Search conditions

Search conditions refers a condition of release, whether it be probation, parole, or bail, that requires submitting to warrantless searches. It is all called a 4th waiver though some practitioners strongly object to that term. Though the term "search conditions" or "4th waiver" is used broadly refer to warrantless searches as a condition of release, search conditions for a probationer do differ slightly from search conditions for a parolee. Probation is a privilege, not a right; so, a probationer has given consent in advance for warrantless searches.

Electronic devices

People v. Bryant (Apr. 17, 2017, No. B271300), available at [1]

People and property in close proximity to person with search conditions

People v Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 682 ("Moreover, officers generally may only search those portions of the residence they reasonably believe the probationer has complete or joint control over.")

People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 798 ("those who live with a probationer maintain normal expectations of privacy over their persons. In addition, they retain valid privacy expectations in residential areas subject to their exclusive access or control, so long as there is no basis for officers to reasonably believe the probationer has authority over those areas.").

A stop of a vehicle made without reasonable suspicion is not subsequently cured by the discovery that one of the passengers has a search condition. (People v. Bates (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 60.)

Search of third parties in proximity to person with search condtiions

People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668.

People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789.)

People v. Ermi (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 277.)

There is a difference between authority over a room, and access to a room. A probation search is for rooms in which the probationer has authority over; it is not for rooms that the probationer has access to. The Court said, "it flouts widely held social exxpectations to define joint access as simply having the physical ability to open a door, walk into a room, and open drawers. (People v. Carreon (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866, 879.)

People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759

Russi v. Superior Court (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 160

Detention of others during probation search

People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837

People v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584

People v. Gutierrez (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1146, held it violation of a Fourth Amendment where defendant "ordered out of the house, subjected to patdown search, and directed to sit down on front porch or in the front yard" for the length of search of a probationer.

Search of residence

Search excluded

People v. Alders (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 313

A search of a woman's coat belonging to the co-resident of a male probationer was improper, because clearly the woman's coat did not belong to male probationer.

People v. Veronica (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 906

Search of parolee's wife's purse excluded. The purse did not belong to parolee.

People v. Sandoval (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 205

People v. Carreon (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 866

When probationer is renting room, search conditions don't extend to whole residence.

Search not excluded

People v. Downey (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 652

Law enforcement search residence that they have good faith belief to be that of a probationer. However, probationer had already moved out and updated his new address. Because law enforcement had a "reasonable belief," a standard lower than probable cause, that probationer would be address, search was valid.

People v. Ermi (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 277

People v Smith (2002)

People v. Rios (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 584

Search of vehicle

Search not excluded

People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909

Good Faith Exception

Herring v. U.S. (2009) 555 U.S. 135, overruling People v. Willis (2002) 28 Cal.4th 22. Unless the officer's conduct could be described as “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent” or in some instances “recurring or systemic negligence” the exclusionary rule does not apply.

People v. Prichett (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 355, in regards to termination of probation under operation of law under AB1950, but not officially and publicly terminated.