Gun-Free School Zone
Federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority; Act was criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly defined; possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce; and statute contained no jurisdictional element to ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that possession of firearm had any concrete tie to interstate commerce. U.S. v. Lopez, U.S.Tex.1995, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.Ed.2d 626. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Amended statute proscribing possession of a firearm in a school zone is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power; amended statute requires knowing possession of a firearm that “has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce,” and thus ensures through case-by-case inquiry that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce. U.S. v. Danks, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1999, 221 F.3d 1037. Commerce Key Number 82.6; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in school zone, in full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond power of Congress under commerce clause; neither Act itself nor its legislative history reflected any congressional determination that possession denounced by Act was in any way related to interstate commerce or its regulation, or even that Congress was exercising its powers under commerce clause, no prior federal enactments or congressional findings spoke to subject matter of Act or its relationship to interstate commerce, and there was no finding, legislative history, or evidence to support Act on grounds that “business” of elementary, middle, and high schools affects interstate commerce. U.S. v. Lopez, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 2 F.3d 1342, rehearing denied 9 F.3d 105, certiorari granted 114 S.Ct. 1536, 511 U.S. 1029, 128 L.Ed.2d 189, affirmed 115 S.Ct. 1624, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.Ed.2d 626. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Congressional findings at the time of enactment of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act were evidence that Congress found that regulated class of firearms had substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that nexus continued to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which was added to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1990, so that the prohibition on possession of a firearm in a school zone was a valid exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause. U.S. v. Holland, E.D.Pa.1993, 841 F.Supp. 143. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Commerce clause does not authorize Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibiting knowing possession of firearm in school zone. U.S. v. Morrow, N.D.Ala.1993, 834 F.Supp. 364. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
State
Cases
- In re J.K. (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1123, report of school kid with gun.
- People v. Gomez (G053870, Aug. 23, 2017) [unpublished], 626.9, 29800, 11379.
- In re A.M. (A150476, June 26, 2017) [unpublished], juvenile with gun
- People v. Kendrick (B271845, Apr. 18, 2017 [unpublished], traffic stop
- United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir. 1999)
United States v. Smith (Sixth Circuit 2005) United States v. Dorsey (Ninth Circuit 2005) United States v. Nieves-Castaño (First Circuit 2007) United States v. Weekes (Third Circuit 2007) United States v. Benally (Tenth Circuit 2007) United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez (First Circuit 2008) Convictions overturned post-Lopez under the revised Gun Free School Zones Act include:
United States v. Tait (Eleventh Circuit 2000) United States v. Haywood (Third Circuit 2002) United States v. Guzman-Montanez (First Circuit 2014)
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in place that individual believes or has reasonable cause to believe is school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority; Act was criminal statute that by its terms had nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly defined; possession of gun in local school zone was not economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce; and statute contained no jurisdictional element to ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that possession of firearm had any concrete tie to interstate commerce. U.S. v. Lopez, U.S.Tex.1995, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.Ed.2d 626. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Amended statute proscribing possession of a firearm in a school zone is a constitutional exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power; amended statute requires knowing possession of a firearm that “has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce,” and thus ensures through case-by-case inquiry that the firearm in question affects interstate commerce. U.S. v. Danks, C.A.8 (N.D.) 1999, 221 F.3d 1037. Commerce Key Number 82.6; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Gun-Free School Zones Act, which makes it unlawful for any individual knowingly to possess firearm in school zone, in full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond power of Congress under commerce clause; neither Act itself nor its legislative history reflected any congressional determination that possession denounced by Act was in any way related to interstate commerce or its regulation, or even that Congress was exercising its powers under commerce clause, no prior federal enactments or congressional findings spoke to subject matter of Act or its relationship to interstate commerce, and there was no finding, legislative history, or evidence to support Act on grounds that “business” of elementary, middle, and high schools affects interstate commerce. U.S. v. Lopez, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 2 F.3d 1342, rehearing denied 9 F.3d 105, certiorari granted 114 S.Ct. 1536, 511 U.S. 1029, 128 L.Ed.2d 189, affirmed 115 S.Ct. 1624, 514 U.S. 549, 131 L.Ed.2d 626. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Congressional findings at the time of enactment of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act were evidence that Congress found that regulated class of firearms had substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that nexus continued to the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which was added to the Comprehensive Crime Control Act in 1990, so that the prohibition on possession of a firearm in a school zone was a valid exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause. U.S. v. Holland, E.D.Pa.1993, 841 F.Supp. 143. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)
Commerce clause does not authorize Gun-Free School Zones Act prohibiting knowing possession of firearm in school zone. U.S. v. Morrow, N.D.Ala.1993, 834 F.Supp. 364. Commerce Key Number 82.50; Weapons Key Number 106(4)