know, the contents of the money bag at the time he took it. No such knowledge however, is necessary to sustain the conviction. What is important here is that defendant intended to steal the bag whatever its contents. The evidence clearly establishes that intent. It is not necessary that he knew its contents in advance. The essential elements 478 of larceny are: The taking and asportation of property; from the possession of another; without his consent; and with the intent, without claim or right to wholly deprive the owner or possessor, of possession thereof. (People v. Williams, 73 Cal.App.2d 154, 157, 166 P.2d 63.) ‘When the money, * * or personal property taken is of a value exceeding two hundred ($200) * * * then the same shall constitute grand theft.’ (Pen.Code § 487, subd. (1)).


			People v. Earle, 222 Cal. App. 2d 476, 477–78, 35 Cal. Rptr. 265, 266 (Ct. App. 1963)

	==Robbery==		==Robbery==

Sysop at 02:57, 31 July 2023

2023-07-31T02:57:31Z

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	==Intent==		==Intent==
	Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868 [no requirement to intend to steal specific property]; People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 317-219 [theft crimes generally require only the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of property].		Jesus O., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 868 [no requirement to intend to steal specific property]; People v. Davis (1998) 19 Cal.4th 301, 305, 317-219 [theft crimes generally require only the intent to permanently deprive the owner of possession of property].

			==Value==

			Price listings on retailer's website and price tags in brick-and-mortar store were nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of fair market value of adjustable dumbbells, and thus were admissible in prosecution for grand theft based on allegations that defendants stole 15 boxes of dumbbells; advertised prices could be considered by jury as circumstantial evidence of price at which willing sellers and willing buyers would consummate transaction in marketplace.

			People v. Portillo, 91 Cal. App. 5th 577, 308 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500 (2023), review filed (June 21, 2023)

	==Robbery==		==Robbery==