Domestic Violence: Difference between revisions
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Penal Code 13700: “cohabitant” means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) whether the parties hold themselves out as spouses, (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship. | Penal Code 13700: “cohabitant” means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) whether the parties hold themselves out as spouses, (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship. | ||
Father was not a person “related by consanguinity or affinity” within the second degree to his child's stepfather, and thus was not entitled to seek a Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) injunction against stepfather, even though stepfather was married to the child's mother. Riehl v. Hauck (App. 2 Dist. 2014) 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 795, 224 Cal.App.4th 695. | Father was not a person “related by consanguinity or affinity” within the second degree to his child's stepfather, and thus was not entitled to seek a Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) injunction against stepfather, even though stepfather was married to the child's mother. Riehl v. Hauck (App. 2 Dist. 2014) 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 795, 224 Cal.App.4th 695. | ||
Prosecution witness Ivan Scott does not qualify as “a person within the third degree of relationship” to Judge Morrow. In Robinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1895) 105 Cal. 526, 557–558, 38 P. 94, this court explained when someone is within such a relationship. There, the plaintiff moved to disqualify an associate justice of this court, Justice W.C. Van Fleet, on the ground that a first cousin or “cousin-german” of the justice's wife was a stockholder of the defendant corporation. We denied the motion because the relationship between the justice and his wife's cousin was not one within the third degree. We explained: “ ‘In the collateral line the degrees are counted *653 by generations from one of the relations up to a common ancestor, and from the common ancestor to the other relations. In such computation, the decedent is excluded, the relative included, and the ancestor counted but once. Thus, brothers are related in the second degree; uncle and nephew in the third degree; cousins-german in the fourth, and so on.’ ” (Robinson, supra, 105 Cal. at p. 557, 38 P. 94, italics added.) | |||
Here, witness Ivan Scott is the nephew of Judge Morrow's son-in-law. Thus, as uncle and nephew, the relationship between the witness and the son-in-law is in the third degree. But the relationship between the witness and Judge Morrow is not within the third degree. Either the two are not related at all because there is no blood relationship between them (see Code Civ. Proc., § 170. 5, subd. (d) [“The third degree of relationship shall be calculated according to our civil law system.”]; 26A C.J.S., Descent & Distribution § 22, pp. 562–563 [civil law only recognizes relationships of consanguinity] ), or their relationship is in the fifth degree (see former Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1 [recognizing relationships based on marriage but providing that spouses are separated by one degree] ). Accordingly, the disqualification premise of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1) does not apply here. (''People v. Williams'' (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652-653.) | |||
==Traumatic condition== | ==Traumatic condition== | ||
Latest revision as of 13:39, 2 January 2025
Relationships
Family Code section 6211
“Domestic violence” is abuse perpetrated against any of the following persons:
(a) A spouse or former spouse.
(b) A cohabitant or former cohabitant, as defined in Section 6209.
(c) A person with whom the respondent is having or has had a dating or engagement relationship.
(d) A person with whom the respondent has had a child, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child of the female parent under the Uniform Parentage Act (Part 3 (commencing with Section 7600) of Division 12).
(e) A child of a party or a child who is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the father of the child to be protected.
(f) Any other person related by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.
Penal Code 13700: “cohabitant” means two unrelated adult persons living together for a substantial period of time, resulting in some permanency of relationship. Factors that may determine whether persons are cohabiting include, but are not limited to, (1) sexual relations between the parties while sharing the same living quarters, (2) sharing of income or expenses, (3) joint use or ownership of property, (4) whether the parties hold themselves out as spouses, (5) the continuity of the relationship, and (6) the length of the relationship.
Father was not a person “related by consanguinity or affinity” within the second degree to his child's stepfather, and thus was not entitled to seek a Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) injunction against stepfather, even though stepfather was married to the child's mother. Riehl v. Hauck (App. 2 Dist. 2014) 168 Cal.Rptr.3d 795, 224 Cal.App.4th 695.
Prosecution witness Ivan Scott does not qualify as “a person within the third degree of relationship” to Judge Morrow. In Robinson v. Southern Pacific Co. (1895) 105 Cal. 526, 557–558, 38 P. 94, this court explained when someone is within such a relationship. There, the plaintiff moved to disqualify an associate justice of this court, Justice W.C. Van Fleet, on the ground that a first cousin or “cousin-german” of the justice's wife was a stockholder of the defendant corporation. We denied the motion because the relationship between the justice and his wife's cousin was not one within the third degree. We explained: “ ‘In the collateral line the degrees are counted *653 by generations from one of the relations up to a common ancestor, and from the common ancestor to the other relations. In such computation, the decedent is excluded, the relative included, and the ancestor counted but once. Thus, brothers are related in the second degree; uncle and nephew in the third degree; cousins-german in the fourth, and so on.’ ” (Robinson, supra, 105 Cal. at p. 557, 38 P. 94, italics added.)
Here, witness Ivan Scott is the nephew of Judge Morrow's son-in-law. Thus, as uncle and nephew, the relationship between the witness and the son-in-law is in the third degree. But the relationship between the witness and Judge Morrow is not within the third degree. Either the two are not related at all because there is no blood relationship between them (see Code Civ. Proc., § 170. 5, subd. (d) [“The third degree of relationship shall be calculated according to our civil law system.”]; 26A C.J.S., Descent & Distribution § 22, pp. 562–563 [civil law only recognizes relationships of consanguinity] ), or their relationship is in the fifth degree (see former Code Civ. Proc., § 170.1 [recognizing relationships based on marriage but providing that spouses are separated by one degree] ). Accordingly, the disqualification premise of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(1) does not apply here. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 652-653.)
Traumatic condition
People v. Beasley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1078
United States v. Hall (9th Cir. 2005) 419 F.3d 980
Prior domestic violence
People v. Kiger (Mar. 30, 2022, E075551)
Attempted domestic violence
People v. Kiger (Mar. 30, 2022, E075551)
Domestic Violence for Sentencing Purposes
Penal Code section 1203.097
People v. Cates (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 545