Privilege against self-incrimination
Statutes
Evidence Code section 940
To the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.
When the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked
The privilege may be invoked "where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer." (Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [71 S. Ct. 814, 95 L. Ed. 1118].) "To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." (Id. at pp. 486–487.)
"The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime." (Hoffman v. U. S. (1951) 341 U.S. 479, 486 [71 S.Ct. 814, 818, 95 L.Ed. 1118].)
People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 304 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 493, 504, 114 P.3d 742, 751]
Effects of privilege against self-incrimination
If a witness testifies on direct testimony, but then invokes the privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination, the entire direct may be stricken. (People v. Daggett (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, 760; People v. Abner (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 484, 489; People v. McGowan (1926) 80 Cal.App. 293.) However, it's at the discretion of the judge as to how much of the direct testimony should be stricken. (People v. Robinson (1961) 196 Cal.App.2d 384, 391 [16 Cal.Rptr. 484])
In civil cases when the plaintiff has invoked, the entire civil case may be dismissed. (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 709, 713 [204 Cal.Rptr. 864].) In civil cases when the defendant has invoked, since the Confrontation Clause is not at issue, striking the direct is deemed too harsh a penalty for most circumstances. (Alvarez v. Sanchez (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 709, 713 [204 Cal.Rptr. 864.)