Officer records: Difference between revisions

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===Request for state case===
===Request for state case===
People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93 doesn't directly address it, but does mention using the Pitchess procedure on an DEA agent. However, I'm sure the Forest Service would claim an official privilege such as FOIA exemption 6 or the Privacy Act. But 5 USC 552a(b)(11) does allow release of personnel records pursuant to a court order. A SDT may  not be considered a court order. (Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (N.D. Ga. 1978) 453 F.Supp. 798; see Doe v. DiGenova (D.C. Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 74 [rejecting a grand jury subpoena as a court order].)
 
In ''People v. Salcido'' (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, the trial court denied a Pitchess request for a DEA agent because "it did not have jurisdiction to order the United States Attorney into court, could not enter an ex parte order in the absence of counsel, and lacked authority to order production of the records." (''Salcido'', at p. 145.) The California Supreme Court said the denial of the ''Pitchess'' was within the trial court's discretion because of the lack of good cause shown. The California Supreme Court did not address at all the lack of authority of a California court to order discovery from a federal agency.  
 
 
However, I'm sure the Forest Service would claim an official privilege such as FOIA exemption 6 or the Privacy Act. But 5 USC 552a(b)(11) does allow release of personnel records pursuant to a court order. A SDT may  not be considered a court order. (Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (N.D. Ga. 1978) 453 F.Supp. 798; see Doe v. DiGenova (D.C. Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 74 [rejecting a grand jury subpoena as a court order].)


If it's a federal case, ​read United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) in which personnel files are discoverable under Brady, but unfortunately, the government gets to review them for "materiality."
If it's a federal case, ​read United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) in which personnel files are discoverable under Brady, but unfortunately, the government gets to review them for "materiality."

Revision as of 05:14, 29 May 2019

Public Records Act Request

Pitchess

Federal agents

Request for state case

In People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, the trial court denied a Pitchess request for a DEA agent because "it did not have jurisdiction to order the United States Attorney into court, could not enter an ex parte order in the absence of counsel, and lacked authority to order production of the records." (Salcido, at p. 145.) The California Supreme Court said the denial of the Pitchess was within the trial court's discretion because of the lack of good cause shown. The California Supreme Court did not address at all the lack of authority of a California court to order discovery from a federal agency.


However, I'm sure the Forest Service would claim an official privilege such as FOIA exemption 6 or the Privacy Act. But 5 USC 552a(b)(11) does allow release of personnel records pursuant to a court order. A SDT may not be considered a court order. (Stiles v. Atlanta Gas Light Co. (N.D. Ga. 1978) 453 F.Supp. 798; see Doe v. DiGenova (D.C. Cir. 1985) 779 F.2d 74 [rejecting a grand jury subpoena as a court order].)

If it's a federal case, ​read United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Cadet, 727 F.2d 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) in which personnel files are discoverable under Brady, but unfortunately, the government gets to review them for "materiality."

Saulter v. Municipal Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 231, which was a post-Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, but pre-EC1043 et seq case, that approved of a court ordering ATF to disclose personnel records. That's also this interesting line in the case:

"Unless there is supervening policy under an act of Congress, which precludes such action by an employee of the bureau involved in this matter, sanctions similar to those contemplated by state law against the use of the testimony of the federal officer as a witness might be imposed. In other words, a finding that he had used excessive or unnecessary force on past occasions might be imposed against a federal employee witness, if his refusal to consent to the disclosure of his personal records were the sole ban to the discovery of such records."


Frankly, if I'm defending a case that involves investigation by federal agents and there's going to be discovery non-compliance, I'm going to aim for a dismissal.

"Dismissal is proper as a sanction for refusing to comply with a discovery order when the effect of such refusal is to deny defendant's right to due process." People v. Brophy (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 932, 937, citing People v. Broome (1998) 201 Cal.App.3d 1479, 1497; Dell M. v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.2d 782, 786.)


From the Johnson case: "'[T]he Pitchess scheme does not 

unconstitutionally trump a defendant's right to exculpatory evidence as delineated in Brady. Instead, the two schemes operate in tandem.' (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 1473.)" (People v. Superior Court (Johnson) (2015) 61 Cal.4th 696, 719-720.)

Request for federal case