Theories of liability: Difference between revisions
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==Aider and abettor== | ==Aider and abettor== | ||
===Statute=== | |||
Penal Code section 31: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats, menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed." | |||
“Because a conspirator can be liable for a crime committed by any other conspirator, and the defendant need not do (or even encourage) anything criminal except agree to commit a crime, it is reasonable to make a conspirator not liable for another conspirator's crime that is a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the confederates outside of, or foreign to, the common design. But aiding and abetting is different. An aider and abettor is someone who, with the necessary mental state, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime. Because the aider and abettor is furthering the commission, or at least attempted commission, of an actual crime, it is not necessary to add a limitation on the aider and abettor's liability for crimes other principals commit beyond the requirement that they be a natural and probable, i.e., reasonably foreseeable, consequence of the crime aided and abetted. If the prosecution can prove the nontarget crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime the defendant intentionally aided and abetted, it should not additionally have to prove the negative fact that the nontarget crime was not committed for a reason independent of the common plan. [¶ ] To be sure, whether an unintended crime was the independent product of the perpetrator's mind outside of, or foreign to, the common design may, if shown by the evidence, become relevant to the question whether that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. In a given case, a criminal defendant may argue to the jury that the nontarget crime was the perpetrator's independent idea unrelated to the common plan, and thus was not reasonably foreseeable and not a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. But that would be a factual issue for the jury to resolve, not a separate legal requirement.” (People v. Smith, 60 Cal. 4th 603, 616-617, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 337 P.3d 1159 (2014) (internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original).) | “Because a conspirator can be liable for a crime committed by any other conspirator, and the defendant need not do (or even encourage) anything criminal except agree to commit a crime, it is reasonable to make a conspirator not liable for another conspirator's crime that is a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the confederates outside of, or foreign to, the common design. But aiding and abetting is different. An aider and abettor is someone who, with the necessary mental state, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime. Because the aider and abettor is furthering the commission, or at least attempted commission, of an actual crime, it is not necessary to add a limitation on the aider and abettor's liability for crimes other principals commit beyond the requirement that they be a natural and probable, i.e., reasonably foreseeable, consequence of the crime aided and abetted. If the prosecution can prove the nontarget crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime the defendant intentionally aided and abetted, it should not additionally have to prove the negative fact that the nontarget crime was not committed for a reason independent of the common plan. [¶ ] To be sure, whether an unintended crime was the independent product of the perpetrator's mind outside of, or foreign to, the common design may, if shown by the evidence, become relevant to the question whether that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. In a given case, a criminal defendant may argue to the jury that the nontarget crime was the perpetrator's independent idea unrelated to the common plan, and thus was not reasonably foreseeable and not a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. But that would be a factual issue for the jury to resolve, not a separate legal requirement.” (People v. Smith, 60 Cal. 4th 603, 616-617, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 337 P.3d 1159 (2014) (internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original).) | ||
Revision as of 22:37, 28 October 2023
Aider and abettor
Statute
Penal Code section 31: "All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and encouraged its commission, and all persons counseling, advising, or encouraging children under the age of fourteen years, or persons who are mentally incapacitated, to commit any crime, or who, by fraud, contrivance, or force, occasion the drunkenness of another for the purpose of causing him to commit any crime, or who, by threats, menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are principals in any crime so committed."
“Because a conspirator can be liable for a crime committed by any other conspirator, and the defendant need not do (or even encourage) anything criminal except agree to commit a crime, it is reasonable to make a conspirator not liable for another conspirator's crime that is a fresh and independent product of the mind of one of the confederates outside of, or foreign to, the common design. But aiding and abetting is different. An aider and abettor is someone who, with the necessary mental state, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime. Because the aider and abettor is furthering the commission, or at least attempted commission, of an actual crime, it is not necessary to add a limitation on the aider and abettor's liability for crimes other principals commit beyond the requirement that they be a natural and probable, i.e., reasonably foreseeable, consequence of the crime aided and abetted. If the prosecution can prove the nontarget crime was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the crime the defendant intentionally aided and abetted, it should not additionally have to prove the negative fact that the nontarget crime was not committed for a reason independent of the common plan. [¶ ] To be sure, whether an unintended crime was the independent product of the perpetrator's mind outside of, or foreign to, the common design may, if shown by the evidence, become relevant to the question whether that crime was a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. In a given case, a criminal defendant may argue to the jury that the nontarget crime was the perpetrator's independent idea unrelated to the common plan, and thus was not reasonably foreseeable and not a natural and probable consequence of the target crime. But that would be a factual issue for the jury to resolve, not a separate legal requirement.” (People v. Smith, 60 Cal. 4th 603, 616-617, 180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 100, 337 P.3d 1159 (2014) (internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original).)
Conspiracy
Statute
(a) If two or more persons conspire:
(1) To commit any crime.
(2) Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime, or to procure another to be charged or arrested for any crime.
(3) Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action, or proceeding.
(4) To cheat and defraud any person of any property, by any means which are in themselves criminal, or to obtain money or property by false pretenses or by false promises with fraudulent intent not to perform those promises.
(5) To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, or to pervert or obstruct justice, or the due administration of the laws.
(6) To commit any crime against the person of the President or Vice President of the United States, the Governor of any state or territory, any United States justice or judge, or the secretary of any of the executive departments of the United States.
They are punishable as follows:
When they conspire to commit any crime against the person of any official specified in paragraph (6), they are guilty of a felony and are punishable by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for five, seven, or nine years.
When they conspire to commit any other felony, they shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the punishment of that felony. If the felony is one for which different punishments are prescribed for different degrees, the jury or court which finds the defendant guilty thereof shall determine the degree of the felony the defendant conspired to commit. If the degree is not so determined, the punishment for conspiracy to commit the felony shall be that prescribed for the lesser degree, except in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, in which case the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree.
If the felony is conspiracy to commit two or more felonies which have different punishments and the commission of those felonies constitute but one offense of conspiracy, the penalty shall be that prescribed for the felony which has the greater maximum term.
When they conspire to do an act described in paragraph (4), they shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine.
When they conspire to do any of the other acts described in this section, they shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not more than one year, or pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. When they receive a felony conviction for conspiring to commit identity theft, as defined in Section 530.5, the court may impose a fine of up to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000).
All cases of conspiracy may be prosecuted and tried in the superior court of any county in which any overt act tending to effect the conspiracy shall be done.
(b) Upon a trial for conspiracy, in a case where an overt act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defendant cannot be convicted unless one or more overt acts are expressly alleged in the indictment or information, nor unless one of the acts alleged is proved; but other overt acts not alleged may be given in evidence.
Conspiracy to commit murder
Conspiracy to commit murder is always conspiracy to commit first-degree murder and thus always a 25-to-life. The statute says, "in the case of conspiracy to commit murder, in which case the punishment shall be that prescribed for murder in the first degree." (Accord
However, conspiracy to commit murder is not a capital offense; special circumstances do not apply to this crime. People v Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 835, 864–870, disapproved on another ground in People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th 758.
[A] conviction of conspiracy to commit murder requires a finding of intent to kill, and cannot be based on a theory of implied malice." (People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593; accord People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223.)