Stalking
Elements
Credible threat may be implied from a course of conduct. (People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436.)
Appellant's argument that the evidence showed only that he had knowledge he was scaring Rizzo, not that he intended to scare her or to hurt her, is also unpersuasive. “ ‘[T]he element of intent is rarely susceptible of direct proof and must usually be inferred from all the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence.’ (People v. Kuykendall (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 642, 645 [285 P.2d 996]; see also People v. Lyles (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 482, 486 [319 P.2d 745].)” (Falck, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 299, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624.) Appellant not only ignored Rizzo's increasingly impassioned pleas to stop contacting her because he was scaring her, he responded with further contacts, continuing even after the police became involved. There can be no question appellant knew **600 he was causing Rizzo fear. When contacted by the police in August, appellant acknowledged that his messages or artwork might have “upset” Rizzo, and he told her after he talked to the police that he would stop contacting her because he wanted her to feel “happy and safe.” Rizzo told him in September that she had contacted the police because he was frightening and scaring her, and told him again at the bus stop in November that he was scaring her; on the latter occasion, appellant told her he was sorry for scaring her. Appellant maintains that despite his knowledge, he had no intent to instill fear in Rizzo, that he only wanted to reconcile with her. But his persistence in the face of Rizzo's efforts to avoid him and make him understand the degree of fear he was causing her, including going to the police to stop him, amply supports the inference that he intended the result he caused. (Falck, at p. 299, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 624 [“it can be inferred that appellant intended to cause fear in the victim from the fact that he insisted on maintaining contact with her although she clearly was attempting to avoid him, and although he had been warned away by the police, the court and the victim's husband”]; People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 578, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 653 [sufficient evidence of intent to cause fear despite absence of express threats and evidence of defendant's affection and concern for victim].)
People v. Lopez (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 436, 454 [192 Cal.Rptr.3d 585, 599–600], as modified on denial of reh'g (Sept. 30, 2015)
We agree with, and adopt, this statutory interpretation as a matter of California law. We thus interpret subdivision (a) of section 646.9 to be satisfied by proof that defendants consciously disregarded a substantial risk that their communications would be viewed as threatening harm.
People v. Obermueller (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 207, 220 [324 Cal.Rptr.3d 544, 552]