Detention

==Reasonable Suspicion To be clear, we do not adopt a bright-line rule that an officer's use of emergency lights in close proximity to a parked car will always constitute a detention of the occupants. “[A]ny assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account ‘ “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident” ’ in each individual case.” (Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 572, 108 S.Ct. 1975, quoting Delgado, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758.) As an example, a motorist whose car had broken down on the highway might reasonably perceive an officer's use of emergency lights as signaling that the officer has stopped to render aid or to warn oncoming traffic of a hazard, rather than to investigate crime. Ambiguous circumstances may be clarified by whether other cars are nearby or by the officer's conduct when approaching. (See Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 791 & fn. 11, 195 Cal.Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325; People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110–1112, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 849.) Here, no circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person that Deputy Geasland was doing anything other than effecting a detention. Under the totality of these circumstances, Brown was detained when Geasland stopped behind the parked car and turned on his emergency lights.

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 980

What is a detention

However, “when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” the officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, fn. 16 (Terry ); accord, Bostick, at p. 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974

In situations involving a show of authority, a person is seized “if ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter,’ ” (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254–255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (Brendlin )), and if the person actually submits to the show of authority (id. at p. 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400).

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974

he was required to “point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that [Brown] may be involved in criminal activity.” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 885 P.2d 982 (Souza ); accord, United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417–418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (Cortez ); Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 17, 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975

“[W]hen an individual's submission to a show of governmental authority takes the form of passive acquiescence,” we simply consider whether, objectively, “ ‘in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,’ ” or “ ‘otherwise terminate the encounter.’ ” (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, quoting Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870 and Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 977

Turning on lights

The Supreme Court has long recognized that activating sirens or flashing lights can amount to a show of authority. (Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 575, 108 S.Ct. 1975.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 978

Staying in a parked car when lights are turned on is a detention. (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 977.)

In People v. Bailey (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 402, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235 (Bailey ) an officer stopped behind the defendant's parked car and activated his emergency lights. (Id. at p. 404, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235.) Applying the test from United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (Mendenhall ), the court concluded a detention had occurred because “[a] reasonable person to whom the red light from a vehicle is directed would be expected to recognize the signal to stop or otherwise be available to the officer. Any reasonable person in a similar situation would expect that if he drove off, the officer would respond by following with red light on and siren sounding in order to accomplish control of the individual.” (Bailey, at pp. 405–406, 222 Cal.Rptr. 235.)1

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975

To be clear, we do not adopt a bright-line rule that an officer's use of emergency lights in close proximity to a parked car will always constitute a detention of the occupants. “[A]ny assessment as to whether police conduct amounts to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into account ‘ “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident” ’ in each individual case.” (Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 572, 108 S.Ct. 1975, quoting Delgado, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758.) As an example, a motorist whose car had broken down on the highway might reasonably perceive an officer's use of emergency lights as signaling that the officer has stopped to render aid or to warn oncoming traffic of a hazard, rather than to investigate crime. Ambiguous circumstances may be clarified by whether other cars are nearby or by the officer's conduct when approaching. (See Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 791 & fn. 11, 195 Cal.Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325; People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110–1112, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 849.) Here, no circumstances would have conveyed to a reasonable person that Deputy Geasland was doing anything other than effecting a detention. Under the totality of these circumstances, Brown was detained when Geasland stopped behind the parked car and turned on his emergency lights.

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 980

Commands

Ordering a person to take hands out of pocket does not transform a consensual encounter into a detention. Supposedly, it's for officer safety reasons. (In re Frank V. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1236.)

Asking a person to refrain from placing hands in his pockets does not transform a consensual encounter into a detention. Again, it's supposedly for officer safety reasons. (People v. Parrott (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 495, 494.)

An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the person is willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, those responses, and the officer's observations, are admissible in a criminal prosecution. (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (Bostick ); Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (Royer ) (plur. opn. of White, J.).) Such consensual encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require justification. (Bostick, at p. 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382.)

People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 974