Right to Counsel: Difference between revisions
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==Right to self-representation under Faretta v. California== | ==Right to self-representation under Faretta v. California== | ||
===Unequivocal request=== | |||
''People v. Burgener (2016) 1 Cal.5th 461 | |||
===Right to self-representation vs right to speedy trial=== | ===Right to self-representation vs right to speedy trial=== | ||
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fn. 2 "When counsel stated their appearances on August 4, no one actually announced “ready” and the plan to defer swearing the jury to August 10 raises a question about whether trial “commenced” on August 4 or August 10. Since the defendants win under either approach, we discuss only the stricter discretionary rule, treating August 4 as the day trial commenced. (But see People v. Gephart (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 989, 998, 156 Cal.Rptr. 489 [for jeopardy purposes, trial commences when the jury is sworn].) People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 591 fn.2.) | fn. 2 "When counsel stated their appearances on August 4, no one actually announced “ready” and the plan to defer swearing the jury to August 10 raises a question about whether trial “commenced” on August 4 or August 10. Since the defendants win under either approach, we discuss only the stricter discretionary rule, treating August 4 as the day trial commenced. (But see People v. Gephart (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 989, 998, 156 Cal.Rptr. 489 [for jeopardy purposes, trial commences when the jury is sworn].) People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 591 fn.2.) | ||
We have found only two reported decisions in which the trial courts denied Faretta motions when the defendants were ready to proceed without a continuance, People v. Herrera (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 167, 174–175, 163 Cal.Rptr. 435, and People v. Tyner (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 352, 355, 143 Cal.Rptr. 52. In both cases, the denials resulted in reversals. (People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) | |||
Latest revision as of 01:36, 25 November 2024
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Indigent defendants
People v. Washington (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 311
McCoy v. Louisiana (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1500
People v. Bernal, H045620, 12/5/19 The client's disagreement with counsel must be part of the record.
People v. Palmer; D074240; 5/22/20; C/A 4th, Div. 1
In re Smith; E073871; 5/26/20; C/A 4th, Div. 2
Marsden motion to substitute appointed counsel
"[T]he court must allow the accused to give specific reasons why he wishes replacement of his appointed counsel. (People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 906, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 679.) But court doesn't have a sua sponte duty.
"[M]erely express[ing] some unhappiness with certain aspects of counsel's handling of his case" is not a Marsden hearing request. (People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 410, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2011) 49 Cal.4th 405.)
Defendant can waive Marsden by failing to notify court. (People v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 355; People v. Vera (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 970, 981-2.)
A full hearing is not required when defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel is set forth in a letter or handwritten motion of sufficient detail. People v. Terrill (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 291, 298
Court may appoint independent counsel to assist defendant with Marsden motion. People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997 People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856
Marsden available under SVP or LPS People v. Hill (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 646
Right to self-representation under Faretta v. California
Unequivocal request
People v. Burgener (2016) 1 Cal.5th 461
Right to self-representation vs right to speedy trial
- the court had discretion to deny the motions. In exercising that discretion, the trial court was required to consider (1) the quality of counsels' representation, (2) the defendants' prior proclivity to substitute counsel, (3) the reasons for the request, (4) the length and stage of the proceedings, and (5) the disruption or delay which might reasonably be expected to follow the granting of such a motion. (People v. Windham, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 128, 137 Cal.Rptr. 8, 560 P.2d 1187; People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 853, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270.) (People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 591.)
fn. 2 "When counsel stated their appearances on August 4, no one actually announced “ready” and the plan to defer swearing the jury to August 10 raises a question about whether trial “commenced” on August 4 or August 10. Since the defendants win under either approach, we discuss only the stricter discretionary rule, treating August 4 as the day trial commenced. (But see People v. Gephart (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 989, 998, 156 Cal.Rptr. 489 [for jeopardy purposes, trial commences when the jury is sworn].) People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 591 fn.2.)
We have found only two reported decisions in which the trial courts denied Faretta motions when the defendants were ready to proceed without a continuance, People v. Herrera (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 167, 174–175, 163 Cal.Rptr. 435, and People v. Tyner (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 352, 355, 143 Cal.Rptr. 52. In both cases, the denials resulted in reversals. (People v. Nicholson (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.)