Threats - Revision history

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T02:21:42Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	Defendant's commands to stepson “Don't lie to me,” and “Don't call me that” were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific they conveyed to stepson an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat, as required for the offense of criminal threat, where defendant made the commands while pointing a gun at stepson's head. People v. Culbert (App. 2 Dist. 2013) 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 853, 218 Cal.App.4th 184.		Defendant's commands to stepson “Don't lie to me,” and “Don't call me that” were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific they conveyed to stepson an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat, as required for the offense of criminal threat, where defendant made the commands while pointing a gun at stepson's head. People v. Culbert (App. 2 Dist. 2013) 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 853, 218 Cal.App.4th 184.

			Finding that threats made against a victim in California by her former cohabitant, an unemployed drug-user in Texas, were “so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,” in convicting the former cohabitant of criminal threats, was supported by substantial evidence, including victim's testimony that cohabitant threatened to kill her, that he threatened to come to California and hurt her, and that victim felt cohabitant had nothing left to lose, as well as evidence of the long and escalating history of cohabitant's violence, and evidence that cohabitant had made a prior trip to California and assaulted the victim. People v. Smith (App. 2 Dist. 2009) 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 471, 178 Cal.App.4th 475,

	Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283		Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T02:18:10Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	Threat by prisoner that when he is released on parole in 10 months is sufficient for PC422. (''People v. Wilson'' (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789.)		Threat by prisoner that when he is released on parole in 10 months is sufficient for PC422. (''People v. Wilson'' (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789.)

			Pharmacy manager's fear of defendant was reasonable under the circumstances, as required for the offense of making a criminal threat, after a telephone call in which defendant told the manager he was “dead,” since it was reasonable for the manager to believe that defendant could carry and fire a gun despite a disability that required defendant to use a motorized wheelchair, and defendant previously told the manager to “expect something when you least expect it.” People v. Orloff (App. 2 Dist. 2016) 206 Cal.Rptr.3d 755

	Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required		Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T02:14:55Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	Crime of criminal threat does not require an immediate ability or even an actual intention to carry out the threat. People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 503 P.3d 668		Crime of criminal threat does not require an immediate ability or even an actual intention to carry out the threat. People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 503 P.3d 668

			Defendant's commands to stepson “Don't lie to me,” and “Don't call me that” were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific they conveyed to stepson an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat, as required for the offense of criminal threat, where defendant made the commands while pointing a gun at stepson's head. People v. Culbert (App. 2 Dist. 2013) 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 853, 218 Cal.App.4th 184.

	Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283		Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T02:13:30Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required		Immediate Ability to Carry Out Threat Not Required
	People v. Lopez (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 252].		People v. Lopez (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 675, 679 [88 Cal.Rptr.2d 252].

			Crime of criminal threat does not require an immediate ability or even an actual intention to carry out the threat. People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 289 Cal.Rptr.3d 582, 503 P.3d 668

	Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283		Threat can be shown by prior bad acts. (''People v. Stern'' (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 283

Sysop: /* (2)Threat */

2026-04-20T02:08:54Z

(2)Threat

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	A threat too outlandish reasonably to cause the victims to suffer sustained fear would be legally insufficient to support conviction of an attempted criminal threat. People v. Jackson (App. 6 Dist. 2009) 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 539, 178 Cal.App.4th 590.		A threat too outlandish reasonably to cause the victims to suffer sustained fear would be legally insufficient to support conviction of an attempted criminal threat. People v. Jackson (App. 6 Dist. 2009) 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 539, 178 Cal.App.4th 590.

			A terroristic threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury; a threat is not insufficient simply because it does not communicate a time or precise manner of execution. People v. Gaut (App. 2 Dist. 2002) 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 924, 95 Cal.App.4th 1425.

			Criminal-threats statute is not violated by mere angry utterances or ranting soliloquies, however violent. People v. Felix (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 311, 92 Cal.App.4th 905,

			In prosecution for making terroristic threats, evidence was sufficient to find element that defendant's verbal statement was unequivocal, where testimony established that defendant, while victims were talking to police officer, said “shush” as he made a throat-slashing gesture and placed his finger to his lips. People v. Franz (App. 3 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 773, 88 Cal.App.4th 1426,

	People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; People v.		People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; People v.

Sysop: /* (2)Threat */

2026-04-20T02:07:33Z

(2)Threat

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	Thus, “[a] communication that is ambiguous on its face may nonetheless be found to be a criminal threat if the surrounding circumstances clarify the communication's meaning.” (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007.)		Thus, “[a] communication that is ambiguous on its face may nonetheless be found to be a criminal threat if the surrounding circumstances clarify the communication's meaning.” (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 93 P.3d 1007.)

			A threat too outlandish reasonably to cause the victims to suffer sustained fear would be legally insufficient to support conviction of an attempted criminal threat. People v. Jackson (App. 6 Dist. 2009) 100 Cal.Rptr.3d 539, 178 Cal.App.4th 590.

	People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; People v.		People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 728]; People v.

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T02:06:29Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	People v. Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].		People v. Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].

			Defendant's statement that he would kill victim if she testified against his fellow gang members was a “threat” within meaning of statute prohibiting threatening to commit crime which would result in great bodily injury, although statement was conditional. People v. Brooks (App. 4 Dist. 1994) 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 283, 26 Cal.App.4th 142,

	There is no requirement that the threat be unconditional, nor can we judge a threat “solely on the words spoken. It is clear by case law that threats are judged in their context.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, fn. omitted.)		There is no requirement that the threat be unconditional, nor can we judge a threat “solely on the words spoken. It is clear by case law that threats are judged in their context.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, fn. omitted.)

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T01:21:03Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	As to the third element, “ ‘the determination [of] whether a defendant intended [for their] words to be taken as a threat, and whether the words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate[,] and specific [that] they conveyed to the victim an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat[,] can be based on all the surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.’ ” (People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1431.) “ ‘The parties’ history can also be considered as one of the relevant circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)		As to the third element, “ ‘the determination [of] whether a defendant intended [for their] words to be taken as a threat, and whether the words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate[,] and specific [that] they conveyed to the victim an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat[,] can be based on all the surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.’ ” (People v. Gaut (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1431.) “ ‘The parties’ history can also be considered as one of the relevant circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.)

			We conclude the evidence was sufficient for this purpose. Although the recording does not reveal exactly what condition defendant placed on his threat, from the context and surrounding circumstances the jury reasonably could have determined that defendant essentially threatened to kill S. if she did not cooperate and answer his questions about the slip of paper he had found. Indeed, virtually everything defendant said immediately before and after his threat supports such a determination. Before his threat, he demanded that she “just start answering these fucking questions” and that she “better fucking come clean.” Immediately after the threat, he told her she was “not *1434 escaping this one” and told her to “give [him] information,” “just start talking,” and “[g]et going.” Under these circumstances, the jury did not need to know the exact words of the condition defendant placed on the threat to conclude that the threat was so unconditional as to convey a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution. Accordingly, defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his conviction of making a criminal threats fails. People v. Hamlin (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1433–1434 [89 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 420], as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 9, 2009)

Sysop: /* (3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat */

2026-04-20T01:19:21Z

(3) Unconditional, Specific, and Immediate Threat

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	But not required to be unconditional		But not required to be unconditional

	People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th		People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 339–340 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374], disapproving People v. Brown (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76];
	297, 339–340 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374], disapproving People v.
	Brown (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1256 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 76];

	People v.		People v. Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].
	Stanfield (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1162 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 328].

			There is no requirement that the threat be unconditional, nor can we judge a threat “solely on the words spoken. It is clear by case law that threats are judged in their context.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, fn. omitted.)

	Conditional Threat May Be True Threat, Depending on Context		Conditional Threat May Be True Threat, Depending on Context

Sysop: /* Internet and phone apps */

2026-04-20T01:13:43Z

Internet and phone apps

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	===Internet and phone apps===		===Internet and phone apps===

			In this case, the juvenile court found defendant A.G., a minor high school student, made criminal threats when he posted a photo of a realistic looking replica gun on his Snapchat account, which was visible to about 60 people he identified as friends. The photo bore the caption, “Everybody go to school tomorrow. I'm taking gum.”

	The record contains sufficient evidence A.G. intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat and that he willfully threatened to kill or cause great bodily injury In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 655 [272 Cal.Rptr.3d 602, 609], as modified (Dec. 23, 2020)		The record contains sufficient evidence A.G. intended his Snapchat post to be understood as a threat and that he willfully threatened to kill or cause great bodily injury In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 655 [272 Cal.Rptr.3d 602, 609], as modified (Dec. 23, 2020)