Harvey-Madden

The Harvey–Madden rule is a court-created evidentiary rule that only applies at Penal Code 1538.5 hearings.

People v. Romero

Harvey-Madden can be invoked orally, without notice. People v. Collins (1997)

People v. Perez (2002)

People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968

People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516

Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659

People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017

Ojeda v. Superior COurt (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 909

People v. Magana (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 453

In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1638, 1643.)

Hearsay is admissible when the information provided to the arresting officer by other officers is specific and reliable. People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 541.

In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1259.

People v. Lazanis (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 49, 59.

"California courts have long and consistently rejected the contention that probable cause for an arrest is established where arresting officers are proven to have relied on information furnished by other officers in their own departments without further prosecution proof [that] the information on which the arresting officers acted was actually given to those officers who transmitted that information to the arresting officers." People v. Armstrong (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 228, 234

"Justifying an arrest or detention based on information received by an officer through 'official channels' requires the prosecution to trace the information received by the arresting officer back to its source and prove that the [source] had the requisite probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the arrest or detention." In re Eskiel S. (1993) 15 Cal. App.4th 1639, 1643.

"In California, certain evidentiary rules have been established to govern the manner in which the prosecution may prove the underlying grounds for arrest when the authority to arrest has been transmitted to the arresting officer through police channels. These evidentiary rules are often referred to as the 'Harvey-Madden rule.'" People v. Collins (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 988, 993

“(Harvey-Madden) governs the manner in which the prosecution may prove the underlying grounds for arrest when the authority to arrest has been transmitted to the arresting officer through police channels.” People v. Gomez (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 531, 540.

[“(W)hen the first officer passes off information through ‘official channels’ that leads to arrest, the officer must also show basis for his probable cause.” People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1553.

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968

Anonymous 911

Navarette found an anonymous motorist's 911 call sufficiently reliable to support the traffic stop of a pickup truck on suspicion of drunk driving. (Navarette, supra, ––– U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at pp. 1688–1690.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981

First, a caller's personal knowledge “lends significant support to the tip's reliability.” (Navarette, supra, ––– U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1689; accord, People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 467, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693 (Dolly ); Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981

Second, the caller's report was contemporaneous, a factor that “has long been treated as especially reliable.” *982 Navarette, supra, ––– U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1689; accord, Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 467, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693; Wells, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1087, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 8, 136 P.3d 810.) Indeed, the dispatcher confirmed she could hear people screaming in the background of the call, further corroborating the caller's account. The caller also told the dispatcher that he could hear the siren and see the lights of the responding patrol car.

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 981–982

“Another indicator of veracity is the caller's use of the 911 emergency system,” which “has some features that allow for identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide[s] some safeguards against making false reports with immunity.” (Navarette, supra, ––– U.S. at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1689; accord, Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 467, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693.) This 911 call was recorded, and the caller confirmed his address with the dispatcher. (Navarette, at p. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at p. 1690; ***595 Dolly, at p. 467 & fn. 2, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693.) 15 Finally, as this court has observed, private citizens who report criminal activity generally have no bias or motive other than good citizenship, and therefore tend to be reliable. (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 268–269, 127 Cal.Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333; People v. Brueckner (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1500, 1504, 273 Cal.Rptr. 292; see Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 233–234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 982

Brown further argues that the caller's reliability must be assessed based on the facts known to Deputy Geasland, not the 911 dispatcher, and that Geasland was unaware of the circumstances under which the call was *983 placed. The argument is unpersuasive. An officer may arrest or detain a suspect **316 “based on information received through ‘official channels.’ ” (People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1017, 1021, 88 Cal.Rptr. 171, 471 P.2d 971; see United States v. Hensley (1985) 469 U.S. 221, 230–233, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (Hensley ).) If a 911 call “has sufficient indicia of reliability ... a dispatcher may alert other officers by radio, who may then rely on the report, [citation], even though they cannot vouch for it.” (U.S. v. Cutchin (D.C.Cir.1992) 956 F.2d 1216, 1217–1218; accord, U.S. v. Torres (3d Cir.2008) 534 F.3d 207, 210.) However, upon proper objection (People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547–548, 146 Cal.Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048), “ ‘ “the People must prove that the source of the information is something other than the imagination of the officer who does not become a witness.” ’ ” (Madden, at p. 1021, 88 Cal.Rptr. 171, 471 P.2d 971, quoting Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, 666, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11; accord, People v. Harvey (1958) 156 Cal.App.2d 516, 523–524, 319 P.2d 689 (conc. opn. of Dooling & Draper, JJ.).) This requirement can be met by calling the police dispatcher as a witness at the suppression hearing or by introducing a recording of the 911 call. (In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252, 1260, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 506; People v. Orozco (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 435, 444, 170 Cal.Rptr. 604.) Here, the dispatcher was present at the hearing but was not called because Brown stipulated to admission of ***596 the 911 recording into evidence. That recording provided ample basis to review the caller's reliability. (Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 467, fn. 2, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 803, 150 P.3d 693; People v. Lazanis (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 49, 57, 257 Cal.Rptr. 180.)4

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 982–983