Minors
Minor is under age 18
Stepparents
Stepfather is a position of authority for finding of duress to be a PC288(b).
The People argue there was evidence Brianna feared defendant and this, in conjunction with other factors, was sufficient to establish duress within the meaning of section 288, subdivision (b). Brianna was seven years old at the time of the molestation. When defendant molested Brianna, she was normally *47 alone with defendant in his or Brianna's bedroom. On at least one occasion, the bedroom door was locked. And, as Brianna's stepfather, defendant was an authority figure in the household. In addition, Brianna feared defendant and feared that if she told anyone defendant was molesting her, defendant would kill her or mother. We conclude there was sufficient evidence of duress. A reasonable inference could be made that defendant made an implied threat sufficient to support a finding of duress, based on evidence that Brianna feared defendant and was afraid that if she told anyone about the molestation, that defendant would harm or kill Brianna, her mother or someone else. Additional factors supporting a finding of duress include Brianna's young age when she was molested; the disparity between Brianna and defendant's age and size; and defendant's position of authority in the family. The totality of this evidence is sufficient to support a finding that defendant molested Brianna by means of duress, in violation of section 288, subdivision (b). (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46–47.)
The instant case is similar in many significant ways to Cochran, although we recognize Cochran differs in that defendant was Brianna's stepfather, rather than her biological father, and there was no testimony defendant told Brianna that if she reported the molestation, she would break up the family. Nevertheless, the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of duress, based on Brianna's age and size; her relationship to defendant; and her testimony *49 that she feared defendant and feared he would harm or kill her or mother if she told anyone defendant was molesting her. Furthermore, Brianna was even younger than the victim in Cochran. It could be reasonably inferred that defendant threatened Brianna implicitly or explicitly, based on her fear of defendant and fear he would harm her or mother. This fear along with the other mentioned factors, is sufficient to support a finding of duress within the meaning of section 288, subdivision (b). As the court in Cochran notes, “as a factual matter, when the victim is as young as this victim and is molested by her father in the family home, in all but the rarest cases duress will be present.” (Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 16, fn. 6, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416.) Although in the instant case, defendant was Brianna's stepfather, rather than her father, he held a similar position of authority in Brianna's home, which would support a finding of duress, along with Brianna's testimony she feared defendant. (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 48–49.)
Stepfather is a relationship that can be aggravating circumstance. (People v. Franklin (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 328; People v. Clark (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 663;
The status of stepparent arises solely as a result of the marriage of that person to the natural parent. (Adoption of Bird (1960) 183 Cal.App.2d 140, 147, 6 Cal.Rptr. 675.) A stepparent bears no legal obligation to contribute directly to the support of the child (see former Civ.Code, § 4721, subd. (e) [Stats.1988, ch. 153, § 3, p. 476] now § 4721, subd. (a)(5); *1329 In re Marriage of Nolte (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 966, 973–974, 236 Cal.Rptr. 706), and upon the termination of the marriage the stepparent-stepchild relationship ceases. We find it inconceivable that the Legislature intended that fundamental parenting rights attach to one who is not bound to the child either biologically or by securing the legally recognized status of parent and child through formal adoption. (In re Jodi B. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1322, 1328–1329.)
Yohner fails to cite a single case in which the term “parent” has been interpreted to include stepparents, or the term “grandparent” has been interpreted to include stepgrandparents. Moreover, the Legislature routinely distinguishes between parents and stepparents and between grandparents and *9 stepgrandparents in statutory text.
(See, e.g., Prob.Code, § 6454 [“For the purpose of determining intestate succession by a person or the person's issue from or through a ... stepparent, the relationship of parent and child exists between that person and the person's ... stepparent” under certain specified circumstances]; (italics added)];Fam.Code, § 3101 [differentiating between a “birth parent ” **556 and a “stepparent ” for purposes of establishing stepparent visitation]; (italics added)]; Veh.Code, § 5101.2, subd. (g) [“For purposes of this section, ‘family’ means grandparents, stepgrandparents, parents, stepparents, siblings, stepsiblings, stepchildren, natural-born children, or adopted children of the person issued the special license plates under subdivision (a)” (italics added) ].) (Yohner v. California Dept. of Justice (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9.)