License to Carry

Statutes

Penal Code section 26150

(a) When a person applies for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the sheriff of a county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:

(1) The applicant is of good moral character.

(2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.

(3) The applicant is a resident of the county or a city within the county, or the applicant’s principal place of employment or business is in the county or a city within the county and the applicant spends a substantial period of time in that place of employment or business.

(4) The applicant has completed a course of training as described in Section 26165.

(b) The sheriff may issue a license under subdivision (a) in either of the following formats:

(1) A license to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

(2) Where the population of the county is less than 200,000 persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, a license to carry loaded and exposed in only that county a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

(c)

(1) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the sheriff of the county from entering into an agreement with the chief or other head of a municipal police department of a city to process all applications for licenses, renewals of licenses, or amendments to licenses pursuant to this chapter, in lieu of the sheriff.

(2) This subdivision shall only apply to applicants who reside within the city in which the chief or other head of the municipal police department has agreed to process applications for licenses, renewals of licenses, and amendments to licenses, pursuant to this chapter.

AB1134 (2015) added (c)(1) and (c)(2), incorporating Los Angeles County Superior Court case number BC48049 and Vargas v. County of Los Angeles (B257371)

1.Construction and application  Limits imposed by this section on the grant of an application to carry a concealed weapon are that the applicant must be of good moral character, and that the applicant show good cause, and that the applicant be a resident of the county.  Salute v. Pitchess (App. 2 Dist. 1976) 132 Cal.Rptr. 345, 61 Cal.App.3d 557.  Weapons Key Number 134

2.Preemption  County ordinance which precluded the possession and use of guns in the county's parks and recreational areas was not preempted by the state statutes authorizing county sheriffs to issue concealed weapon licenses.  Calguns Foundation, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (App. 1 Dist. 2013) 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 698, 218 Cal.App.4th 661, review denied.  Counties Key Number 24;  Weapons Key Number 104

County ordinance prohibiting the possession of firearms on county property, insofar as it concerned gun shows, was not preempted by implication as being duplicative of state gun statutes; possessing a gun on county property was not identical to the crime of possessing an unlicensed firearm that was concealable or loaded, nor was it a lesser included offense, and therefore someone could lawfully be convicted of both offenses.  Nordyke v. King (2002) 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 761, 27 Cal.4th 875, 44 P.3d 133, rehearing denied, answer to certified question conformed to 319 F.3d 1185, rehearing en banc denied 364 F.3d 1025, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 60, 543 U.S. 820, 160 L.Ed.2d 30, on subsequent appeal 563 F.3d 439, rehearing en banc ordered 575 F.3d 890, vacated 611 F.3d 1015, on remand 644 F.3d 776.  Counties Key Number 21.5;  Weapons Key Number 103

3.Due process  Because California applicants for license to carry concealed weapon (CCW) did not have property or liberty interest in that license, sheriff was not required to provide them with due process before denying their initial license application.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 1106, reversed and remanded 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Constitutional Law Key Number 4496;  Weapons Key Number 134

4.Equal protection  Class-of-one equal protection claim does not depend upon a suspect classification such as race or gender, but rather, such a claim arises where the plaintiff was (1) intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.  Scocca v. Smith, N.D.Cal.2012, 912 F.Supp.2d 875.  Constitutional Law Key Number 3042;  Constitutional Law Key Number 3056

Requirement that applicant for license to carry a concealed weapon (CCW) in California be a resident or spend substantial time in county in which they apply does not violate equal protection.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 1106, reversed and remanded 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Constitutional Law Key Number 3478;  Weapons Key Number 106(4)

Equal protection was not violated by California county sheriff's policy of requiring applicant for license to carry concealed weapon to demonstrate “good cause” for its issuance, defined as set of circumstances that distinguished applicant from other members of the general public and caused him or her to be placed in harm's way, more than generalized fear for one's personal safety, and backed by supporting documentation; policy did not treat similarly situated individuals differently because not all law-abiding citizens were similarly situated.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 1106, reversed and remanded 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Constitutional Law Key Number 3478;  Weapons Key Number 106(4)

Applicant's allegations that, although he regularly resided in his motorhome, he maintained and had nearly exclusive use of single room in residence located in county, that he regularly lived in county for several months each year, that he was required by his work to travel to high crime and remote rural areas, and that sheriff denied him license to carry concealed weapon because he did not have good cause for permit and because he was not county resident were sufficient to state claim that denial of license violated his equal protection rights, where county failed to identify important government interest or demonstrate how denial of license furthered that interest.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 678 F.Supp.2d 1046.  Constitutional Law Key Number 3376;  Constitutional Law Key Number 3478;  Weapons Key Number 136

County's concealed-carry weapon (CCW) licensing scheme did not treat applicants differently based on whether they had contributed to sheriff's campaign fund, thereby precluding applicant's Fourteen Amendment equal protection claims; over 200 non-contributors received licenses during sheriff's tenure, while several donors had their applications denied or, when they made direct inquiries to sheriff, were told they were required to apply through regular application process.  Mehl v. Blanas, C.A.9 (Cal.)2013, 532 Fed.Appx. 752, 2013 WL 3369261.  Constitutional Law Key Number 3478;  Weapons Key Number 106(4)

5.Second Amendment rights  California's favoring concealed carry over open carry does not offend the Second Amendment, so long as it allows one of the two.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, C.A.9 (Cal.)2014, 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Weapons Key Number 106(3)

County's requirement that person had to show sufficiently pressing need for self-protection before permit to carry concealed weapon would be granted infringed Second Amendment right to bear arms.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, C.A.9 (Cal.)2014, 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Weapons Key Number 106(3)

Under intermediate scrutiny, Second Amendment right to bear arms was not violated by California county sheriff's policy of requiring applicant for license to carry concealed weapon to demonstrate “good cause” for its issuance, defined as set of circumstances that distinguished applicant from other members of the general public and caused him or her to be placed in harm's way, more than generalized fear for one's personal safety, and backed by supporting documentation; government had important and substantial interest in public safety and in reducing rate of gun use in crime, particularly in reducing number of concealed weapons in public in order to reduce risks to other members of public who used streets and went to public accommodations.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 1106, reversed and remanded 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Weapons Key Number 106(3)

Applicant's allegation that sheriff denied his application for license to carry concealed weapon because he did not have good cause for permit and because he was not county resident, without identifying important governmental interest or how denial furthered that interest, was sufficient to state claim for violation of his Second Amendment right to bear arms.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 678 F.Supp.2d 1046.  Weapons Key Number 136

6.Revocation  Privilege to carry concealed firearm on person was not significant property right so as to require hearing prior to revocation of license under due process clause;  licensee's livelihood was not dependent upon license, and license to carry concealed firearm was of limited and restrictive nature.  Nichols v. County of Santa Clara (App. 2 Dist. 1990) 273 Cal.Rptr. 84, 223 Cal.App.3d 1236.  Constitutional Law Key Number 4496;  Weapons Key Number 135

Holder of license to carry concealed firearm was not deprived of liberty interest, as protected by due process clause, by sheriff's revocation of license, which was based on charges by police that licensee displayed poor attitude toward police while under influence of alcohol;  sheriff who revoked license did not make public reasons for revocation and thus did not damage licensee's good name, reputation, honor or integrity.  Nichols v. County of Santa Clara (App. 2 Dist. 1990) 273 Cal.Rptr. 84, 223 Cal.App.3d 1236.  Constitutional Law Key Number 4496;  Weapons Key Number 135

Holder of license to carry concealed firearm did not have right under State Constitution to hearing prior to license revocation;  licensee's limited interest in practicing profession of manufacturing of weapons in particular way was small and governmental interest in protecting public safety was large.  Nichols v. County of Santa Clara (App. 2 Dist. 1990) 273 Cal.Rptr. 84, 223 Cal.App.3d 1236.  Weapons Key Number 135

Sheriff's office did not wrongfully refuse to exercise its discretion in deciding to revoke license to carry concealed firearm;  sheriff's office relied upon information from police concerning licensee's individual circumstances.  Nichols v. County of Santa Clara (App. 2 Dist. 1990) 273 Cal.Rptr. 84, 223 Cal.App.3d 1236.  Weapons Key Number 135

7.Investigation and determination  It is the duty of the sheriff to make an investigation and determination, on an individual basis, on every application for a concealed firearm license.  Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 88 Cal.App.4th 801.  Weapons Key Number 134

8.Right to license  Plaintiff, an employee of licensed private investigator, did not have liberty interests in obtaining initial license to carry concealed weapon, where many people engaged in occupations of private investigator and criminal offense investigator without concealed weapons license and no stigma attached to denial of her application.  Erdelyi v. O'Brien, C.A.9 (Cal.)1982, 680 F.2d 61.  Constitutional Law Key Number 4496

Duly licensed private investigators are authorized to carry loaded firearms on their persons and in automobiles, and are also entitled to carry such weapons in a concealed manner as long as they are of good moral character, show good cause, and are residents of county.  Salute v. Pitchess (App. 2 Dist. 1976) 132 Cal.Rptr. 345, 61 Cal.App.3d 557.  Weapons Key Number 203(1)

9.Right to travel  Requirement that applicant for license to carry a concealed weapon (CCW) in California be a resident or spend substantial time in county in which they apply does not violate right to travel.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 758 F.Supp.2d 1106, reversed and remanded 742 F.3d 1144, on rehearing en banc 824 F.3d 919, certiorari denied 137 S.Ct. 1995, 198 L.Ed.2d 746.  Constitutional Law Key Number 1282;  Weapons Key Number 106(4)

Issues of whether sheriff's denial of application for license to carry concealed weapon on ground that applicant was not full-time county resident deterred applicant from spending time outside of county, and whether residency requirement was necessary to further some compelling state interest involved fact questions that could not be resolved on motion to dismiss applicant's claim that denial violated his constitutional right to travel.  Peruta v. County of San Diego, S.D.Cal.2010, 678 F.Supp.2d 1046.  Federal Civil Procedure Key Number 1831

10.Discretion of sheriff  Under the state statutes authorizing county sheriffs to issue concealed weapon licenses, the sheriff has extremely broad discretion concerning the issuance of concealed weapons licenses, and the county board of supervisors also has the authority to provide, via its legislative process, for exceptions and conditions to when and where an issued “Carry License” may be validly used.  Calguns Foundation, Inc. v. County of San Mateo (App. 1 Dist. 2013) 160 Cal.Rptr.3d 698, 218 Cal.App.4th 661, review denied.  Weapons Key Number 134

The sheriff has extremely broad discretion concerning the issuance of concealed weapons licenses.  Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 88 Cal.App.4th 801.  Weapons Key Number 134

The issuing officer has explicit statutory discretion to issue or not issue concealed firearm licenses to applicants who meet the minimum statutory requirements.  Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 88 Cal.App.4th 801.  Weapons Key Number 134

11.Good cause  Stipulated judgment in earlier litigation between city police department and applicants for concealed firearm licenses did not relieve applicant of statutory obligation to show good cause for license; judgment did require police department to renew applicants' licenses from year to year, but only on application, and only “so long as they continue to have good cause, good character, not to be barred by law from the ownership of concealed firearms, and to meet” other statutory requirements of licensure.  Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 88 Cal.App.4th 801.  Weapons Key Number 134

Where duly licensed private investigators, as applicants for permits to carry concealed weapons, were of good moral character and were residents of county, albeit that no inquiry into existence of good cause had ever been made by sheriff in connection with application of any investigator, or of any other applicants outside a limited group of public officials, it was the duty of the sheriff to make such an investigation and to make a determination, on an individual basis, on every application.  Salute v. Pitchess (App. 2 Dist. 1976) 132 Cal.Rptr. 345, 61 Cal.App.3d 557.  Weapons Key Number 134

12.Residence  A reserve police officer for a city may not be issued a concealed firearm permit if the reserve officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located.  62 Op.Atty.Gen. 508 (September 18, 1979), 1979 WL 29270.

62 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 508 (Cal.A.G.), 1979 WL 29270 Office of the Attorney General State of California Opinion No. 79-708 September 18, 1979

• 1 THE HONORABLE JAMES M. CRAMER

DISTRICT ATTORNEY COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO THE HONORABLE JAMES M. CRAMER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO, has requested an opinion on the following question: May a city police chief issue a concealed firearm permit to a person appointed to the position of reserve police officer for the city if the reserve officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located?

CONCLUSION

A city police chief may not issue a concealed firearm permit to a person appointed to the position of reserve police officer for the city if the reserve officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located.

ANALYSIS

Penal Code section 830.6 authorizes a city police chief to appoint a reserve (i.e., volunteer) ‘city policeman’ to carry out assigned specific police functions, and for the duration of the specific assignment a reserve police officer has the authority of a peace officer. (See also Gov. Code, § 38631.) Subject to certain exceptions (Pen. Cdde, §§ 12026, 12027), Penal Code section 12025 prohibits the carrying of a concealable firearm concealed upon one's person or in one's vehicle in the absence of a license to carry such firearm. Section 12025 does not apply to ‘duly appointed peace officers.’ (Pen. Code, § 12027, subd. (a); see also Pen. Code, § 12031, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, reserve peace officers while on duty are not prohibited by section 12025 from carrying a concealed firearm without a license. However, when not on duty, reserve peace officers do not have peace officer authority. (See Pen. Code, § 830.6.) Absent any exceptional circumstance specified in Penal Code sections 12026 and 12027, a reserve officer would need a license to carry lawfully a concealed firearm off duty. Penal Code section 12050 sets forth the conditions under which such a license, commonly referred to as a ‘permit,’ may be obtained. That section provides: ‘(a) The sheriff of a county or the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county, upon proof that the person applying is of good moral character, that good cause exists for the issuance, and that the person applying is a resident of the county, may issue to such a person a license to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm for any period of time not to exceed one year from the date of the license, or in the case of a peace officer appointed pursuant to Section 830.6, three years from the date of the license. ‘(b) A license may include any reasonable restrictions or conditions which the issuing authority deems warranted, including restrictions as to the time, place, and circumstances under which the person may carry a concealed firearm. ‘(c) Any restrictions imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) shall be indicated on any license issued on or after the effective date of the amendments to this section enacted at the 1970 Regular Session of the Legislature.’

• 2 The question presented for analysis is whether the above quoted section authorizes a city police chief to issue a concealed firearm permit to a person appointed to the position of reserve police officer for the city despite the fact the reserve police officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located. We conclude that Penal Code section 12050 does not authorize the issuance of such a permit.

In construing the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature, we must first turn to the actual words used. (Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764.) ‘In the absence of compelling countervailing considerations, we must assume that the Legislature ‘knew what it was saying and meant what it said.’' (Tracy v. Municipal Court, supra, at p. 764.) In the case of Penal Code section 12050 we find no countervailing considerations. Whatever may be thought of the wisdom or policy of an enactment, when the meaning of a statute appears to be plain, clear and unambiguous on its face, the necessity for construction is eliminated. (County of Madera v. Carleson (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 764.) Subdivision (a) of section 12050 sets forth in plain, unambiguous language that a county sheriff or a city police chief may issue a license to carry a concealed firearm to a person only if three conditions are met. The first condition is that the person be of good moral character. The second condition is that good cause exists for the issuance of the license, and the third condition is ‘that the person applying is a resident of the county.’ Subdivision (a) then sets forth the time period for which the license shall be valid. The operative phrase begins with the words ‘for any period of time . . ..’ Thereafter, two time periods are expressed. The first is ‘not to exceed one year from the date of the license’ and the second is ‘three years from the date of the license.’ The prepositional phrase ‘in the case of a peace officer appointed pursuant to section 830.6’ clearly relates to and modifies only the reference to the three year time period which immediately follows it. Thus, reserve officers are not exempt from the residence requirement of that section. We ‘. . . cannot ignore the plain words of [a] statute unless it appears the words used were, beyond question, contrary to what was intended by the Legislature.’ (County of Madera v. Carleson, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at pp. 768-769.) The reference to reserve officers in Penal Code section 12050 was added by Statutes of 1977, chapter 987, section 3. The Legislative Counsel's Digest for the bill (AB 641) which was enacted as that chapter states that the amendment to section 12050 ‘. . . would provide for the licensing of reserve peace officers for the purpose of concealed carrying of concealable weapons for a period of three years.’ That explanation of the amendment sheds no light on the issue of whether the Legislature intended reserve peace officers to be exempt from the residence requirement of section 12050. It is likely the Legislature never considered the issue. Where the words of a statute are clear, we cannot ‘add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.’ (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183; County of Madera v. Carleson, supra, at p. 769.) Thus, we conclude that under Penal Code section 12050 a city police chief is not authorized to issue a concealed firearm permit to a person appointed to the position of reserve police officer for the city if the reserve officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located.

• 3 We have also considered the validity of the residency requirement of Penal Code section 12050 in light of the state and federal constitutional concepts of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws (see Cal. Const., art. I, § 7; U.S. Const. 14th Amend.) and have found no reason to question its constitutionality. An act of the Legislature is presumed constitutional and all presumptions and intendments are in favor of the statute's validity. (McGowan v. Maryland (1961) 366 U.S. 420, 425; In re Ricky H. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 513, 519.)

Substantive due process of law requires that legislative action which creates some deprivation of individual life, liberty or property be reasonable in its goal and application; ‘. . ., i.e., the law must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious but must have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.’ (Gray v. Whitmore (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 1, 21; see also Nebbia v. New York (1934) 291 U.S. 502, 525; Russell v. Carleson (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 334, 342.) Traditionally, the constitutional right of equal protection of laws requires that the state action in creating classifications bears some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. (Hardy v. Stumpf (1978) 21 Cal.3d 1, 7; Gray v. Whitmore, supra, 17 Cal.App.3d at p. 21.) However, if the state action creates a ‘suspect classification’ or abridges a ‘fundamental right,’ the state must show a ‘compelling state interest’ in justifying the action. (Hardy v. Stumpf, supra.) Suspect classifications have been held to include those based upon race, sex, national origin, alienage, and poverty. (Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 18.) It is apparent that Penal Code section 12050 in no way relates to a suspect class. We have found no authority which would support a conclusion that the right to carry a weapon concealed on one's person or in one's car is a ‘fundamental interest’ requiring a compelling state interest to justify its regulation. (Cf. Ex parte Cheney (1891) 90 Cal. 617, 621.) Penal Code section 12050 does not establish a durational residency requirement, i.e., a requirement that the applicant be a resident for a specified period of time before applying for the permit; thus, the regulation does not penalize or deter a person's right to migrate. (See Adams v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 55, 62.) For these reasons, we believe analysis of both the concepts of substantive due process and equal protection as applied to Penal Code section 12050 involves the same basic issue: whether the residency requirement is rationally related to a legitimate state objective. (Cf. McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. 420 at p. 425.) Clearly it is. The residency requirement delegates to particular public officials the authority to grant licenses to residents of particular geographic areas. Every resident of the state has the right to apply for a license. The restriction is merely that residents of each county may apply only to certain public officials in their county of residence. This requirement is apparently based upon the assumption that a local police agency would be best equipped to determine the good moral character of the applicant, the necessity for the license, and the restrictions, if any, which should be placed on it. We do not find such an assumption irrational, arbitrary or capricious. ‘A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ (McGowan v. Maryland, supra, at p. 426.) Here there is clearly a state of facts justifying the residency requirement.

• 4 Finally we note that nonresidents of the state are barred from obtaining a license under Penal Code section 12050. The Legislature apparently decided that the interest of a nonresident temporarily in the state who is not otherwise exempt from the concealed weapon prohibition of Penal Code section 12025 (see Pen. Code, §§ 12026, 12027) in carrying a concealed weapon is clearly outweighed by the burden imposed upon a local police agency in determining the good moral character of the applicant, the good cause for issuing the license, and the conditions and restrictions, if any, which should be placed on it. In the absence of any durational residency requirement (see, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County (1974) 415 U.S. 250), we see no constitutional infirmity in Penal Code section 12050. (Cf. Adams v. Superior Court, supra, 12 Cal.3d 55, 62.) Thus, we conclude that Penal Code section 12050 is valid and does not permit a city police chief to issue a concealed firearm license to a reserve peace officer who resides in another county.

GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN Attorney General PAUL H. DOBSON Deputy Attorney General 62 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 508 (Cal.A.G.), 1979 WL 29270

13.Private investigators  Licensed private investigator does not have a liberty or property interest in receiving a concealed weapon permit.  Guillory v. Orange County, C.A.9 (Cal.)1984, 731 F.2d 1379.  Constitutional Law Key Number 4280;  Constitutional Law Key Number 4496

14.Grounds for denial  Denial of application for concealed firearm license was not arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support; application contained single statement about good cause, that “All conditions under which this CCW [California concealed weapon] was originally issued remain the same,” and applicant refused to provide further information on that issue.  Gifford v. City of Los Angeles (App. 2 Dist. 2001) 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 164, 88 Cal.App.4th 801.  Weapons Key Number 134

15.Records  A sheriff may not allow public inspection of the state summary criminal information contained in concealed firearm permit records or his investigation files on applicants for concealed firearm permit, but may allow public inspection of the applications for and records of permits for concealed weapons unless the withholding of the records is in the public interest as determined pursuant to Gov.C. § 6255, which provides the justification for withholding records from public inspection.  62 Op.Atty.Gen. 595 (October 16, 1979), 1979 WL 29280.

16.Parties  County sheriff, when deciding whether to grant licenses to carry a concealed weapon (CCW), acted as a representative of the state of California, and not of the county, and thus, the county was not a proper defendant in an action asserting an equal protection claim regarding the administration of a California statute providing for the issuance of CCW licenses; provisions of the California Penal Code dealing with CCW licensing did not suggest that the county board of supervisors or other county administrator, other than the sheriff, exercised control or oversight over CCW licensing, but rather, the relevant code provisions clearly delineated a role for the state with respect to administration and oversight, and moreover, a CCW license conveyed a right exercisable throughout the state.  Scocca v. Smith, N.D.Cal.2012, 912 F.Supp.2d 875.  Weapons Key Number 136

17.Immunity  County sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that her denial of a license to carry a concealed weapon (CCW) constituted an equal protection violation implicating a fundamental right, specifically the Second Amendment; it was not clearly established at the time of the sheriff's decision, in 2008, 2009 and 2010, that there was a fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment to carry a concealed weapon outside a person's home.  Scocca v. Smith, N.D.Cal.2012, 912 F.Supp.2d 875.  Civil Rights Key Number 1376(6)

Penal Code section 26155

(a) When a person applies for a license to carry a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city or city and county may issue a license to that person upon proof of all of the following:

(1) The applicant is of good moral character.

(2) Good cause exists for issuance of the license.

(3) The applicant is a resident of that city.

(4) The applicant has completed a course of training as described in Section 26165.

(b) The chief or other head of a municipal police department may issue a license under subdivision (a) in either of the following formats:

(1) A license to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

(2) Where the population of the county in which the city is located is less than 200,000 persons according to the most recent federal decennial census, a license to carry loaded and exposed in only that county a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

(c) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude the chief or other head of a municipal police department of any city from entering an agreement with the sheriff of the county in which the city is located for the sheriff to process all applications for licenses, renewals of licenses, and amendments to licenses, pursuant to this chapter.