Homicide
Homicide is the killing of an human being by another human being, but can be lawful or unlawful. (People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 87 (superseded by Constitutional amendment on other grounds); Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1011-1012).)
Accidental homicide may not have criminal liability. (People v. Hooper (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1174, 1182 (disapproved of by People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186 (accidental killing of human being will not be the basis for criminal liability unless it is the result of such inexcusable negligence that it constitutes involuntary manslaughter); Somers v. Superior Court (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 961) (person is not criminally liable for a killing committed by accident or through misfortune when there is no evil intention or culpable negligence.)
Criminal liability for death can be found where person had legal duty to act and did not. (Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1017 (physician had no duty to continue life-sustaining treatment once it had become futile in the opinion of qualified medical personnel); People v. Burden (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 603, 616-619 (failure of father to feed starving infant is punishable); People v. Latham (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319, 331-332 (parents' failure to administer aid to diabetic children).)
Discontinuing life support. (Conservatorship of Drabick (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 185, 194; Bartling v. Superior Court (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 186; Barber v. Superior Court (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1006.)
If evidence shows a killing by force or violence and no more, the killing is by definition unlawful, and the defendant must raise a reasonable doubt by presenting some evidence of excuse or justification. If the defendant does so, then the prosecution must disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant does not present evidence of excuse or justification, then these concepts are irrelevant, and the court need instruct the jury on them. (People v. Thompson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 50.)
Murder
Murder is an unlawful killing of a human being that is committed with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Malice aforethought is conscious or wanton disregard for human life.
Malice aforethought can be express or implied. (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a).)
Malice aforethought is express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a)(1).) "Deliberate intention" is different than "deliberate" which would make something first degree murder. (In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 786, 796.) When defendant knows a woman is pregnant, express malice is towards both the woman and the fetus. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468.)
Deliberate intention can be towards a individual or members of a specific group. (In re Sergio R. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 588, 595 (gang members who engaged in drive-by shooting at crowd that was thought to include rival gang members is express malice); People v. Woods (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047-1048 (retaliatory drive-by shooting by gang member was express and implied malice); People v. Vang (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 554, 563-565; gang members spraying occupied building with rifle during drive-by, even if could not see victims, even if shot wrong house, was express malice.)
Malice aforethought is implied when no considerable provocation appears or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart. (Pen. Code, § 188, subd. (a)(2).) Implied malice is physical and mental. Physically, “an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.” Mentally, the defendant “knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and acts with a conscious disregard for life.” People v. Hansen (1994) 9 Cal.4th 300, 307-308
Implied malice is when defendant performs an act with a high probability that it will result in death and does it with a base antisocial motive and with "wanton disregard for human life." (People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221; People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300; People v. Woods (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047-1048; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 515-516, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907.)
People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626-627)
People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500 (implied malice based upon a single sucker punch)
People v. Palomar (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 969, 976-977, sucker punch against an intoxicated person that would cause a fall against a hard surface was implied malice).
People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1217
People v. Stress (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1267
People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300, rejected by People v. Goecke (1998) 457 Mich. 442
People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.3d 2d 690, vacated by 377 U.S. 263 (initiating gun battle
In re Russel H. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 916, 920-922 (assault with gun)
People v. Blakely (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 87
People v. Jones (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 663, 667 (felony-murder rule dispenses with malice and replaces it with specific intent to commit underlying felony)
People v. Swain (1996) 12 Cal.4th 593, 602-603 (malice aforethought in implied malice murder cases is derived from proof of the specific intent to do an act dangerous to human life and the circumstances that killing resulted from that act.)
Voluntary intoxication will not negate malice aforethought. (People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103; People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437.) “To the extent that a defendant who is voluntarily intoxicated unlawfully kills with implied malice, the defendant would be guilty of second degree murder.” (People v. Turk (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1361.)
If the charge is felony-murder, malice aforethought is not an element. (People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626; People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441.) Imperfect self-defense is not available for felony-murder because malice aforethought is not an element. (People v. Tabios (1998); People v. Loustaunau (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 163; People v. Anderson (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1646)
Malice forethought is not the same as “malice”. (Penal Code §7; People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 731, rejected on other grounds by People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318 and people v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101; People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.3d 656, 666, overruled on other grounds in )
Definition of malice. People v. James (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 272; In re Thomas C. (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 786, 795.)
People . Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 43, overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, (under doctrine of felony murder, evidence of malice aforethought is not necessary).
Degrees of murder
The following circumstances are first degree murder under Penal Code section 189:
- Murder where the killing is deliberate and premeditated.
- Murder by the following means:
- Through use of destructive device, explosive, or weapons of mass destruction
- Through use of poison
- Lying in wait
- Through torture
- Through use of armor-piercing ammunition
- During commission of following crimes:
- Arson
- Rape
- Robbery
- Burglary
- Mayhem
- PC288a
- Kidnapping
- Train wrecking
- Sodomy
- PC288
- Penetration
- Murder that is perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict death
The designated felony offenses is California's version of first-degree felony murder, in which a showing of malice is not required. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 450.) The only criminal intent required to be proved is the specific intent to commit the particular underlying felony.” (People v. Chavez (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 385.)
The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony, since only those felonies that are inherently dangerous to life or pose a significant prospect of violence are enumerated in the statute… Once a person has embarked upon a course of conduct for one of the enumerated felonious purposes, he comes directly within a clear legislative warning - if a death results from his commission of that felony, it will be first degree murder, regardless of the circumstances.” People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197
“…first degree felony murder encompasses a far wider range of individual culpability than just deliberate and premeditated murder. It includes not only the latter, but also a variety of unintended homicides resulting from reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident; it embraces both calculated conduct and acts committed in panic or rage, or under the dominion of mental illness, drugs or alcohol; and it condemns alike consequences that are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly unforeseeable.” People v. Dillion (1983) 34 C.3d 441, 477
However, after SB1437, if not involving the death of a peace officer, Penal Code section 189, subdivision (e) now also requires the following:
- (1) The person was the actual killer.
- (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
- (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.
All other is murder in second degree.
People v. Van Ronk (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 818, 823)
People v. Horn (1974) 12 Cal.3d 290, disapproved of by People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223.
“[A]n information charging murder in violation of section 187 is sufficient to support a first degree murder conviction." (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1295.)
"when the killing is proved to have been committed by the defendant, and nothing further is shown, the presumption of law is that it was malicious and an act of murder; but in such a case the verdict should be murder of the second degree, and not murder of the first degree." (People v. Boyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, quoting People v. Lines (1975) 13 Cal.3d 500.)
Verdict forms should specify degree of murder, or it could result in a default of second-degree murder. (In re Birdwell (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 926, 928.)
A prosecutor can choose to withdraw from jury deliberations first-degree murder, but if after start of jury deliberations, jeopardy has attached and there cannot be retrial on first-degree murder. (People v. Bordeau (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 573.) Also see Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503 and People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322
Pleadings
(1) Murder. The general statute (P.C. 952) is supplemented by an illustration in the suggested form, authorizing the allegation that the defendant “murdered C.D.” (P.C. 951.) Hence, the simplified pleading of murder may take either of the following forms:
(a) Allegation in the statutory language of P.C. 187, defining the crime. (See People v. Mendez (1945) 27 C.2d 20, 21, 23, 161 P.2d 929 [defendant “did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice aforethought, murder” the victim]; People v. Coston (1948) 84 C.A.2d 645, 646, 191 P.2d 521 [same].)
(b) Allegation of the simple conclusion suggested in P.C. 951. (See People v. Jordan (1955) 45 C.2d 697, 709, 290 P.2d 484; People v. Berg (1929) 96 C.A. 430, 432, 274 P. 433.)
A charge of murder in the simplified form permits a conviction of first degree murder based on the felony-murder doctrine, even though the accusatory pleading contains no specification of degree. An accusatory pleading charging murder in the short form prescribed by P.C. 951 and 952, without specifying the degree of murder, adequately apprises the defendant of a first degree murder charge, and it has long been settled that, under such a charge, the defendant may be convicted of first degree murder on the theory that the murder was committed in the perpetration of one of the felonies specified in P.C. 189. (In re Walker (1974) 10 C.3d 764, 781, 112 C.R. 177, 518 P.2d 1129.) The following cases are instructive:
People v. Diaz (1992) 3 C.4th 495, 556, 557, 11 C.R.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 [accusatory pleading charging defendant with murder need not specify theory of murder on which prosecution intends to rely].
People v. Kipp (2001) 26 C.4th 1100, 1131, 113 C.R.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450 [pleading charging murder with malice adequately notified defendant of possibility of prosecution and conviction of first degree murder on felony-murder theory].
People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 C.4th 705, 712, 134 C.R.2d 223, 68 P.3d 1190 [although premeditated murder and felony-murder have different elements, only single crime of murder exists; hence, these theories need not be separately pleaded].
People v. Moore (2011) 51 C.4th 386, 412, 121 C.R.3d 280, 247 P.3d 515 [pleading charging murder in terms of malice aforethought and premeditation adequately notifies defendant of possibility of conviction of first degree murder on felony-murder theory].
People v. Scott (1991) 229 C.A.3d 707, 714, 716, 280 C.R. 274 [information charging murder is sufficient for prosecution under either P.C. 187 (malice murder) or P.C. 189 (felony-murder)].
People v. Bradford (2007) 154 C.A.4th 1390, 1422, 65 C.R.3d 548 [information charging that defendant unlawfully murdered victim in violation of P.C. 187(a) gave defendant sufficient notice of charges against him even though information did not plead existence of malice; charge of “murder” necessarily includes allegation of malice, and because information included term “murder,” defendant was on notice that he would have to defend against that charge].
People v. Loza (2012) 207 C.A.4th 332, 361, 143 C.R.3d 355 [defendant, who had been charged with murder under P.C. 187, was not denied adequate notice of charges against her by addition of new theory of murder, i.e., felony murder based on kidnapping, following unexpected testimony from codefendant that opened door to that theory].
(2) Manslaughter. Manslaughter is sufficiently alleged in the bare language of P.C. 192, e.g., that the defendant “did unlawfully and without malice kill” the victim. Averments of the specific means or methods, to characterize it as voluntary or involuntary, are not necessary. (People v. Dobbs (1945) 70 C.A.2d 261, 265, 161 P.2d 46.)
In People v. Carey (2007) 41 C.4th 109, 59 C.R.3d 172, 158 P.3d 743, the court instructed the jury on first degree premeditated murder and first degree felony-murder even though the information charged defendant only with malice murder under P.C. 187(a) (supra, § 9). Held, this was proper. An accusatory pleading charging murder without specifying the degree is sufficient to charge murder in any degree. In instructing a jury on first degree murder where the information charges murder under P.C. 187, the trial court does not violate the defendant's federal constitutional rights to due process, notice, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or a unanimous verdict. Here, the information charged both burglary and robbery special circumstances, putting defendant on notice that the prosecution was proceeding on a felony-murder theory, and felony-murder and premeditated murder are merely “different varieties of the same crime.” (41 C.4th 132.)
People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 712 [although premeditated murder and felony-murder have different elements, only a single statutory crime of murder exists; thus, felony-murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes, and need not be separately pleaded].
People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1294 [P.C. 187 and 189 each include both degrees of murder; thus, information charging murder in terms of P.C. 187 was sufficient to charge first degree murder].
People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1237 [information alleging that defendant committed murder with malice under P.C. 187(a) while engaged in commission of robbery was sufficient to support first degree murder conviction; P.C. 189 defines both degrees of murder, and P.C. 187 includes both in its more general formulation].
People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 54, 97 C.R.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520 [jury can return valid verdict of first degree murder without unanimously agreeing on whether defendant committed felony-murder or premeditated murder].
People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 148 [information charging murder in violation of P.C. 187(a) supported murder conviction in any degree, including first degree felony-murder; P.C. 187 and 189 both define both degrees of murder, and charge of murder not specifying degree is sufficient to charge murder in any degree].
Special circumstances
CALCRIM No. 730: [In addition, in order for this special circumstance to be true, the People must prove that the defendant intended to commit <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> independent of the killing. If you find that the defendant only intended to commit murder and the commission of <insert felony or felonies from Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)> was merely part of or incidental to the commission of that murder, then the special circumstance has not been proved.]
Above doesn't apply to kidnapping or arson, which is why there's CALCRIM No. 731 and No. 732.
The People must plead and prove, and the court must find sufficient cause to believe, a special circumstance allegation is true. (Ramos v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 26, 33, 184 Cal. Rptr. 622 (Cal. 1982); Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 3d 944, 954-955, 153 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1st Dist. 1979).
Unanimity
CALCRIM No. 548: The defendant has been prosecuted for murder under multiple theories. Each theory of murder has different requirements, and I will instruct you on each. You may not find the defendant guilty of murder unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed murder. You need not all agree on the same theory but you must unanimously agree on the degree of murder.
Aider and Abettor
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 Aider and abettor CANNOT be convicted of WDP 1st 187 based on NPC. Instead it's 2nd degree murder.
Different from willful deliberate premediated intent to kill. Directing aiding and abetting is first degree murder still.
Premeditated, Willful, And Deliberate
Not necessary to prove that defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of his act. People v. Casares (2016) 62 Cal.4th 808
premeditation and deliberation can occur in a very short period of time. (People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 435 [162 Cal.Rptr. 306, 606 P.2d 341].) The test is not time, but reflection. ” Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly. ...'“ (People v. Boyd (1987) 43 Cal.3d 333, 348.)
“Premeditated” has been defined as “on preexisting reflection,” and “deliberate” as “resulting from careful thought and weighing of considerations.” (See People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 26, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, infra, § 30; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 C.4th 489, 546, 7 C.R.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101.) The terms have been further defined by their antonyms: “premeditated” is not “spontaneous” and “deliberate” is not “hasty,” “impetuous,” “rash,” or “impulsive.” (See People v. Thomas (1945) 25 C.2d 880, 901, 156 P.2d 7; People v. Hilton (1946) 29 C.2d 217, 222, 174 P.2d 5.) And premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from a variety of circumstances, such as prior threats or other conduct of the defendant, or the type of weapon used. (See 2 Wharton, Crim. Law (16th ed.), § 21:4)
Premeditation encompasses the idea that the defendant thought about or considered the act beforehand. The term means “thought over in advance” and “deliberation” and refers to the careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action. (People v. Pearson (2013) 56 C.4th 393, 443, 154 C.R.3d 541, 297 P.3d 793.) (On aider and abettor's liability for premeditated murder, see 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Introduction to Crimes, § 107 et seq.)
In People v. Thomas (1945) 25 C.2d 880, 156 P.2d 7, the jury was instructed that, “this is murder of the second degree, unless the evidence proves the existence in the mind of the slayer of the specific intent to take life. If such specific intent exists at the time of such unlawful killing the offense committed would of course be murder of the first degree.” (25 C.2d at 898.) Held, this was reversible error.
(a) The court expressly disapproved cases indicating that a specific intent to kill is enough to make the crime first degree murder, holding that there is required “as an element of such crime substantially more reflection than may be involved in the mere formation of a specific intent to kill.” (25 C.2d at 900.)
(b) With reference to the statement in People v. Sanchez (1864) 24 C. 17, 30, supra, § 27, the court declared that “this is not the equivalent of saying that the intention to kill can be formed without being preceded by deliberation and premeditation. … In other words, a murder is of the first degree no matter how quickly the act of killing follows the ultimate formation of the intention if that intention has been reached with deliberation and premeditation.” The “true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly,” but the requirement that deliberation and premeditation concur excludes murders resulting from a “mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed.” (25 C.2d at 900.)
Many additional decisions are in accord. (See People v. Holt (1944) 25 C.2d 59, 153 P.2d 21, infra, § 93; People v. Bloyd (1987) 43 C.3d 333, 348, 233 C.R. 368, 729 P.2d 802 [“the test is not time, but reflection”]; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 C.4th 764, 795, 42 C.R.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481, infra, § 38 [premeditated simply means “considered beforehand”]; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 C.4th 668, 60 C.R.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [“thoughts may follow each other rapidly and calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly”]; People v. Lenart (2004) 32 C.4th 1107, 1127, 12 C.R.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498, infra, § 31 [extensive time is not required for premeditation and deliberation]; People v. Harris (2008) 43 C.4th 1269, 1286, 78 C.R.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727 [test is extent of reflection more than duration of time]; People v. Wang (2020) 46 C.A.5th 1055, 1085, 260 C.R.3d 343 [in closing argument, prosecutor properly analogized deliberation and premeditation to deciding quickly whether to drive through intersection on yellow light signal].)
Premeditation, deliberation, intent to kill, and malice all must be present for a killing to be first degree murder, and an instruction stating these requirements in the disjunctive is erroneous. (See People v. Smith (1973) 33 C.A.3d 51, 67, 108 C.R. 698 [harmless error]; People v. Swain (1996) 12 C.4th 593, 606, 608, 49 C.R.2d 390, 909 P.2d 994, 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Elements, § 88 [nature of premeditation discussed in context of conspiracy to commit murder]; People v. Moon (2005) 37 C.4th 1, 29, 32 C.R.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591, infra, § 44 [instruction that first degree murder required express malice, premeditation, and deliberation did not omit requirement that killing be willful; concept of express malice includes that of willfulness; willful murder is intentional murder and malice is express when there is intent to unlawfully kill human being]; 18 A.L.R.4th 961 [malice aforethought, deliberation, premeditation, as elements of first degree murder]; 36 U.S.F. L. Rev. 261 [application of premeditation and deliberation elements and distinction between degrees of murder].) Westlaw
Some cases imposed the requirement that to establish first degree murder the prosecution must prove that the defendant maturely and meaningfully contemplated the gravity of his or her act. (See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 C.2d 795, 818, 40 C.R. 271, 394 P.2d 959; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 C.3d 703, 713, 112 C.R. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) However, this requirement has been eliminated. “To prove the killing was ‘deliberate and premeditated,’ it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of the defendant's act.” (P.C. 189(d).)
In People v. Smithey (1999) 20 C.4th 936, 86 C.R.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171, the trial court modified CALJIC, No. 8.20 on first degree premeditated murder, by adding the statutory language. Defendant argued that the language was confusing and might have led the jury to believe that it could convict on the basis of immature and frivolous reflection. Held, the instruction was proper. It is generally appropriate to frame an instruction on the language of a statute, and the words in the phrase “maturely and meaningfully reflected” are commonly understood. Beyond that, the substance of a clarification requested by defendant was included in the instruction, which defined “deliberate” as requiring careful thought, weighing, and consideration for and against the proposed course of action, and “premeditated” as “considered beforehand.” (20 C.4th at 981.) (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 C.5th 983, 1000, 274 C.R.3d 309, 479 P.3d 797 [approving amendment to CALCRIM, No. 521, adding language of P.C. 189(d); statute was stated in commonly understood terms, and there was no reasonable likelihood that jury misunderstood and misapplied mental state required for deliberate and premeditated murder; following Smithey].)
Anderson factors
People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27.)
(1) How and what defendant did prior to the actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing— what may be characterized as “planning” activity;
(2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing was the result of “a pre-existing reflection” and “careful thought and weighing of considerations” rather than “mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed”;
(3) facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a “preconceived design” to take his victim's life in a particular way for a “reason” which the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).
(1) Anderson Standards. People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, analyzed the earlier cases and set forth definitive standards: (a) Recognizing the need to clarify the difference between first and second degree murder and the bases on which a reviewing court may find the evidence sufficient to support a first degree murder verdict, the court set forth standards for the kind of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation. These standards were derived from the nature of premeditation and deliberation as these terms are used by the Legislature and interpreted by the court. (70 C.2d at 25.) (b) The court divided the type of evidence it has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation into three categories (70 C.2d at 26): (1) Facts about what the defendant did before the actual killing showing that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and intended to result in, the killing (“planning activity”). (2) Facts about the defendant's prior relationship or conduct or both with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive to kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or (3), would in turn support an inference that the killing resulted from a “pre-existing reflection” and “careful thought and weighing of considerations” rather than “mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed.” (3) Facts about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular that the defendant must have acted on a preconceived design to kill in a particular way for a reason that the jury can reasonably infer from facts of type (1) or (2).
The court typically sustains first degree murder verdicts when there is evidence of all three types. The court otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of the first type, or evidence of the second type in conjunction with evidence of either the first or third type. (70 C.2d at 27.)
The court discussed as illustrative the following cases in which the evidence was held sufficient: People v. Stroble (1951) 36 C.2d 615, 619, 226 P.2d 330 [all three types]; People v. Cole (1956) 47 C.2d 99, 106, 301 P.2d 854 [primarily type (2), also type (1)]; People v. Cartier (1960) 54 C.2d 300, 309, 5 C.R. 573, 353 P.2d 53, infra, § 76 [strong type (3), also both others]; People v. Kemp (1961) 55 C.2d 458, 11 C.R. 361, 359 P.2d 913 [types (1) and (3)]; People v. Quicke (1964) 61 C.2d 155, 158, 37 C.R. 617, 390 P.2d 393 [substantial type (1) and also type (2)]; People v. Hillery (1965) 62 C.2d 692, 703, 44 C.R. 30, 401 P.2d 382 [strong type (1) and strong type (3)]. (70 C.2d at 27.) (See People v. Alcala (1984) 36 C.3d 604, 627, 205 C.R. 775, 685 P.2d 1126 [planning is “the most important prong” of Anderson test].)
Standards Are Not Elements of Crime. In People v. Lucero (1988) 44 C.3d 1006, 245 C.R. 185, 750 P.2d 1342, the court stated that the Anderson factors “are not elements of the crime of first degree murder.” Rather, Anderson “merely set forth a standard of appellate review by identifying the type of evidence that this court has found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation.” (44 C.3d at 1021.) Hence, the trial judge properly rejected a defense instruction that quoted directly from Anderson, and that incorrectly suggested that the jury had to find evidence of “planning, motive and manner of killing in proper combination under one of the alternative Anderson formulae before it could find first degree murder.” (44 C.3d at 1021.)
Standards Are Not Limitation on Evidence. By its terms, Anderson guides appellate courts in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support jury findings of premeditation and deliberation. It does not purport to be and cannot be applied to limit a jury's consideration of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Moon (2005) 37 C.4th 1, 31, 32 C.R.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591, infra, § 44 [citing Lucero; trial court properly refused proposed instruction providing alternative definition of premeditation and deliberation based on Anderson factors, even though proposed instruction was relevant to defendant's theory of case].) (See 96 A.L.R.2d 1435 [presumption of deliberation or premeditation from circumstances of killing].)
(1) Standards Are Not Normative. In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has explained that the standards in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, supra, § 30, do not establish normative rules, but are merely guides to analysis. In People v. Thomas (1992) 2 C.4th 489, 7 C.R.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101, the court stated that “[u]nreflective reliance on Anderson for a definition of premeditation is inappropriate. The Anderson analysis was intended as a framework to assist reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing resulted from preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations. It did not refashion the elements of first degree murder or alter the substantive law in any way.” (2 C.4th at 517.)
People v. Perez (1992) 2 C.4th 1117, 9 C.R.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159, repeated the statement in Thomas and added that “[t]he Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative. … The goal of Anderson was to aid reviewing courts in assessing whether the evidence is supportive of an inference that the killing was the result of preexisting reflection and weighing of considerations rather than mere unconsidered rash impulse. … In identifying categories of evidence bearing on premeditation and deliberation, Anderson did not purport to establish an exhaustive list that would exclude all other types and combinations of evidence that could support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. … The Anderson factors, while helpful for purposes of review, are not a sine qua non to finding first degree premeditated murder, nor are they exclusive.” (2 C.4th at 1125.)
People v. Pride (1992) 3 C.4th 195, 10 C.R.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643, stated that Anderson does not require that the factors of planning activity, motive, and manner of killing be present in any special combination, that they be given a particular weight, or that they be exclusive. (3 C.4th at 247.) People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 C.4th 920, 42 C.R.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574, continued this approach, stating that while the Anderson factors provide a synthesis of prior case law, they are not a definitive statement of the prerequisites for proving deliberation and premeditation in every case. (10 C.4th at 957.)
Standards Are Not Exclusive. The Anderson standards are not the exclusive means for establishing premeditation and deliberation. In People v. Lenart (2004) 32 C.4th 1107, 12 C.R.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498, defendant was convicted of the willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder of G, who walked into a bar where defendant had just murdered the bartender by ordering her to the floor and shooting her. Defendant pointed his gun at G and ordered her to the floor. When she seized the gun and ran from the bar, defendant followed her. Held, conviction upheld. This evidence amply supports the jury's finding that defendant premeditated and deliberated a willful murder of G patterned on the murder of the bartender, and that he intended to kill her from the time he pointed the gun at her until she escaped. (32 C.4th at 1127, citing Perez.) (See People v. Combs (2004) 34 C.4th 821, 850, 22 C.R.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007 [Anderson factors are not exclusive or invariably determinative]; People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 C.4th 379, 420, 64 C.R.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512 [Anderson guidelines are descriptive, not normative or exhaustive, and reviewing courts need not give any of them any particular weight]; People v. Gunder (2007) 151 C.A.4th 412, 420, 59 C.R.3d 817 [defendant, arguing that evidence was insufficient to prove premeditation, employed discredited approach of using analytical paradigm articulated in Anderson “as a straightjacket on the manner in which premeditation can be proven adequately at trial”].)
(1) Sufficient Evidence Under Anderson Standards. The following decisions found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation using the standards in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, supra, § 30, as guides to analysis (see supra, § 31):
People v. Lucero (1988) 44 C.3d 1006, 1018, 245 C.R. 185, 750 P.2d 1342 [although evidence was “not particularly strong” on any one of Anderson factors, some evidence was presented on each; considered in combination, evidence was sufficient].
People v. Wharton (1991) 53 C.3d 522, 548, 280 C.R. 631, 809 P.2d 290 [evidence of planning activity and motive were sufficient even though manner of killing did not indicate preconceived design].
People v. Edwards (1991) 54 C.3d 787, 814, 1 C.R.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436 [specific motive need not be proved to uphold judgment of first degree murder; senseless, random, but premeditated killing supports verdict of first degree murder verdict].
People v. Thomas (1992) 2 C.4th 489, 516, 7 C.R.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101 [jury could have concluded that defendant went to car for rifle before killings and carefully reloaded before shooting second victim, that killings were in quiet area where weapon would not be readily accessible, and that each victim was killed by single contact shot; possible motive was elimination of witness to other murder]. People v. Davis (1995) 10 C.4th 463, 510, 41 C.R.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119 [defendant pursued victim, who was gravely injured in car accident, and strangled her while she was severely debilitated and in pain from internal injuries; even if Anderson factors are not met, they are merely descriptive].
People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 C.4th 920, 957, 42 C.R.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574 [execution-style manner of killing was sufficient to prove premeditation and deliberation, despite minimal evidence of planning and motive]. People v. Jones (2003) 30 C.4th 1084, 1115, 135 C.R.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359 [by naming gang “211 187” (Penal Code sections for robbery and murder), gang members showed that, when committing robbery, they planned in advance to kill victims].
People v. Young (2005) 34 C.4th 1149, 1183, 24 C.R.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487 [when denied entry, defendant, armed with loaded gun, crashed through living room window (planning; armed entry with possible intent to kill); after shooting victim, defendant pointed gun at woman near house and told her not to return because house “was his turf” (motive to intimidate and show seriousness); defendant accosted victims and others at gunpoint (violent and random manner of killing)].
People v. Solomon (2010) 49 C.4th 792, 813, 112 C.R.3d 244, 234 P.3d 501 [defendant expressed hostility towards prostitutes generally, and all six murder victims were prostitutes (motive); all murders were all carried out by binding and asphyxiating victims (planning, manner)].
People v. Booker (2011) 51 C.4th 141, 173, 119 C.R.3d 722, 245 P.3d 366 [although defendant may have quickly decided to kill two out of three victims, trier of fact could reasonably have concluded that defendant killed all three to eliminate them as witnesses].
People v. Cage (2015) 62 C.4th 256, 277, 195 C.R.3d 724, 362 P.3d 376 [defendant entered B's home and shot her three times in rapid succession, then went upstairs to D's room where he kicked in door and shot D twice at close range].
People v. Nazeri (2010) 187 C.A.4th 1101, 1115, 114 C.R.3d 730 [defendant told his brother beforehand about attacking wife and mother-in-law (planning); defendant believed wife was having affair and planning to kill him, and mother-in-law witnessed attack on wife (motives); defendant inflicted numerous knife blows to neck and vital organs of both victims (manner)].
People v. Shamblin (2015) 236 C.A.4th 1, 10, 186 C.R.3d 257 [citing Davis; defendant devised plan to kill victim during or after sexual assault to prevent her from identifying him afterwards, killed victim to effectuate that plan, and strangled her with sufficient force to break bone in her neck].
People v. Williams (2018) 23 C.A.5th 396, 409, 232 C.R.3d 671 [defendant's rage at collapse of relationship and deliberate manner of killing showed motive; he stabbed wife twice in neck and inflicted blunt force trauma in different areas of her body, and exhibited no remorse]. People v. Serrano (2024) 100 C.A.5th 1324, 1333, 319 C.R.3d 765 [defendant engaged in shootout with police after crashing stolen vehicle in busy intersection, shooting multiple times with pump-action firearm that required cycling each shell into chamber for firing].
(2) Insufficient Evidence Under Anderson Standards. In People v. Wear (2020) 44 C.A.5th 1007, 1023, 258 C.R.3d 213 [there was insufficient evidence to support the planning element under Anderson. Defendant killed the victim during a gun sale held on a Sunday afternoon in a suburban neighborhood in plain view of multiple witnesses, and did not arrive armed with a weapon. Defendant and the victim were loudly arguing before the shooting, suggesting that defendant acted rashly in response to provocation. Although there was some evidence of motive due to defendant's month-old threat to kill the victim, it did not amount to planning activity. (44 C.A.5th at 1023.)
Mental defense
Some cases imposed the requirement that to establish first degree murder the prosecution must prove that the defendant maturely and meaningfully contemplated the gravity of his or her act. (See People v. Wolff (1964) 61 C.2d 795, 818, 40 C.R. 271, 394 P.2d 959; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 C.3d 703, 713, 112 C.R. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) However, this requirement has been eliminated. “To prove the killing was ‘deliberate and premeditated,’ it shall not be necessary to prove the defendant maturely and meaningfully reflected upon the gravity of the defendant's act.” (P.C. 189(d).) In People v. Smithey (1999) 20 C.4th 936, 86 C.R.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171, the trial court modified CALJIC, No. 8.20 on first degree premeditated murder, by adding the statutory language. Defendant argued that the language was confusing and might have led the jury to believe that it could convict on the basis of immature and frivolous reflection. Held, the instruction was proper. It is generally appropriate to frame an instruction on the language of a statute, and the words in the phrase “maturely and meaningfully reflected” are commonly understood. Beyond that, the substance of a clarification requested by defendant was included in the instruction, which defined “deliberate” as requiring careful thought, weighing, and consideration for and against the proposed course of action, and “premeditated” as “considered beforehand.” (20 C.4th at 981.) (See People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 C.5th 983, 1000, 274 C.R.3d 309, 479 P.3d 797 [approving amendment to CALCRIM, No. 521, adding language of P.C. 189(d); statute was stated in commonly understood terms, and there was no reasonable likelihood that jury misunderstood and misapplied mental state required for deliberate and premeditated murder; following Smithey].)
1) Grounds for Admitting Evidence. A defendant charged with first degree murder may offer evidence as to mental state for any of these purposes: (a) the complete defenses of legal insanity or unconsciousness, leading to acquittal; (b) the partial defenses of intoxication or abnormal mental condition short of insanity, to negative the element of premeditation, and thereby reduce the crime to second degree murder, and (c) to negative the element of malice aforethought, and thereby reduce the crime to manslaughter. The admissibility of this evidence was established in People v. Wells (1949) 33 C.2d 330, 350, 202 P.2d 53, dealing with an assault by a life prisoner “with malice aforethought,” and in People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 C.2d 716, 733, 336 P.2d 492, a murder case. (On necessity of proper instructions on effect of intoxication, see People v. Baker (1954) 42 C.2d 550, 570, 268 P.2d 705, 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 21; on necessity of instructing on mistake of fact as defense, see People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 C.3d 143, 157, 125 C.R. 745, 542 P.2d 1337, 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 55; on criminal intent as element of crime generally, see 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Elements, § 1 et seq.; on defenses negating required intent, see 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 4 et seq. [lack of capacity], § 48 et seq. [conditions affecting intent].)
(2) Provocation. The test for finding that provocation precluded the defendant from deliberating so as to reduce the degree of murder is a subjective test, unlike the objective test used to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter by reason of heat of passion. (People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 C.A.4th 1285, 1295, 3 C.R.2d 808.) Provocation sufficient to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder must come from the victim, not a third party. (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 C.A.5th 362, 368, 315 C.R.3d 452 [case of first impression; adopting rule applicable to provocation reducing second degree murder to manslaughter].)
A number of decisions involve the scope of jury instructions on the nature of provocation. (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 C.4th 826, 878, 48 C.R.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135 [trial court is not required to instruct on its own motion that provocation inadequate to reduce killing to manslaughter may suffice to negate premeditation, thus reducing the degree of murder]; People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 C.A.4th 1327, 1333, 107 C.R.3d 915 [court did not mislead jury by instructing on provocation without stating that it can negate premeditation and deliberation; instructions, read as whole, informed jury that provocation can give rise to impulsive decision, which shows no premeditation or deliberation]; CALCRIM, No. 522 [Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder]; CALJIC, No. 8.73 [Evidence of Provocation May Be Considered in Determining Degree of Murder]; on heat of passion, see infra, § 136 et seq.) Where substantial evidence of provocation is lacking, the trial court does not err in refusing to instruct on provocation reducing the degree of murder. (People v. Avila (2009) 46 C.4th 680, 707, 94 C.R.3d 699, 208 P.3d 634 [citing People v. Steele (2002) 27 C.4th 1230, 1253, 120 C.R.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225, infra, § 135; hearing person yell possible gang reference or challenge does not cause ordinarily reasonable person to become homicidally enraged]; People v. Windfield (2021) 59 C.A.5th 496, 519, 273 C.R.3d 583 [insufficient evidence to support provocation instruction where defendant claimed that shooting was mistake, not that it was provoked, and that victim was unable to identify shooters].)
In People v. Jones (2014) 223 C.A.4th 995, 167 C.R.3d 659, defendant's best friend, R, was shot and killed by a fellow gang member, A. Defendant was beaten by fellow gang members who believed that defendant did not come to R's aid. The next day defendant saw M, who was rumored to have given A the gun used to kill R. Defendant told an acquaintance that he was going to kill M, then he chased M and shot him several times. Defendant was convicted of the first degree murder of M with personal firearm use and street gang allegations. He argued that the jury instructions on provocation were misleading because they did not inform the jury that the objective standard applies only to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter, not to reduce first degree to second degree murder. Held, there was no error.
(a) The jury was instructed that, if defendant's action in killing M resulted from provocation, first degree murder was not committed, and that provocation can give rise to a rash, impulsive decision, which shows lack of premeditation and deliberation. The jury was also informed that, to reduce murder to manslaughter, the provocation must be sufficient to cause a person of average disposition in the same situation, knowing the same facts, to have acted from passion rather than judgment. Defendant did not request a pinpoint instruction that the objective test did not apply to reduce the degree of murder, and thus, forfeited this claim on appeal. (223 C.A.4th at 1001.)
(b) There was little evidence in the record to support a provocation defense. Even though R was defendant's best friend and defendant was upset about the murder and about being disciplined by the gang, R's death had occurred the day before defendant killed M, and defendant had time to decide on a course of action. Defendant said he was going to kill M and did so. Defense counsel reasonably argued mistaken identity, rather than provocation, as a defense. And the prosecutor did not dwell on provocation, merely pointing out that the defense had not argued it. (223 C.A.4th at 1001.)
(3) Duress. A malicious, premeditated killing is murder, despite duress. (People v. Anderson (2002) 28 C.4th 767, 784, 122 C.R.2d 587, 50 P.3d 368, 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 63.)
(1) Express Malice. In People v. Saille (1991) 54 C.3d 1103, 2 C.R.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588, defendant, who had been drinking heavily throughout the day, was twice refused service at a bar. After the second refusal, he left, saying to a security guard, “I'm going to get a gun and kill you.” Defendant went home, got a rifle, and returned to the bar. The guard tried to grab the rifle, but it discharged and killed a patron. Defendant's blood-alcohol level was .19% at the time. He was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder. On appeal, defendant claimed that the instructions on voluntary intoxication were inadequate, in that the trial court did not instruct that intoxication could reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating malice or that the jury could consider intoxication on the issue of premeditation and deliberation. Held, conviction affirmed. The law of California no longer permits voluntary intoxication or mental disorder to reduce murder to nonstatutory voluntary manslaughter. (54 C.3d at 1107.) (a) Defendant relied primarily on People v. Molina (1988) 202 C.A.3d 1168, 249 C.R. 273, which held that, despite the abolition of the diminished capacity defense in 1981 (see 1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 28 et seq.), murder could still be reduced to voluntary manslaughter by evidence of mental illness showing lack of malice. However, Molina failed to consider the amendment of P.C. 188 that was part of the same 1981 legislative package. That amendment provides that, where a killing results from an intentional act with express or implied malice, “no other mental state need be shown to establish the mental state of malice aforethought. Neither an awareness of the obligation to act within the general body of laws regulating society nor acting despite such awareness is included within the definition of malice.” (54 C.3d at 1113.) (b) P.C. 188, as amended, repudiates the expanded definition of malice aforethought adopted in earlier cases and makes express malice and an intent unlawfully to kill “one and the same.” Thus, “when an intentional killing is shown, malice aforethought is established. Accordingly, the concept of ‘diminished capacity voluntary manslaughter’ (nonstatutory manslaughter) … is no longer valid as a defense.” (54 C.3d at 1114.) (c) Defendant, relying on the language of P.C. 188 requiring a “deliberate intention unlawfully” to kill, argued that express malice requires more than intent to kill. The reasoning to the contrary of People v. Bobo (1990) 229 C.A.3d 1417, 3 C.R.2d 747, is persuasive. Bobo pointed out that deliberate intent to kill is not an element of murder, but only of one class of first degree murder: an unlawful, premeditated, and deliberate killing. “Deliberate intention,” as used in P.C. 188, merely distinguishes express from implied malice, and the word “deliberate” is essentially redundant. (54 C.3d at 1114, 1115.) (d) Former P.C. 22(b) (now P.C. 29.4(b)) (1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 33 et seq.) and P.C. 28(a) (1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Defenses, § 28 et seq.) make evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental illness admissible solely on the issue whether the defendant actually formed a required mental state or harbored malice aforethought. These are general statutes covering all specific intent crimes, and the leeway in the language is needed to ensure that coverage. These provisions relate to any crime without defining what mental state is required, while P.C. 188 defines malice for purposes of murder. Together they make it clear that the jury may consider evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental disorder in deciding whether there was malice as defined by P.C. 188. There is no conflict in the statutes. (54 C.3d at 1115, 1116.) (e) The narrowing of the definition of express malice does not violate due process. Express malice is now equated with an intent unlawfully to kill. A defendant is still free to show that, because of mental illness or voluntary intoxication, the required intent to kill was not in fact formed. (54 C.3d at 1116, 1117.) (See People v. Forrest (2017) 7 C.A.5th 1074, 1082, 212 C.R.3d 848, infra, § 138 [any misstatement of law made by prosecutor in telling jury that voluntary intoxication could be considered for its effect on defendant's capacity to premeditate, deliberate, and harbor express malice was harmless where trial court fully instructed jury that evidence of voluntary intoxication could be considered only to decide whether defendant acted with intent to kill or with deliberation and premeditation, and for no other purpose]; CALCRIM, No. 626 [Voluntary Intoxication Causing Unconsciousness: Effects on Homicide Crimes].) (2) Implied Malice. Voluntary intoxication is irrelevant to the mental state of implied malice or conscious disregard for life; under former P.C. 22(b) (now P.C. 29.4(b)), voluntary intoxication is admissible, in a murder prosecution, solely on whether the defendant premeditated, deliberated, or harbored express malice. (People v. Timms (2007) 151 C.A.4th 1292, 1300, 1302, 60 C.R.3d 677, 1 Cal. Crim. (5th), Defenses, § 34; People v. Turk (2008) 164 C.A.4th 1361, 1376, 80 C.R.3d 473 [defendant who unlawfully kills without express malice due to voluntary intoxication but with implied malice, which voluntary intoxication cannot negate, is guilty of second degree murder].) (3) Hallucination. Hallucination, although not a basis for reducing murder to voluntary manslaughter, may reduce the degree of murder. (People v. Padilla (2002) 103 C.A.4th 675, 678, 126 C.R.2d 889, supra, § 15.)
The Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove every element of the offense charged, including the necessary intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 1892, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, 522.) However, once the prosecution proves facts constituting a crime, the state may require the defendant to prove an affirmative defense, such as insanity or extreme emotional disturbance, by a preponderance of the evidence. (See Patterson v. New York (1977) 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2325, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 290.)
(1) Early Decisions. In decisions before People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, supra, § 30, premeditation or deliberate purpose was inferred from a variety of circumstances, such as the defendant's prior threats or other acts, the defendant's motive, the type of weapon used, the nature and location of the wounds, the duration of the attack, the nature of the interaction between the defendant and the victim, the defendant's conduct before and after the crime, the defendant's attempts to avoid detection, and the defendant's description of his or her own mental and emotional processes. (See, e.g., People v. Mendez (1945) 27 C.2d 20, 29, 161 P.2d 929; People v. Eggers (1947) 30 C.2d 676, 686, 185 P.2d 1; People v. Love (1960) 53 C.2d 843, 851, 3 C.R. 665, 350 P.2d 70; People v. Cooper (1960) 53 C.2d 755, 765, 766, 3 C.R. 148, 349 P.2d 964; People v. Saterfield (1967) 65 C.2d 752, 759, 56 C.R. 338, 423 P.2d 266.) (2) Later Decisions. After the decision in People v. Anderson, defendants often challenged the sufficiency of evidence of premeditation and deliberation by reference to the standards set forth in that case: (a) planning, (b) motive, and (c) method or manner. In the following cases, the court determined that the evidence was sufficient to meet the Anderson standards. In People v. Alcala (1984) 36 C.3d 604, 205 C.R. 775, 685 P.2d 1126, defendant was convicted of the kidnapping and first degree murder of a girl, age 12. Held, the following evidence was sufficient to sustain the first degree murder conviction: (a) defendant met and photographed the victim, abducted her, took her to secluded spot in rural area, bringing along the murder weapon (planning); (b) defendant could have killed the victim to eliminate her as the sole witness to the kidnapping (motive); (c) the killing was brutal, indicating a calculated design to cause death, with damage to the teeth and jaw indicating a blow to the head with a blunt object (method). However, the court pointed out that, without other evidence, a brutal method of slaying is as consistent with a sudden explosion of violence as with calculated murder. (36 C.3d at 626.) In People v. Proctor (1992) 4 C.4th 499, 15 C.R.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100, defendant entered a woman's home and raped, tortured, and murdered her. Held, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation. (a) A cigarette butt near a window and handprint on the windowsill indicate that defendant spent time outside the home observing her before entering to commit the offenses (planning). (b) The jury could have determined that defendant killed to avoid detection for abuse committed against the victim (motive). (c) Defendant subjected the victim to prolonged physical abuse before strangling her, first manually and then with a ligature (method). (4 C.4th at 529.) In People v. Thompson (2010) 49 C.4th 79, 109 C.R.3d 549, 231 P.3d 289, defendant's cohort on the night of the murder testified that defendant robbed and shot the victim. Following the murder, they methodically disposed of the victim's property. Defendant's knowledge of the location and entry code to the victim's storage facility supports the inference that he gained this information from the victim as part of a plan to take his property after killing him. (49 C.4th at 113.) This evidence, combined with evidence that defendant convinced the victim to drive to an isolated area, picking up defendant's cohort along the way, that defendant ordered the victim to take off his clothes before the shooting, that defendant shot the victim at close range without provocation or evidence of a struggle, was sufficient to support a conviction of premeditated murder. (49 C.4th at 114.) Many other cases have found the evidence sufficient: People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 C.3d 1210, 1237, 1238, 278 C.R. 640, 805 P.2d 899 [defendant used alias, selected most vulnerable victim (infant rather than young child), and drove to isolated location to commit killing]. People v. Welch (1999) 20 C.4th 701, 85 C.R.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754 [defendant told victims and others that he was planning to kill everyone in house hours before doing so, and had obtained semiautomatic weapon to carry out killings (planning); he wanted to prevent several people in house from testifying about his harassment of them (motive); he systematically moved through house shooting everyone he encountered in head or chest at close range (method)]. People v. Elliot (2005) 37 C.4th 453, 471, 35 C.R.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968 [defendant armed himself with knife before killing, selected vulnerable victim, and removed her to secluded spot (planning); defendant inflicted three potentially fatal and almost 80 other knife wounds and then shot victim four times in head, indicating possible desire to make sure that she could not testify about robbery and attempted torture (method and motive)]. People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 C.4th 379, 421, 64 C.R.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512 [defendant acted purposively in driving to find various persons and killing them; neither victim provoked defendant or struggled with him; defendant had planned another shooting an hour earlier (planning); defendant was distraught about his financial situation, and he associated each location where he committed shooting with his financial troubles (motive); victims were shot in head or neck from few feet away (method)]. People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 C.4th 174, 201, 79 C.R.3d 125, 186 P.3d 496 [defendant engaged in continuing and escalating acts of abuse of young child that culminated in brutal blows and burning with oil during mother's absence; when mother returned home, defendant dissuaded and then prevented her from seeking medical help; lack of evidence of motive did not preclude conviction of first degree murder based on this evidence]. People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 C.4th 983, 1019, 81 C.R.3d 299, 189 P.3d 300 [after abusing victim, defendant dumped her dead body in river in secluded spot where she might have been swept away, thus eliminating evidence of his crimes (motive; planning); defendant killed victim with rope by strangulation, which is by its nature deliberate act requiring constant force over prolonged period of time (manner)]. People v. Brady (2010) 50 C.4th 547, 561, 113 C.R.3d 458, 236 P.3d 312 [during traffic stop, defendant, prohibited from possessing firearm, had several minutes to plan action to prevent discovery of gun located in glove compartment (planning and motive); defendant shot officer once as officer stood by car, again as officer moved away from car, and third time as officer lay on ground (method)]. People v. Jennings (2010) 50 C.4th 616, 639, 114 C.R.3d 133, 237 P.3d 474 [defendant spoke of “shooting” or “killing” unmanageable young child (motive); before child's death, defendant had sent mother and grandfather, and had gone himself, to find place to dump child's body and had devised story to explain child's disappearance (planning); child was systematically starved, continuously abused, and deliberately given lethal dose of sedatives (method)]. People v. Gonzales & Soliz (2011) 52 C.4th 254, 294, 128 C.R.3d 417, 256 P.3d 543 [defendants targeted victims in retaliation for prior murder of gang member (motive); decision to kill victims was formed when armed defendants saw victims and decided to confront them (planning); victims were killed by multiple gunshots at close range with semiautomatic weapon, and there was no evidence of struggle (manner)]. People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 C.4th 1056, 1069, 132 C.R.3d 808, 263 P.3d 1, infra, § 44 [during police stop, defendant used friend as shield to surreptitiously approach officer, pushed friend aside, stepped closer to officer, and shot him in face (planning); defendant was subject to parole condition that he not possess weapon (motive); by use of stealth and precision, defendant killed officer with single shot to head (manner)]. People v. Streeter (2012) 54 C.4th 205, 243, 142 C.R.3d 481, 278 P.3d 754 [defendant was angry at victim, who was leaving him and taking their son (motive), he left what could be understood as murder/suicide note, and evidence suggested that he had siphoned gasoline from tank while waiting for victim at scheduled meeting place (planning); he beat victim, poured gasoline on her, dragged her to his car, and set her on fire (manner)]. People v. Houston (2012) 54 C.4th 1186, 1216, 144 C.R.3d 716, 281 P.3d 799 [defendant blamed teacher who flunked him and school system for ruining his life (motive); he diagrammed school, wrote farewell letter to his family, and brought two loaded firearms and spare ammunition to school (planning); he had controlled demeanor during killings (manner)]. People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 C.4th 394, 425, 196 C.R.3d 424, 363 P.3d 41 [defendant set out to kill rival gang member; when police officers arrived on scene, defendant decided to kill officers rather than allow fellow gang member to be returned to prison (motive); in military-style execution, defendant quickly fired multiple rounds from high-powered weapon into police car (manner)]. People v. Brooks (2017) 3 C.5th 1, 58, 219 C.R.3d 331, 396 P.3d 480 [defendant, who previously expressed intent to blow up car, drove car, with unconscious victim inside, to secluded freeway off-ramp in early morning hours and maneuvered it out of view (planning); in months before killing defendant had become obsessed and angry with victim (motive); defendant poured accelerant around car and on victim, and stuffed lighted cloth into gas tank (method)]. People v. Lopez (2018) 5 C.5th 339, 355, 235 C.R.3d 64, 420 P.3d 878 [defendant complained that victim—a small child—was financial strain, escalated acts of abuse over time, threw victim onto floor knowing that she was fragile, and concealed his actions by preventing victim from receiving medical attention]. People v. Morales (2020) 10 C.5th 76, 88, 266 C.R.3d 706, 470 P.3d 605 [defendant entered victim's home and attacked first victim from behind, slitting his throat, before killing other victims in prolonged attack; manner of killing suggested intent to kill, and defendant was possibly motivated by debt owed to victim and failed attempt to date victim's daughter]. People v. Williams (1995) 40 C.A.4th 446, 455, 46 C.R.2d 730 [defendant shot two victims in head after binding and gagging them; defendant brought duct tape and loaded gun with him and parked car on side street (planning), bound victims' hands, feet, and mouths, and efficiently killed each by a single bullet to the head (method)]. People v. Disa (2016) 1 C.A.5th 654, 666, 204 C.R.3d 870 [defendant used carotid restraint hold, which can render victim dead in 1 minute (method), he deliberately continued to exert pressure on victim's neck even after she went limp (planning), and he was jealous over her relationship with another man and angry that she tried to kick him out of his own house and insulted him (motive); evidence that he calmly smoked cigarettes, ate leftovers, slept, and went to work after killing victim was inconsistent with rash, impulsive killing].
Where the evidence fails to show premeditation and deliberation, a verdict of first degree murder cannot stand, and the judgment will be either reversed or modified to second degree murder. (See 86 A.L.R.2d 656 [presumption of deliberation or premeditation from fact of killing]; infra, § 93 et seq. [illustrations of second degree murder].) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 C.2d 15, 73 C.R. 550, 447 P.2d 942, supra, § 30, the court reduced a first degree murder conviction to second degree. Defendant lived with a woman and her three children. He killed her daughter, age 10. The girl's body had over 60 wounds, and her clothes had been torn from it. The prosecution relied on premeditation and attempt to violate P.C. 288 (lewd act with child) as the basis for first degree murder. The jury's verdict was first degree, with the death penalty. Held, affirmed as modified by reducing the degree to second. (a) After stating the controlling standards and analyzing cases holding the evidence sufficient (see supra, § 30), the court followed People v. Craig (1957) 49 C.2d 313, 316 P.2d 947, infra, § 73, and People v. Granados (1957) 49 C.2d 490, 319 P.2d 346, in holding the evidence insufficient. The only prior behavior was sending the victim's brother on an errand and returning alone with the victim; this was ambiguous in terms of inferences as to purpose (planning); the alleged sexual molestation did not support a reasonable inference of motive to kill, with the resulting inference of preconceived design (motive); the manner of killing (brutal hacking) did not support a reasonable inference of deliberately placed blows, with the resulting inference of premeditated killing (manner). (70 C.2d at 31.) (b) “We conclude that a finding of premeditation and deliberation cannot be sustained in the absence of any evidence of (1) defendant's actions prior to the killing, (2) a ‘motive’ or ‘reason’ from which the jury could reasonably infer that defendant intended to kill [the victim], or (3) a manner of killing from which the jury could reasonably infer that the wounds were deliberately calculated to result in death.” (70 C.2d at 33.) In People v. Rowland (1982) 134 C.A.3d 1, 184 C.R. 346, defendant brought a woman to his apartment after a party, strangled her, and disposed of her body. He was convicted of first degree murder. Held, judgment modified to second degree. Defendant's attempts to keep the woman's presence in the apartment secret from his live-in girlfriend, who was at home, and his use of an electric cord to strangle the woman were minimal evidence of planning. Moreover, this method of killing was not “so particular and exacting” as to show an intentional killing based on a preconceived design. (134 C.A.3d at 8, 9.) Defendant's alleged motive, to silence the woman so that his girlfriend would not hear her, is more consistent with a spontaneous reaction than with a deliberated plan to end the woman's life. (134 C.A.3d at 9.) In People v. Boatman (2013) 221 C.A.4th 1253, 165 C.R.3d 521, defendant shot the victim in the face, killing her. Defendant and the victim were in a house with four others present. There was evidence that the shooting occurred shortly after defendant and the victim had been arguing. According to defendant's report, he took the gun away from the victim, who had pointed it at him. He pointed the gun at her, jokingly, about 12 inches from her face, knowing that it was loaded, and cocked the hammer. Then the victim slapped the gun and it discharged. Immediately after that, defendant told his younger brother to “call the cops.” He tried to give the victim mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Held, judgment modified to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder; the evidence, although sufficient to establish second degree implied malice murder, was not sufficient to support a conviction for first degree premeditated murder. (a) Determinative factors. Defendant gave multiple false versions of how the victim was shot, but these false denials of wrongdoing, by themselves, were insufficient to support an inference that defendant committed the crime. (221 C.A.4th at 1266, citing People v. Velazquez (2011) 201 C.A.4th 219, 133 C.R.3d 684.) (b) Planning. There was no evidence of planning. Defendant shot the victim in his home with four others present who could identify him. There was no evidence that he left the home, or the room, to get the gun; rather the only evidence of his possession of the gun was that he took it away from the victim shortly before the shooting. Although the jury could disbelieve his statement that he did not intend to shoot the victim, this disbelief, absent other evidence, could not support an inference that he did what he denied doing. His behavior after the shooting was that of someone who was horrified and distraught, not of someone who had just accomplished a preconceived plan. (221 C.A.4th at 1267.) (c) Motive. There was little or no evidence of motive. Evidence by another resident of the house that she heard a loud screaming fight and of a text message by the victim to a friend that she and defendant were fighting shortly before the shooting did not support a motive suggesting pre-existing reflection. Rather, such motive would support a killing based on a “rash impulse hastily executed.” (221 C.A.4th at 1267.) (d) Manner. Cases that have found sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation in the absence of evidence of planning and motive are those in which the manner of killing suggests an execution-style murder. Here, there was no such evidence. Defendant and the victim were facing each other, and there is no evidence that the victim was crouching or kneeling. Although the gun was only 12 inches from the victim's head, the bullet completely missed her brain. Moreover, although the gun still held five live rounds, no second shot was fired. Defendant's actions immediately after the shooting—directing his brother to call 911 and attempting to resuscitate the victim and obtain medical aid—are not consistent with an execution. (221 C.A.4th at 1269.) (e) Other evidence. Evidence that defendant (1) had time to premeditate between the time the argument ended and the time the shooting occurred (absent evidence that defendant actually engaged in such reflection); (2) shot the victim at close range, and (3) pulled back the hammer of the gun, pointed the gun at the victim and fired the weapon, were not, without more, sufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. (221 C.A.4th at 1270.) Several other decisions are of interest. (See People v. Pantoja (2004) 122 C.A.4th 1, 14, 18 C.R.3d 492 [neither infliction of multiple wounds nor unusual brutality of killing was alone sufficient to support determination that the assault was premeditated]; People v. Cardenas (2020) 53 C.A.5th 102, 121, 266 C.R.3d 788 [evidence was insufficient where defendant brought loaded weapon to restaurant and shot several persons during confrontation there, and victim arrived at scene after shooting had started and defendant shot victim seconds after arrival; kill zone theory (1 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Elements, § 18) did not apply as there was no reasonable inference that defendant specifically intended to kill everyone in area in order to kill victim].)
Proving intent
The means used
The manner in which it is done
The circumstances surrounding the killing
Statements made before, during, and after
Implied malice
People v. Fay (Apr. 29, 2024, B328209) https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/B328209.PDF
CALCRIM 520.
The defendant had implied malice if:
1. (He/She) intentionally (committed the act/ [or] failed to act);
2. The natural and probable consequences of the (act/ [or] failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/ [or] failure to act) involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death;
3. At the time (he/she) (acted/ [or] failed to act), (he/she) knew (his/her) (act/ [or] failure to act) was dangerous to human life; AND
4. (He/She) deliberately (acted/ [or] failed to act) with conscious disregard for (human/ [or] fetal) life.
IMPLIED MALICE requires an extreme indifference to human life. "It is when a defendant, free from any mental impairment and not acting in the heat of passion or on adequate provocation, makes a voluntary choice to commit a person-endangering act." (People v. Summers (1983) 147 Cal.App.3rd 180, 184, citing People v. Love, supra, 111 Cal.App.3d 98, 105–106.)
Love was impliedly overruled in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279 in which the Supreme Court explained that it is this “subjective awareness” requirement which critically distinguishes implied malice murder from those types of manslaughter which are based on a finding of culpable negligence: “[A] finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Id. at pp. 296–297, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279, emphasis in original.)
Physical component - the performance of an act the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life: high probability it will result in death Mental component - defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and acts with a conscious disregard for life. People v. Calderon (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1301
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830
People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241
To support a finding of second degree murder based on implied malice, the evidence must establish that the defendant deliberately committed an act, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, with knowledge of its danger to life and a conscious disregard of that danger. (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) This conscious disregard for the danger to the life of another distinguishes implied malice from gross negligence, which involves “the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences.” (Id. at p. 296, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) “Phrased in everyday language, the state of mind of a person who acts with conscious disregard for life is, ‘I know my conduct is dangerous to others, but I don't care if someone is ... killed.’ The state of mind of the person who acts with conscious indifferences to the consequences is simply, ‘I don't care *515 what happens.’ ” (Olivas, supra, 172 Cal.App.3d at pp. 987–988, 218 Cal.Rptr. 567.) Implied malice requires that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved. (Watson, at pp. 296–297, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) “In short, implied malice requires a defendant's awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of another—no more, and no less.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143, 59 Cal.Rptr.3d 157, 158 P.3d 731; see People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988, 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 832, 531 P.3d 357 (Reyes) [“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life’ ” ’ ”].) People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 514-515
Murder is committed with implied malice when an act is “deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988, 309 Cal.Rptr.3d 832, 531 P.3d 357 (Reyes).) It is well settled that exceptionally hazardous driving that causes a fatal traffic collision may support a conviction for second degree murder based on the mental state of implied malice. (People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 520, 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545, 562
A high-speed flight from police in an automobile can present such a high probability of death that there is probable cause to believe the driver harbored implied malice. (People v. Lima (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 259, 265–267, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 815 (Lima) [collecting cases]; see also People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 842–843, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 565 [racing]; People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 952–955, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 757 [speeding]; People v. Moore (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 937, 939–942, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 540 (Moore) [road rage].) Similarly, a driver reasonably may be held to exhibit conscious disregard for life if he “ ‘wilfully consumes alcoholic beverages to the point of intoxication, knowing that he thereafter must operate a motor vehicle, thereby combining sharply impaired physical and mental faculties with a vehicle capable of great force and speed.’ ” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) Applying these principles, a jury could readily conclude Chagolla demonstrated a conscious disregard for the lives of her fellow motorists at the point in time when she decided to lead police on a 35-to 40-mile chase at speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour on a highway full of vehicles while under the influence of oxycodone. There was ample evidence she was awake and functioning with sufficient faculties to have the requisite mens rea. The evidence at the preliminary hearing showed Chagolla was conscious and acting volitionally as she wove in and out of traffic. She was able to drive the car with precision, deliberately engaging in evasive movements as she passed other cars. She purposefully drove on the shoulder to keep going forward when necessary. She was alert and dexterous enough to avoid a collision in tight traffic for more than 20 minutes. Such extreme driving created an *521 obvious, life-threatening risk of a deadly, multi-car crash during the entire course of the extended car chase. There's more. Officer Guillermo Bermudez specifically lectured Chagolla about the risk of causing a deadly accident when he stopped her for reckless driving two years earlier. Overwhelming evidence provided probable cause to believe Chagolla had the required subjective awareness to consciously disregard the life-threatening risk that “collisions, injuries, and deaths would occur in the course of the chase.” (People v. Harris (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 427, 125 Cal.Rptr. 40; Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301, 179 Cal.Rptr. 43, 637 P.2d 279.) The majority and I agree she easily could have killed many people during the course of her impaired driving. (Maj. opn., at pp. 555-56.) (People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 520–521 [321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545, 562], review denied (Aug. 14, 2024))
Watson murder
"the key volitional act under a Watson murder is driving. It is easily proven. A prosecutor must simply show that the defendant was driving." (People v. Superior Court (Chagolla) (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 517."
the key volitional act under a Watson murder is driving. It is easily proven. A prosecutor must simply show that the defendant was driving.
Appellant also points out that this case does not involve the relatively longer course of dangerous driving involved in a number of previous vehicular homicide cases. (See, e.g., Moore, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939–940, 114 Cal.Rptr.3d 540; Lima, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 263–264, 12 Cal.Rptr.3d 815; People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 944, 956–957, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 757; People v. Fuller (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 628–629, 150 Cal.Rptr. 515.)4
People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 505, 514 [307 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 303], review denied (June 28, 2023)
Provocative Act Murder
Instruction is in People v. Gallegos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 453.
In the context of second degree murder prosecutions, an attempt to evade police using a high-speed vehicle chase has been held sufficient to demonstrate implied malice through a conscious disregard for the safety of others.
People v. Lima (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 259, 266 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 815, 820]
In the classic provocative act murder prosecution, malice is implied from the provocative act, and the resulting crime is murder in the second degree. (§§ 187, 188; 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 148, p. 762 et seq.; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1221, 264 Cal.Rptr. 841, 783 P.2d 200.)
People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 873 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 148, 159, 29 P.3d 225, 234]
Derivative liability for homicide attaches under the provocative act doctrine, when the defendant's intentional provocative act proximately causes the death of a victim through the action of a third party.
People v. Gardner (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 475 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 603, 605]
Malice will be implied if the defendant commits a provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life and acts with conscious disregard of the danger. (People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 317, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276, 826 P.2d 274; Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 704, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365.)
People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 655 [142 Cal.Rptr.3d 893, 904, 278 P.3d 1242, 1252]
“The classic provocative act scenario occurs when a perpetrator of the underlying crime instigates a gun battle, usually by firing first, and a police officer, or victim of the underlying crime, responds with privileged lethal force by returning fire ....” (People v. Mejia, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 602–603.) However, the provocative act doctrine “applies to any conduct that is ‘ “fraught with grave and inherent danger to human life” ’ so as to show a conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Lima (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 259, 266.) “Unlike felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, ‘[a] murder conviction under the provocative act doctrine ... requires proof that the defendant personally harbored the mental state of malice.’ ” (People v. Lee, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 264, italics added, quoting People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655.)
People v. Padilla (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 20, 2023, No. F085064) 2023 WL 6934811, at *6, reh'g denied (Nov. 8, 2023), review denied (Dec. 27, 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Padilla v. California (U.S., Oct. 7, 2024, No. 23-7396) 2024 WL 4426764
Capital murder
People v Ward (2005) 36 C4th 186, 197–198 (court lacks authority to keep second counsel in trial of severed noncapital charge)
Felony-murder
The designated felony offenses is California's version of first-degree felony murder, in which a showing of malice is not required. (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 450.) The only criminal intent required to be proved is the specific intent to commit the particular underlying felony.” (People v. Chavez (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 379, 385.)
The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony, since only those felonies that are inherently dangerous to life or pose a significant prospect of violence are enumerated in the statute… Once a person has embarked upon a course of conduct for one of the enumerated felonious purposes, he comes directly within a clear legislative warning - if a death results from his commission of that felony, it will be first degree murder, regardless of the circumstances.” People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197
“…first degree felony murder encompasses a far wider range of individual culpability than just deliberate and premeditated murder. It includes not only the latter, but also a variety of unintended homicides resulting from reckless behavior, or ordinary negligence, or pure accident; it embraces both calculated conduct and acts committed in panic or rage, or under the dominion of mental illness, drugs or alcohol; and it condemns alike consequences that are highly probable, conceivably possible, or wholly unforeseeable.” People v. Dillion (1983) 34 C.3d 441, 477
"[A] concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance." (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511.)
Felony-murder rule
As defendant correctly points out, subsequent to Valasquez we stated in both People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 59, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, and People v. Thompson, supra, 27 Cal.3d 303, 322, 165 Cal.Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883, quoting Green, that a valid conviction of the underlying crime is a “necessary condition” to finding a related special circumstance allegation true. That statement was made in an entirely different context, however, and does not preclude upholding a special circumstance when the notice given by the charge was adequate, the instructions given to the jury required that all of the elements of the underlying crime be found to exist, and the jury was correctly instructed that the defendant's guilt of that crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In those circumstances the jury's attention is focused directly on the crime and it is proven according to the general law. The return of only a special circumstances verdict confirming the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty of the crime is a defect in form not substance.22 The instructions on **424 these matters given the *927 jury in this case were adequate in all respects.23 No demonstrable prejudice to defendant resulted from the failure to charge him with the additional crimes of robbery, kidnapping and rape. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 926–927, as modified on denial of reh'g (May 19, 1988).)
An intent to rob will not support a conviction of felony murder if it arose after the infliction of the fatal wound
"An intent to rob will not support a conviction of felony murder if it arose after the infliction of the fatal wound." People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 23, fn. 9, disapproved of other grounuds by In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535.)
First-degree murder
Key number 350H key number 1681
"All murder . . . that is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, carjacking, robbery, burglary, mayhem, kidnapping, train wrecking, or any act punishable under Section 206, 286, 287, 288, or 289, or former Section 288a . . . is murder of the first degree." (Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).)
"The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:" (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17).)
"To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder." (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17)(M).)
For arson as first-degree felony murder and special circumstances, read People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, People v. Oliver (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 920.)
"New subparagraph (17)(M) eliminated the independent felonious purpose requirement for both kidnapping and arson felony murder special circumstances. (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 608–609, fn. 4, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 66, 267 P.3d 1135.) Thus, after the enactment of subparagraph (M), even if a kidnapping or arson is committed primarily for the purpose of facilitating a murder, the special circumstance may be found true. (Ibid.)" (People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 254.)
"Since the purpose of subparagraph (M) was to overrule Green 's independent purpose requirement and create special circumstance liability where kidnapping and arson are incidental to the murder or, stated another way, where the murder is accomplished by way of kidnapping or arson, we agree both the actual killer and the accomplice must have the intent to kill." (People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237, 255.)
Concurrent intent is discussed in People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083 and People v. WInsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984
Does Not Apply Where Felony Committed Only to Facilitate Murder
If a felony, such as robbery, is committed merely to facilitate an intentional murder, then the felony-murder rule does not apply. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834, fn. 3 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [robbery[ committed to facilitate murder did not satisfy felony-murder special circumstance].) If the defense requests a special instruction on this point, see CALCRIM No. 730, Special Circumstances: Murder in Commission of Felony.
“[A] felony that is merely incidental to the murder cannot serve as the basis for a felony-murder special circumstance” (People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 628, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224), for the Legislature's goal in implementing the death penalty law by enacting the special circumstance scheme would not be achieved if a criminal defendant could be made eligible for the death penalty where his intent is not to commit an enumerated felony but is instead simply to kill, and the associated felony was “merely incidental to the murder.” (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.)8 For example, a killer who takes the victim's clothes so as to forestall later identification of the victim and thus avoid responsibility for the murder (Green, at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468) or a rapist-killer who takes a letter from his victim as a remembrance of his rape (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 41, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262) have not committed murder “while engaged” in their felonies. For those who kill, however, we need not discern their various mental states in too fine a fashion; a “concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony will support a felony-murder special circumstance.” (People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1158, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384.) People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 511 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 559–560, 161 P.3d 58, 87], as modified (Aug. 22, 2007)
"Where an accused's primary goal was not to kidnap, but to kill, and where a kidnapping was merely incidental to a murder but not committed to advance an independent felonious purpose, a kidnapping-felony-murder special circumstance cannot be sustained." (People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836)
Kidnapping an arson special instructions are explained in People v. Odom (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 237
People v. Superior Court (Smart) (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 860, 865.)
Inherently-dangerous felonies
- PC246 (People v. Hansen, overruled by People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172)
Must have an independent felonious purpose, cannot be merely incidental to the murder. People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 61; People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1326
Must have formed the intent to commit the felony prior to the death. People v. Hudson (1995) 45 Cal.2d 121; People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345
Person not required to die immediately so long as the fatal act and the felony are part of one continuous transaction.
Same time and place, aided escape, direct cause of death & natural and probable consequence. People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal. 4th 155, 222
Continuous transaction rule: No strict causal relationship. Not a technical inquiry of whether felony has been completed, abandoned or desisted before homicide was complete. People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 761; People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656.
Escape rule: The crime continues until a defendant has reached a place of temporary safety. People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333.
Double-counting as to both first-degree murder and special circumstances
Defendant contends that double counting the charged felonies—once to elevate the degree of the homicide to first degree murder and again to render him eligible for the death penalty (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17))—is improper. He concedes we rejected **99 this precise argument in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945–946, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676, but asserts we should reconsider that case in light of the number of special circumstance allegations now included in the law, rendering “the narrowing function of the special circumstances ... a nullity.” We conclude no grounds exist to revisit our decision in Marshall. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 158, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [“first degree murder liability and special circumstance findings may be based upon common elements without offending the Eighth Amendment”]; see also People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 164, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990 [double-counting argument “ has been rejected many times before given the manner in which our death penalty scheme permissibly narrows the class of death-eligible offenders and guides the sentencer's discretion”]; Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 246, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 [“that the aggravating circumstance duplicated one of the elements of the crime does not make [a death] sentence constitutionally infirm”].) People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 528 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 573, 161 P.3d 58, 98–99], as modified (Aug. 22, 2007)
Manslaughter
Voluntary Manslaughter
Voluntary manslaughter is intentional killing without malice
Malice is absent when the killing is response to sufficient provocation or an honest but unreasonable belief in self-defense, or killing did not involve conscious disregard for life.
People v. Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 107–111, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441, 999 P.2d 666 (2000); People v. Crowe, 87 Cal. App. 4th 86, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319 (2d Dist. 2001). The Lasko holding regarding intent to kill not being an element of voluntary manslaughter was not a new rule of law, thus juries can be instructed in accord with Lasko even if the killing predated June 2, 2000, the date Lasko was issued. People v. Johnson, 98 Cal. App. 4th 566, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 802 (2d Dist. 2002); People v. Parras, 152 Cal. App. 4th 219, 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 850 (5th Dist. 2007).
People v. Rios, 23 Cal. 4th 450, 469–470, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066 (2000).
People v. Coad, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1094, 1106, 226 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1st Dist. 1986).
People v. Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 87–89, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 999 P.2d 675 (2000); People v. Lasko, 23 Cal. 4th 101, 108, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 441, 999 P.2d 666 (2000).
Involuntary Manslaughter
Involuntary manslaughter is homicide with gross negligence.
Vehicular Manslaughter
Vehicular manslaughter is gross or simple negligence.
People v. Bennett (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036, asserts: “Gross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the consequences. [Citation.] ‘The state of mind of a person who acts with conscious indifferences to the consequences is simply, “I don't care what happens.” ’ [Citation.] The test is objective: whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have been aware of the risk involved. [Citation.]” Gross negligence does not include “inattention, mistaken judgment, or misadventure....” (Id. at p. 1037, fn. 3.) Gross negligence involves aggravated, reckless, or flagrant disregard for human life, or indifference to consequences of one's conduct. (People v. Thompson (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 40, 54.) Put another way, gross negligence occurs when the defendant's acts are such a departure from what would be the conduct of “ ‘ “an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an indifference to consequences.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 540.) “ ‘The facts must be such that the fatal consequence of the negligent act could reasonably have been foreseen.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Clem (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 346, 352, quoting People v. Penny (1955) 44 Cal.2d 861, 880; see also People v. Odom (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1032.) “[G]ross negligence required to convict a defendant of gross vehicular manslaughter ... may be based on the overall circumstances surrounding the fatality.” (People v. Bennett, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1040.)
People v. Cox (Cal. Ct. App., Oct. 22, 2014, No. E060288) 2014 WL 5358763, at *5
Misdemeanor manslaughter. People v. Carmen, 36 Cal. 2d 768, 774, 228 P.2d 281 (1951) (disapproved of by, People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 (1979)); People v. Southack, 39 Cal. 2d 578, 584, 248 P.2d 12 (1952); People v. Wright, 60 Cal. App. 3d 6, 11, 131 Cal. Rptr. 311 (3d Dist. 1976); People v. Morales, 49 Cal. App. 3d 134, 144, 122 Cal. Rptr. 157 (4th Dist. 1975); CALJIC No. 8.45 (7th ed. 2003 bound vol.).
Misdemeanor manslaughter based on battery. People v. Cox, 23 Cal. 4th 665, 674–676, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 647, 2 P.3d 1189 (2000), as modified, (Aug. 9, 2000).
Without due caution. Penal Code § 192(b); People v. Burroughs, 35 Cal. 3d 824, 833, 201 Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894 (1984) (medical procedure that results in death of patient when performed without due caution and circumspection constitutes involuntary manslaughter); People v. Morgan, 177 Cal. App. 3d 466, 471, 225 Cal. Rptr. 673 (2d Dist. 1985); People v. Piorkowski, 41 Cal. App. 3d 324, 331, 115 Cal. Rptr. 830 (2d Dist. 1974); People v. Villalobos, 208 Cal. App. 2d 321, 326, 25 Cal. Rptr. 111 (3d Dist. 1962) (defendant was properly convicted of involuntary manslaughter where she placed her 3-year old daughter in wash basin and turned on hot water, and child died from burns that occurred 5–6 hours before child was taken to hospital).
People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 877–880, 285 P.2d 926 (1955) (negligence must be aggravated, culpable, gross, or reckless); In re Michael B., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1088, 197 Cal. Rptr. 379 (5th Dist. 1983); People v. Wong, 35 Cal. App. 3d 812, 829, 111 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1st Dist. 1973); People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal. App. 2d 433, 435–441, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863 (2d Dist. 1960).
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 134, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 (1988); In re M., 70 Cal. 2d 444, 460, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296 (1969) (defendant, a 15-year-old, found guilty when he intentionally pointed gun at girlfriend and shot twice when he believed that gun was unloaded but admitted he wasn't sure); People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 877–880, 285 P.2d 926 (1955); In re Michael B., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1088, 197 Cal. Rptr. 379 (5th Dist. 1983); People v. Clark, 130 Cal. App. 3d 371, 382, 181 Cal. Rptr. 682 (3d Dist. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by, People v. Blakeley, 23 Cal. 4th 82, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 999 P.2d 675 (2000)); Somers v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 3d 961, 969, 108 Cal. Rptr. 630 (3d Dist. 1973).
Lack of medical attention. Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 123–124, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1, 763 P.2d 852 (1988); People v. Oliver, 210 Cal. App. 3d 138, 146–149, 258 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1st Dist. 1989) (defendant could be convicted of involuntary manslaughter when defendant drove victim home from a bar after having observed that victim was extremely drunk, allowed victim to use bathroom in defendant's apartment to shoot heroin, and then left victim outside apartment where victim died, and when prompt medical attention might have saved victim's life); People v. Montecino, 66 Cal. App. 2d 85, 152 P.2d 5 (2d Dist. 1944).
Attempted murder
There is attempted murder (664/187), which is punishable by 5-7-9. Some, including Californian courts, have called this second-degree attempted murder.
There is also attempted murder, which is willful, deliberate, and premediated (664/187/189), which is 7-to-life. Some, including Californian courts, have called this first-degree attempted murder.
The California Supreme Court in People v. Bright (1996) 12 Cal.4th 652, has explicitly said there are no degrees of attempted murder, just an enhanced punishment for willful, deliberate, and premeditated attempted murder. This supposedly made a difference because the Court in Bright said a jury finds whether there has been attempted murder or not, and not the "degree" of attempted murder. But, the Court later said in People v. Seel (2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, Apprendi applies to this, so a jury does need to find a fact that increases the sentence, and thus a jury does need to determine if it's been willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
In People v. Rodriguez, 75 Cal. App. 5th 816, 291 Cal. Rptr. 3d 70 (5th Dist. 2022), the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction for premeditated and deliberated attempted murder. The court explained: “‘There are three basic categories’ of evidence … generally found sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation: (1) planning activity, or ‘facts about how and what defendant did prior to the actual [attempt to kill] which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as intended to result in, [a] killing’; (2) motive, or ‘facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim’; and (3) manner of [attempt], or ‘facts about the nature of the [attempt] from which the jury could infer that the manner of [attempted] killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must have [intended to kill] according to a “preconceived design” to take his victim's life in a particular way for a “reason” …’” (Ibid. (internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis and brackets in original) (quoted portion not certified for publication).). Here, the fact that at least one of the defendants was armed with a weapon and they exited the vehicle together to confront the victim was evidence of planning activity. The fact that one of the defendants preceded the attack with gang-related language was evidence of a gang-related motive. “[T]he fact the attack involved a hallmark deadly weapon and serious chest wounds leaves little room to doubt the assailants intended to kill. [¶ ] Taken together and combined with the fact one of the gang's primary activities is homicide, the jury could readily infer [the defendant] initiated this encounter with premeditation and deliberation. In other words, the jury could reasonably conclude [the defendant] first identified a victim and then launched a gang-related attack while intending to kill. The fact it appears [the defendant]'s and the victim's paths crossed fortuitously is immaterial.” (Ibid. (quoted portion not certified for publication).)
“[T]o be guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor, a person must give aid or encouragement with knowledge of the direct perpetrator's intent to kill and with the purpose of facilitating the direct perpetrator's accomplishment of the intended killing—which means that the person guilty of attempted murder as an aider and abettor must intend to kill.” (People v. Lee, 31 Cal. 4th 613, 624, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 402, 74 P.3d 176 (2003).)
“For implied malice, the intent requirement is satisfied by proof that the actual perpetrator knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and … acts with conscious disregard for life. Therefore, notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437's elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life.” (People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 850, 272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 477 P.3d 539 (Cal. 2020) (internal quotes and citations omitted).) In People v. Superior Court (Valenzuela), 73 Cal. App. 5th 485, 490, 288 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627 (4th Dist. 2021), the Court of Appeal framed the issue as follows: “what evidence suffices, for purposes of a preliminary hearing, to bind over a defendant on a direct aiding and abetting theory of implied malice murder.” (emphasis in original.) The defendant, Valenzuela (age 39), along with confederates participated in a fight with several teenagers at a neighborhood park. Valenzuela came to the park armed with a screw driver. He brought several others with him, including Diaz, who was a known gang member and came armed with a knife. During the fight, Diaz stabbed and killed one of the teenagers. The People charged Valenzuela with aiding and abetting implied malice murder. The magistrate dismissed the charge, finding insufficient evidence. The People refiled the murder charge and the defense filed a Penal Code § 995 motion. The trial court granted the 995 motion, and the People appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed and found sufficient evidence to hold Valenzuela to answer. The Court of Appeal relied upon the California Supreme Court's ruling in Gentile, supra, and the Court of Appeal's decision in People v. Powell, 63 Cal. App. 5th 689, 278 Cal. Rptr. 3d 150 (3d Dist. 2021). “In Gentile, the Supreme Court stated that notwithstanding … [the] elimination of natural and probable consequences liability for second degree murder, an aider and abettor who does not expressly intend to aid a killing can still be convicted of second degree murder if the person knows that his or her conduct endangers the life of another and acts with conscious disregard for life. We understand this to mean that an aider and abettor who acts with implied malice can be guilty of murder entirely apart from the natural and probable consequences doctrine… [¶ ] Powell carefully explains that direct aiding and abetting of an implied malice murder is based on the aider and abettor's own mens rea. Emphasizing the point, Powell adds that the requisite intent must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor and consists of knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life. In this key respect, Powell is entirely consistent with Gentile in basing murder liability on the aider and abettor's own state of mind—conscious disregard for life.” (Valenzuela, supra, at p. 499 (internal quotes and citations omitted; emphasis in original).)
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal wrote: “There was sufficient evidence that Valenzuela instigated and encouraged Diaz's participation in an armed melee, which under the circumstances was conduct that carried with it a significant risk of death. Valenzuela arranged for the fight, specified its time and place, solicited Diaz, a known gang member, to join him, and brought him to the fight armed with a knife.” (Valenzuela, supra, at p. 502.) The court further stated: “[W]hile it is fair to say that the ‘act’ Valenzuela fostered and instigated was an assault with a deadly weapon, his culpability for implied malice murder on a direct aiding and abetting theory requires more than just showing an intended aggravated assault. Rather, a determination that the intended assault involved a significant risk of death is necessary. Perhaps more importantly, even if the requisite act were the same, the required mental state is significantly different. As both Gentile and Powell make clear, to commit implied malice murder as an aider and abettor one must personally harbor implied malice. This means the defendant knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and … acts with conscious disregard for life… Considering all the evidence and reasonable inferences at this stage of the proceedings, there is some rational ground for assuming the possibility that Valenzuela knowingly instigated and encouraged conduct by Diaz, fully appreciating that it posed a significant risk to human life, and consciously disregarded that risk.” (Valenzuela, supra, at pp. 503-504 (internal quotes and citations omitted).)
The court in People v. Glukhoy, 77 Cal. App. 5th 576, 588, 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 623 (3d Dist. 2022), review granted, see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1115, 295 Cal. Rpt. 3d 878, 513 P.3d 165 (Cal. 2022) (Case No. S274792), cited for persuasive authority pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, described the elements of implied malice murder as an aider or abettor as follows: “In Powell, we explained the actus reus and mens rea elements of direct aiding and abetting implied malice. [¶ ][¶ ] To be culpable as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder, the accomplice ‘must, by words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act.’ (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 150.) Thus, the aider and abettor's actus reus ‘includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the life endangering act.’ (Ibid.; accord Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.3d at p. 501, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 627.) [¶ ] ‘The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 713, 278 Cal.Rptr.3d 150; accord Valenzuela, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 501, 288 Cal.Rptr.3d 627.)” Ibid. (emphasis in original); see also People v. Pacheco, 76 Cal. App. 5th 118, 127, 290 Cal. Rptr. 3d 891 (4th Dist. 2022), review granted, see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1115, 293 Cal. Rptr. 3d 598, 509 P.3d 955 (Cal. 2022) (Case No. S274102), cited for persuasive authority pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115) [“‘Thus, proof of [direct] aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime’”].)
Second degree murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory “requires that the aider and abettor … know and share the murderous intent of the actual perpetrator.” (People v. Gentile, 10 Cal. 5th 830, 850, 272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 814, 477 P.3d 539 (Cal. 2020) (internal quotes and citations omitted).) Express malice murder requires a specific intent—the perpetrator must manifest “a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.” (Penal Code § 188(a)(1).) “The primary difference between express malice and implied malice is that the former requires an intent to kill but the latter does not.” (People v. Soto, 4 Cal. 5th 968, 976, 231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 732, 415 P.3d 789 (Cal. 2018); People v. Coley, 77 Cal. App. 5th 539, 547, 292 Cal. Rptr. 3d 257 (1st Dist. 2022) [intent to kill is equivalent of express malice].)
Transferred intent
CALCRIM No. 562: Do not give this instruction for a charge of attempted murder. The transferred intent doctrine does not apply to attempted murder. A defendant’s guilt of attempted murder must be judged separately for each alleged victim. (People v. Bland (2002) 28 Cal.4th 313, 327–328, 331 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107]; see CALCRIM No. 600, Attempted Murder.)
Shooting
These principles, taken together, reflect that the act of purposefully firing a lethal weapon at another human being at close range, without legal excuse, generally gives rise to an inference that the shooter acted with express malice. That the shooter had no particular motive for shooting the victim is not dispositive, although again, where motive is shown, such evidence will usually be probative of proof of ***170 intent to kill. Nor is the circumstance that the bullet misses its mark or fails to prove lethal dispositive—the very act of firing a weapon “ ‘in a manner that could have inflicted a mortal wound had the bullet been on target’ ” is sufficient to support an inference of intent to kill. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 742.)
Defendant's conviction for multiple counts of attempted murder was affirmed where the defendant shot numerous rounds into a group waiting in a barber shop parking lot. (People v. Foster, 61 Cal. App. 5th 430, 439-440, 275 Cal. Rptr. 3d 649 (2d Dist. 2021), review denied, (May 12, 2021).) The Court of Appeal wrote: “A person who acts with intent to kill in firing at a group of people is guilty of attempted murder even if he or she intended to kill a random person rather than a specific one. (People v. Stone (2009) 46 Cal.4th 131, 141, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272 (Stone).) ‘Although a primary target often exists and can be identified, one is not required.’ (Id. at p. 140, 92 Cal.Rptr.3d 362, 205 P.3d 272.) In describing the theory, the California Supreme Court explained that ‘[a]n indiscriminate would-be killer is just as capable as one who targets a specific person.’ (Ibid.) Multiple attempted murder convictions can be supported by the same reasoning.” (Id. at 440.)
The court in Foster went on to describe the difference between the ‘kill zone’ theory of attempted murder and the theory from People v. Stone, 46 Cal. 4th 131, 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal. 2009): “The absence of a specific target distinguishes this case from the ‘kill zone’ theory. The kill zone theory applies when the defendant chooses, as a means of killing a specific, targeted individual, to kill everyone in the area in which the targeted individual is located (i.e., the ‘kill zone’) as the means of accomplishing the killing of the targeted victim. (People v. Canizales, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 607-608, 248 Cal.Rptr. 3d 370, 442 P.3d 686.) In contrast, the Stone theory applies when there is no specifically targeted individual. The two theories are mutually exclusive. (See People v. McCloud (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 788, 798, 802, fn. 6, 149 Cal.Rptr.3d 902 (McCloud); see also People v. Thompkins, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 396, fn. 10, 264 Cal.Rptr.3d 186 [‘Stone establishes that the kill zone theory cannot be used when the defendant fires indiscriminately at a crowd of people, not aiming to kill anyone in particular, but hoping to kill as many as possible’].)” (Foster, supra, at p. 441, fn. 16.)
Kill zone
CALCRIM 600: [A person may intend to kill a primary target and also [a] secondarytarget[s] within a zone of fatal harm or “kill zone.” A “kill zone” is anarea in which the defendant used lethal force that was designed andintended to kill everyone in the area around the primary target.
In order to convict the defendant of the attempted murder of<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove thatthe defendant not only intended to kill <insert name ofprimary target alleged> but also either intended to kill<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s]on concurrent-intent theory>, or intended to kill everyone within the kill zone.
In determining whether the defendant intended to kill<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s]on concurrent-intent theory>, the People must prove that (1) the onlyreasonable conclusion from the defendant’s use of lethal force, is that thedefendant intended to create a kill zone; and (2) <insertname or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] onconcurrent-intent theory> was located within the kill zone.
In determining whether the defendant intended to create a “kill zone” and the scope of such a zone, you should consider all of the circumstances including, but not limited to, the following:
• The type of weapon used(;/.)
• The number of shots fired(;/.)
• The distance between the defendant and <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>(;/.)
• The distance between <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> and the primary target.
If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant intended to kill<insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory> or intended to kill<insert name or description of primary target alleged> by killing everyone in the kill zone, then you must find the defendant not guilty of the attempted murder of <insert name or description of victim charged in attempted murder count[s] on concurrent-intent theory>.]
In People v. Canizales, 7 Cal. 5th 591, 442 P.3d 686, 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370 (2019), the California Supreme Court addressed and clarified the necessary intent to kill for attempted murder in a kill zone case. The People must establish “(1) the circumstances of the defendant's attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target's death—around the primary target; and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within that zone of harm.” (Id. at p. 607.) The Court identified several factors to be considered when assessing the defendant's intent to create a zone of fatal harm: the type of weapon used; the number of shots fired; the distance between the defendant and the alleged victims; the proximity of the alleged victims to the primary target; whether the attack location was open or instead had a limited means of escape; and whether the defendant hit any of his or her intended targets. (Id. at pp. 607, 611.)
The following cases affirmed the use of the kill zone instruction: People v. Cerda, 45 Cal.App.5th 1, 16-17, 258 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2020), review granted, see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1115, 262 Cal. Rptr. 3d 369, 463 P.3d 168 (Cal. 2020) and cause transferred and opinion not citable, 2022 WL 57723 (Cal. 2022) (Case No. S260915), cited for persuasive value pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1115 [evidence was sufficient to support a kill zone theory of liability where defendants shot into two houses with an assault rifle, with shots targeted at locations in houses where victims were congregated]; People v. Dominguez, 66 Cal. App. 5th 163, 187, 281 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82 (4th Dist. 2021) [“We conclude that sufficient evidence was presented that would support the attempted murder convictions. The very fact that [Defendants] created a hail of bullets at close range to two individuals who were within a few feet of each other as well as Sanabria (the target) is the very definition of creating a kill zone. Moreover, Defendants fired the 21 shots into a small space enclosed on three sides. And they fired so rapidly that the victims had little chance of escape.” (internal quotes and citations omitted; brackets in original)].
The following cases were reversed based upon an erroneous kill zone instruction: In re Lisea, 73 Cal. App. 5th 1041, 1055-1056, 288 Cal. Rptr. 3d 824 (3d Dist. 2022) [“the instruction, when combined with the prosecutor's arguments regarding the instruction, impermissibly allowed the jury to convict petitioner of the attempted murder of the victim based on an intent to kill anyone in the kill zone”]; People v. Thompkins, 50 Cal. App. 5th 365, 394-396, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 186 (1st Dist. 2020), as modified on denial of reh'g, (June 17, 2020) and review denied, (Aug. 26, 2020) [trial court erred in giving kill zone instruction where defendant fired 10 shots into crowd at restaurant, killing two people and wounding five, with no evidence of an intended target]; People v. Mariscal, 47 Cal. App. 5th 129, 139, 260 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (2d Dist. 2020) [jury was erroneously instructed on kill zone theory where defendant killed intended target and then shot at four of the target's friends]; In re Rayford, 50 Cal. App. 5th 754, 779-781, 264 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401 (2d Dist. 2020), review denied, (Sept. 23, 2020) [Canizales applies retroactively to final cases; kill zone instruction was improperly given where shooters fired a total of eight bullets toward house without targeting specific victims]; People v. Cardenas, 53 Cal. App. 5th 102, 114-115, 266 Cal. Rptr. 3d 788 (4th Dist. 2020) [insufficient evidence to warrant kill zone instruction where first two bullets were fired at primary target from close range, with alleged attempted murder victim standing at least one car's length behind primary target, and second round of bullets was fired as shooters retreated]; People v. Booker, 58 Cal. App. 5th 482, 499-500, 272 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421 (2d Dist. 2020), review denied, (Feb. 24, 2021) [kill zone instruction not warranted where defendant fired three to seven shots directed at front driver's side of stationary car, shots were directed at driver, who was killed, from close range, although driver's side front window of car was shattered, there were no bullet holes in car's body or doors that would have reflected spray of bullets, there was no evidence any bullets reached front passenger side of car where owner was sitting, and owner was not injured].)
In In re Sambrano, 79 Cal. App. 5th 724, 727, 294 Cal. Rptr. 3d 826 (4th Dist. 2022), the Court of Appeal granted the habeas petition, reversing the attempted murder convictions because the jury was given a kill zone instruction that was erroneous under Canizales, supra. The Sambrano Court summarized the facts as follows: “Sambrano and his two codefendants, Anthony Lares and Daniel Torres, are all alleged members or associates of a gang called Varrio Coachella Rifa 52 (Varrio Coachella). On the night in question, they drove into the territory of a rival gang, North Side Indio (North Side). Sambrano drove the car, Torres was the front passenger, and Lares was in the back seat. After repeatedly driving past a group of people gathered outside a house, Sambrano stopped the car, and Lares and Torres began shooting. Lares admitted firing at least 10 rounds from his .30-caliber M1 carbine rifle. Torres filed an unknown number of shots from a .22-caliber handgun that held 5 rounds. The shots killed one person and seriously wounded two others, all of whom were outside the house at the time of the shooting. (Id., at p. 728.) The Sambrano Court described the kill zone theory of attempted murder as follows: “The elements of attempted murder are ‘specific intent to kill and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing.’ ‘When a single act is charged as an attempt on the lives of two or more persons, the intent to kill element must be examined independently as to each alleged attempted murder victim; an intent to kill cannot be “transferred” from one attempted murder victim to another under the transferred intent doctrine.’ But consistent with those requirements, the kill zone theory, which was first approved by the Supreme Court in [Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at pp. 327, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 546, 48 P.3d 1107], ‘yields a way in which a defendant can be guilty of the attempted murder of victims who were not the defendant's “primary target.”’” (Sambrano, supra, at p. 730 (internal quotes and citations omitted).)
In Sambrano, the appellate court found the trial court erred by giving the kill zone instruction. The court noted that “[t]here is no evidence that any person at the gathering in front of the Rodriguez house was the primary target of defendants' attack. There is no evidence that Sambrano knew or recognized anyone at the gathering or that the Rodriguez house had been defendants' planned destination. Moreover, there is no evidence that any particular person at the gathering did nor said anything that might have led defendants to target a particular person when the shooting commenced. Instead, the evidence showed only that defendants began firing at the group because of the group's location within rival gang territory. Because there was no evidence of a primary target, the kill zone instruction should not have been given.” (Id. at p. 734 (internal citations omitted).) The Sambrano Court reiterated these principles re the kill zone theory: “If there is no evidence of a primary target, then the kill zone theory does not apply.”
• “Relatedly, if the evidence shows only that the defendant intended to kill everyone in a particular area, but not as a means of ensuring the death of a primary target, then the kill zone theory does not apply.”
• “If there is evidence of a primary target, but the evidence shows only that the defendant subjected people near the primary target to lethal risk, or that the defendant acted with conscious disregard of the risk of serious injury or death for people near the primary target, then the kill zone theory does not apply.”
• “Jury instructions on the kill zone theory are never required.” (Id. at pp. 727-728 (internal citations omitted; emphasis in original).) In People v. Lee, 81 Cal. App. 5th 232, 296 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (2d Dist. 2022) as modified (June 24, 2022), review granted, see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1115, 299 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, 518 P.3d 276 (Case No. S275449), cited for persuasive authority pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.115, the appellate court found the kill zone instruction to be erroneous, but the error harmless. The court described two different versions of “concurrent intent”: “Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill the victim(s), and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward completing the killing. As here relevant, there are two scenarios in which a defendant concurrently intends to kill multiple victims. [¶ ] Under one scenario, a defendant intends primarily to kill a specific victim while concurrently intending to kill others within a zone of fatal harm or ‘kill zone.’ The Supreme Court in Canizales narrowed the circumstances in which courts may instruct on this kill zone theory. The Court held that the kill zone theory applies only when ‘(1) the circumstances of the defendant's attack on a primary target, including the type and extent of the force the defendant used, are such that the only reasonable inference is that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm—that is, an area in which the defendant intended to kill everyone present to ensure the primary target's death … and (2) the alleged attempted murder victim who was not the primary target was located within that zone of harm. [¶ ] Another scenario of concurrent intent exists when a defendant indiscriminately fires into a group of people with the intent to kill ‘a random person rather than a specific one.' Under this theory, the defendant need only intend to kill anyone who got in the way of his bullets.” (Lee, supra (internal citations omitted; quoted portion not certified for publication).)
Pointing a gun
To be guilty of attempted murder, the prosecution must prove the defendant intended to kill the victim and took a direct but ineffectual step towards accomplishing the intended killing. (People v. Ervine, 47 Cal. 4th 745, 785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 3d 786, 220 P.3d 820 (Cal. 2009).) A direct act is something more than mere preparation. (People v. Superior Court (Decker), 41 Cal. 4th 1, 12, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421.) “Conduct that qualifies as mere preparation and conduct that qualifies as a direct but ineffectual act toward commission of the crime exists on a continuum, ‘“since all acts leading up to the ultimate consummation of a crime are by their very nature preparatory.”’” (Ibid.) Whether acts are merely preparatory or sufficiently close to the consummation of the crime to constitute an attempt depends on the circumstances of the case. (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court has recognized that “the law of attempts would be largely without function if it could not be invoked until the trigger was pulled, the blow struck, or the money seized.” (People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 455, 194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1983).)
There are certain circumstances where pointing a gun at a victim will support an attempted murder conviction. In People v. Ervine, supra, 47 Cal. 4th at p. 786, our Supreme Court concluded that sufficient evidence supported a conviction for attempting to murder a third police officer, because the evidence indicated that the defendant wanted to kill all the officers at the scene but had undertaken a direct but ineffectual act toward accomplishing the intended killing by firing at the two officers who posed the most immediate threat. In People v. Nelson, 51 Cal. 4th 198, 212, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406, 246 P.3d 301 (Cal. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 183, 181 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011), there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of attempted murder even though he merely pointed his gun at the victim because he only changed his target when he noticed a nearby patrol car and decided to shoot at the officers who posed a more immediate threat.
Death
Death is 1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions or 2) cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem. (Health and Saf. Code, § 7180.) Prosecution must prove brain death beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Mitchell (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 389, 396.)
Fetuses.
"a fetus is defined as "the unborn offspring in the postembryonic period, after major structures have been outlined." (Sloane-Dorland Ann. Medical-Legal Dict. (1987) p. 281.) This period occurs in humans "seven or eight weeks after fertilization" (ibid.), and is a determination to be made by the trier of fact." (People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797, 810.)
People v. Valdez (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 575.))
there is no crime of manslaughter of a fetus. (People v. Brown (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1585, 1592-1594, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 155; accord, People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 505-506, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.)
Multiple causes of death
The defendant's criminal act or omission must have been the cause of death. (People v. Morgan (1985) 177 Cal.App.3d 466.)
A “ ‘cause of the death of [the decedent] is an act or omission that sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural and probable consequence of the act or omission the death of [the decedent] and without which the death would not occur.’ ” (People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866.)
People v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 499, 523 [321 Cal.Rptr.3d 545, 564–565], review denied (Aug. 14, 2024)
Cause is determined by ordinary principles of causation. (People v. Armitage (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 405, 420.)
Whether defendant's act or omission was cause of death is question of fact. (People v. Harris (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 427; People v. Collins (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 526, 535 (jury was permitted to draw conclusion based on circumstantial evidence that defendant had caused victim's death).)
People v. Moncada (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1124.)
Defendant's act or omission may be cause of death as long as it shortened the victim's life. (People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 579 (defendant was convicted of murder when victim's parents postponed surgery that might have cured victim in reliance on defendant's misrepresentation that he could cure cancer); People v. Stamp (1969) 2 Cal.App.2d 203)
People v. Funes (1994) 2 3Cal.app.4th 1506, 1524 (defendant guilty of murder despite decision not to administer antibiotics for pneumonia caused by defendant's beating.)
People v. Matta (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 472, 481 (cause of death was pneumonia, but pneumonia was caused by injury to lungs by defendant)
People v. Mai (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 117, disapproved by People v. Nguyen (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767 (defendant's act must be a proximate cause, substantial factor resulting to result.)
People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 844-849
People v. Canizalez (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 845 (defendant engaging in street race with co-defendant was proximate cause of car collision)
People v. Lewis (1899) 124 Cal.551, 554-559 (murder where defendant fatally shot victim, even though victim slit his own throat.)
People v. Armitage (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 405 (victim's contributory negligence does not provide a defense)
People v. Vernon (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 853, 864.
People v. Harris (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 419, 426-427
People v. McGee (1947) 31 Cal.2d 229, 240-242 (doctor's negligence doesn't change that defendant inflicted fatal injury); People v. Dilworth (1969) 247 Cal.App.2d 27, 33 (same)
People v. Cobler (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 375, 378-379 (defendant poisoned victim, so victim fell and hit head and die)
People v. Moan (1884) 65 Cal.532, 536-537 (alcohol abuse)
‘’People v. Ah Fat’’ (1874) 48 Cal. 61, 64. (gunshot wound)
Eggshell plaintiff rule (People v. Morgan (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 603, 609 (murder where senior citizen died of heart attack caused by hits to the head, though a normal person would not have died from the hits.)
(People v. Wattier (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 948, 953-954 (failure to use seatbelt was properly excluded at vehicular manslaughter trial)
(People v. Marlin (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 559, 570 (victim's speeding doesn't change murder)
Vicarious liability
People v. Gardner (1995) 37 Cal.app.4th 473, 482-483 (2nd degree murder under NPC when he intentionally and provicately fired gun down street at fleeing victim, which caused a third person to fire back, which killed the victim.)
People v. Kainzrants (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1076-1079 (Robbery gone bad which caused person robbed to fire back and kill his own girlfriend, thus 1st degree murder)
Natural and probable consequences
"sets in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act or omission the death in question and without which the death would not occur." People v. Fiu (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 360
High speed chase which causes officer to to crash into another car and kill a person is up to jury to determine whether harm was foreseeable. (People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38.)
Death of firefighters is reasonably foreseeable consequence of reckless setting fire in woods (People v. Brady (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1314)
Implied malice towards fetus when pregnant woman is killed even if killer did not know of pregnancy. (People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863.)
when a defendant commits an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, with a conscious disregard for life in general, he acts with implied malice towards those he ends up killing. There is no requirement the defendant specifically know the existence of each victim.” (People v. Taylor (2004) 32 Cal.4th 863, 868.)
Parents of their 17-year-old daughter KNEW that their FAILURE to obtain medical treatment for daughter with diabetes endangered her life OR that they failed to obtain such medical treatment in conscious disregard for her life. (People v. Latham (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 319.)
Multiple shooters
‘’People v. Sanchez’’ (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 844-849.
‘’People v. Canizalez’’ (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 832, 845.
‘’People v. Gardner’’ (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 473, 482-483
Multiple deaths
People v. Bunyard (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1189, abrogated by People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176
People v. Smith (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1495-1517-1519, abrogated on other grounds by People v. Davis (1994) 7 Cal.4th 797.
Delay of death
Penal code section 194
To make the killing either murder or manslaughter, it is not requisite that the party die within three years and a day after the stroke received or the cause of death administered. If death occurs beyond the time of three years and a day, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the killing was not criminal. The prosecution shall bear the burden of overcoming this presumption. In the computation of time, the whole of the day on which the act was done shall be reckoned the first.
Old rule created by statute in 1850, of "one-year-and-a-day rule" required victim die within a year or day for defendant to be charged with murder or manslaughter. (People v. Clark (1951) 106 Cal.App.2d 271.) In 1969, it was changed to "three years and one day." (People v. Snipe (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 742) Current law is Penal Code section 194, enacted in 1996.
Lesser Included Offenses
N.337.02 N.337.03
N.337.1 N.337.3 N.337.3.2
Defenses
A killing is lawful if excusable or justifiable.
A killing is excusable when:
- committed by accident or misfortune
- in the heat of passion
- upon sudden and sufficient provocation
- upon sudden combat
- when no undue advantage is taken nor any dangerous weapon used
Excusable self-defense because of accident
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent. (Pen. Code, § 195, subd. (1).)
“‘Misfortune’ when applied to a criminal act is analogous [to] the word ‘misadventure’ and bears the connotation of accident while doing a lawful act.” (People v. Gorgol (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 281, 308.)
Excusable self-defense because of heat of passion
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner. (Pen. Code § 195, subd. (2)
“emotion that obscures reasoning or judgment” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 14)
People v. Perdue, 49 Cal. 425, 428–429, 1874 WL 1551 (1874) (homicide was not excusable when evidence tended to prove that undue advantage was taken of deceased where defendant renewed his assault on victim after a struggle leaving victim lying on floor and crying that he had enough); People v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 2d 341, 347, 30 Cal. Rptr. 280 (2d Dist. 1963); People v. Dugger, 179 Cal. App. 2d 714, 722, 4 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1st Dist. 1960); People v. Pilgrim, 73 Cal. App. 2d 391, 394, 166 P.2d 636 (3d Dist. 1946); People v. Hampton, 96 Cal. App. 157, 159–160, 273 P. 854 (2d Dist. 1929).
People v. Mayes, 262 Cal. App. 2d 195, 197, 68 Cal. Rptr. 476 (5th Dist. 1968) (court rejected argument that if homicide is excusable, battery is also excusable, and held that immunity provided by § 195 has not been extended to battery; court explained that if A, in heat of passion and with sufficient provocation, strikes B with no intent to injure B, and B dies, homicide is excusable under Penal Code § 195, but A is guilty of battery).
Penal Code section 195
Homicide is excusable in the following cases:
1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent.
2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
Justifiable homicide: self-defense
PC197 PC198 PC198.5
Reasonable belief in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or GBI and uses no more force than necessary to repel danger
“A danger is imminent if, when fatal wound occurred, the danger actually existed or defendant believed it existed…must seem immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may not be merely prospective or in the near future.” People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178; CalCrim 505
Knowledge that victim had threatened or harmed victim or others in past, can be used to prove actual belief element. See People v. Spencer (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1208; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622
Mere fear is not enough
Fear of future harm is not enough
Must act under particular reasonable fear alone
Belief of harm must be reasonable to a similarly situated reasonable person (People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073)
No requirement to retreat. (People v. Hughes (1951) 107 Ca.App.2d 487)
Penal Code section 197
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases:
(1) When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person.
(2) When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein.
(3) When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a spouse, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he or she was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed.
(4) When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
Self-defense of life
Flannel instruction. People v. Flannel (!979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680-683
Self-defense need only create a reasonable doubt. N.84 N.85 N.86
Self-defense of property
Duty to retreat
N. 67
N. 68
N. 69
N.70 N.71 N.72
Loss of self-defense as an aggressor
Self-defense against citizen’s arrest.
N.73.1 73.15[2]
Evidence considered
The victim’s state of mind, showing mortal fear of defendant n.298
Evidence of victim’s state of mind to show death resulted from suicide n. 299
Evidence used to cause victim’s death. N.300, n. 301
Voluntary intoxication to negate intent to kill n. 309.
If the prosecution does not establish implied malice, voluntary intoxication will negate express malice to reduce offense to involuntary manslaughter.
Contributory negligence is not a defense
Defendant claims that the victim's attempt to swim ashore, whether characterized as an intervening or a superseding cause, constituted a break in the **525 natural and continuous sequence arising from the unlawful operation of the boat. The claim cannot hold water. It has long been the rule in criminal prosecutions that the contributory negligence of the victim is not a defense. (People v. Harris, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at p. 426, 125 Cal.Rptr. 40; People v. Tracy (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 163, 168, 18 Cal.Rptr. 487; People v. Freudenberg (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d 564, 583–584, 263 P.2d 875; People v. Lett (1947) 77 Cal.App.2d 917, 921, 177 P.2d 47; People v. Fator (1936) 14 Cal.App.2d 403, 404, 58 P.2d 402.)10 In order to exonerate a defendant the victim's conduct must not only be a cause of his injury, it must be a superseding cause. “A defendant may be criminally liable for a result directly caused by his act even if there is another contributing cause. If an intervening cause is a normal and reasonably foreseeable result of defendant's original act the intervening act is ‘dependent’ and not a superseding cause, and will not relieve defendant of liability.” (People v. Harris, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at p. 427, 125 Cal.Rptr. 40.) As Witkin further notes, “[a]n obvious illustration of a dependent cause is the victim's attempt to escape from a deadly attack or other danger in which he is placed by the defendant's wrongful act.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Crimes, supra, § 82, p. 81.) Thus, it is only an unforeseeable intervening cause, an extraordinary and abnormal occurrence, *421 which rises to the level of an exonerating, superseding cause. (People v. Hebert (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 514, 520–521, 39 Cal.Rptr. 539; see also People v. Sam (1969) 71 Cal.2d 194, 210–211, 77 Cal.Rptr. 804, 454 P.2d 700.) Consequently, in criminal law a victim's predictable effort to escape a peril created by the defendant is not considered a superseding cause of the ensuing injury or death. (People v. Harrison (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 330, 335, 1 Cal.Rptr. 414. See also People v. Monk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 288, 296, 14 Cal.Rptr. 633, 363 P.2d 865; People v. Lewis (1899) 124 Cal. 551, 555, 57 P. 470.) As leading commentators have explained it, an unreflective act in response to a peril created by defendant will not break a causal connection. In such a case, the actor has a choice, but his act is nonetheless unconsidered. “When defendant's conduct causes panic an act done under the influence of panic or extreme fear will not negative causal connection unless the reaction is wholly abnormal.” (Hart & Honore, Causation in the Law (2d ed. 1985) p. 149.) Here defendant, through his misconduct, placed the intoxicated victim in the middle of a dangerous river in the early morning hours clinging to an overturned boat. The fact that the panic stricken victim recklessly abandoned the boat and tried to swim ashore was not a wholly abnormal reaction to the perceived peril of drowning. Just as “[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife” (Brown v. United States (1921) 256 U.S. 335, 343, 41 S.Ct. 501, 502, 65 L.Ed. 961, 963, Holmes, J.), neither can caution be required of a drowning man. Having placed the inebriated victim in peril, defendant cannot obtain exoneration by claiming the victim should have reacted differently or more prudently. In sum, the evidence establishes that defendant's acts and omissions were the proximate cause of the victim's death.
People v. Armitage (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 405
Loss of self-defense
Def was initial aggressor See In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768; People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461; CalCrim 3471
Danger had ceased to exist People v. Keys (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 232; CalCrim 3474
Def wrongful conduct created need for victim’s use of force See In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768; People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461
Def’s own wrongful conduct caused victim’s justifiable attack or pursuit See In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768; People v. Randle (2005) 35 Cal.4th 987
Belief is completely delusional See People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121
Must actually, not reasonably, associate threat to victim See People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055
Provocation
“Sudden quarrel or heat of passion” are referred to as provocation.
People v. Van Ronk, 171 Cal. App. 3d 818, 823, 217 Cal. Rptr. 581 (3d Dist. 1985) (requirement of provocation is implicit in statutory definition of voluntary manslaughter); People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (4th Dist. 1984).
his or her reason was disturbed or obscured by “passion” to such an extent that an ordinary person of average disposition likely would act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection
People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 137–144, 169 P.2d 1 (1946); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 546, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 (1991), as modified on denial of reh'g, (July 9, 1991)
The amount of provocation need not rise to the level where it would cause an ordinary person of average disposition to kill.4
People v. Beltran, 56 Cal. 4th 935, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 301 P.3d 1120 (2013), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Aug. 28, 2013). “‘To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an emotion so intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection …. [T]he anger or other passion must be so strong that the defendant's reaction bypassed his thought process to such an extent that judgment could not and did not intervene. Framed another way, provocation is not evaluated by whether the average person would act in a certain way: to kill. Instead, the question is whether the average person would react in a certain way: with his reason and judgment obscured.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wright, 242 Cal. App. 4th 1461, 1482, 196 Cal. Rptr. 3d 115 (1st Dist. 2015).)
Provocation must be both objective, that a reasonable person would have experienced it, and subjective, that the accused actually experienced it.
People v. Wickersham, 32 Cal. 3d 307, 326, 327, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311 (1982) (disapproved of by, People v. Barton, 12 Cal. 4th 186, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 (1995)); People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (1976); People v. Brooks, 185 Cal. App. 3d 687, 694, 695, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86 (2d Dist. 1986); CALJIC No. 8.42 (7th ed. 2003 bound vol.).
The victim must be the source of the provocation. People v. Brooks, 185 Cal. App. 3d 687, 693, 694, 695, 230 Cal. Rptr. 86 (2d Dist. 1986); In re Thomas C., 183 Cal. App. 3d 786, 798, 228 Cal. Rptr. 430 (2d Dist. 1986); People v. Spurlin, 156 Cal. App. 3d 119, 125–126, 202 Cal. Rptr. 663 (4th Dist. 1984).
People v. Lee, 20 Cal. 4th 47, 59, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001 (1999).
Since it is in heat of passion and provocation, the defendant cannot have exercised judgment. People v. Rich, 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1112, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960 (1988)
Provoked rage. People v. Danielly, 33 Cal. 2d 362, 377, 202 P.2d 18 (1949).
Anger. Penal Code § 192(a); People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 515, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (1976); People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 329, 325 P.2d 97 (1958); CALJIC No. 8.44 (7th ed. 2003 bound vol.).
Brooding is provocation. People v. Hyde, 166 Cal. App. 3d 463, 473, 212 Cal. Rptr. 440 (4th Dist. 1985); People v. Hudgins, 252 Cal. App. 2d 174, 179, 60 Cal. Rptr. 176 (2d Dist. 1967).
Jealousy is provocation. People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 329, 325 P.2d 97 (1958); People v. Jones, 215 Cal. App. 2d 341, 347, 30 Cal. Rptr. 280 (2d Dist. 1963).
Resistance to rape is not provocation. People v. Rich 45 Cal. 3d 1036, 1112, 1113, 248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960 (1988), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Aug. 25, 1988).
Resistance to attack is not provocation. People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 305, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149 (1980) (disapproved of by, People v. Cromer, 24 Cal. 4th 889, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 15 P.3d 243 (2001)) (victim's response to discovery that defendant is burglarizing her home is not sufficient provocation to reduce killing to manslaughter).
Resistance to unlawful arrest is not provocation. People v. Roman, 256 Cal. App. 2d 656, 659, 64 Cal. Rptr. 268 (2d Dist. 1967).
Escalation of a fistfight started by defendant that becomes lethal is not provocation. People v. Johnston, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1299, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161 (2d Dist. 2003).
However, the defendant's own emotional and mental abilities are not to be used to determine provocation.
People v. Padilla, 103 Cal. App. 4th 675, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889 (5th Dist. 2002). See CALJIC No. 8.73.1 (7th ed. 2003 bound vol.); In re Thomas C., 183 Cal. App. 3d 786, 228 Cal. Rptr. 430 (2d Dist. 1986).
Penal Code section 29 prevents putting on mental state, because that would be forbidden diminished capacity.
Imperfect self-defense
"When the trier of facts find that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter." (In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.)
(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.)
Special Circumstances
Special circumstance of arson is for PC451(b), not PC451(a). PC451(a) and PC451(b) have different elements. So setting arson of car killing person was not PC451(b). (People v. Debose (2014) 59 Cal.4th 177
“The arson special circumstance thus applies only to arson of an inhabited structure or inhabited property.” (People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 606, fn. 13.)
Robertson explains Green rule. (People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21.)
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, is an example of Green rule, in which arson was supposed to cause other family members to come out, not just kill the target.
Multiple murder
(1) Governing Statute. The trier of fact may consider as a special circumstance that the defendant has in the current proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of first or second degree murder. (P.C. 190.2(a)(3).) (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 C.3d 1104, 1148, 1149, 240 C.R. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, infra, § 644 [information properly alleged that in addition to victim named in each count, defendant murdered another victim on or about the same date; it would be illogical to require prosecution, at this stage, to allege that defendant, in words of P.C. 190.2(a)(3), “has been convicted” of more than one murder]; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 C.4th 468, 510, 71 C.R.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035 [requirement was satisfied where killing involved that of mother and her unborn fetus]; People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 C.4th 227, 256, 188 C.R.3d 1, 349 P.3d 103 [refiling of twice-dismissed murder charge underlying multiple-murder special circumstance finding was improper, requiring reversal of conviction, setting aside of finding, and reversal of death judgment; refiling constituted retroactive application of P.C. 1387.1, permitting three refilings, in violation of Ex Post Facto Clause]; CALCRIM, No. 721 [Special Circumstances: Multiple Murder Convictions (Same Case)]; CALJIC, No. 8.81.3 [Special Circumstances—Multiple Murder Convictions].) (2) Finding of First Degree. The requirements of P.C. 190.2(a)(3) are met by a finding that any one of the multiple murders was of the first degree; it is not necessary that more than one be of that degree. (People v. Williams (1988) 44 C.3d 883, 923, 245 C.R. 336, 751 P.2d 395; People v. Miller (1990) 50 C.3d 954, 995, 269 C.R. 492, 790 P.2d 1289; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 C.3d 771, 828, 281 C.R. 90, 809 P.2d 865.) (3) Jury Consideration. The multiple-murder special circumstance is perhaps unique in that it does not require a finding of facts beyond the bare recognition that the jury has convicted defendant of at least one additional count of murder in the same proceeding. Nevertheless, the multiple-murder allegation should not be removed from the jury's consideration. (People v. Marshall (1996) 13 C.4th 799, 849, 852, 55 C.R.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 [error in failing to submit issue to jury was harmless].) (4) Distinction: Multiple Verdicts. Even though only one multiple-murder special circumstance may be alleged in a capital murder case involving two victims, the prosecutor may seek a separate penalty verdict for each of the victims. Each murder is a separate capital offense. (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 C.4th 379, 430, 64 C.R.3d 721, 165 P.3d 512 [where prosecutor sought separate penalty verdict for each of two victims and jury was unable to reach verdict as to one victim, retrial was not barred on basis that defendant had been “once in jeopardy” for single capital crime].)
It is improper to allege this special circumstance for each of two murder counts joined for trial. In People v. Harris (1984) 36 C.3d 36, 201 C.R. 782, 679 P.2d 433, the multiple-murder special circumstance was alleged in each of the two murder counts charged in the information. This practice “inflates the risk that the jury will arbitrarily impose the death penalty.” The appropriate manner of charging in this situation is to allege one multiple murder special circumstance, separate from the individual murder counts. (36 C.3d at 67.)
The Harris rule, prohibiting more than one multiple-murder special circumstance in a single proceeding, has been consistently followed. But a failure to apply the rule is generally held not to be prejudicial, largely because the jury is well aware of the actual number of murders alleged. (See People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 C.3d 730, 787, 230 C.R. 667, 726 P.2d 113 [nothing at trial suggested jury thought there had been two more murders due to extra special circumstance allegation]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 C.3d 386, 409, 247 C.R. 137, 754 P.2d 184 [two special circumstances charged and found; one vacated]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 C.3d 815, 876, 277 C.R. 122, 802 P.2d 906 [only one special circumstance should be charged when there are multiple murders, but superfluous findings are generally not prejudicial]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 C.4th 495, 565, 11 C.R.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 [defendant was improperly charged with 12 multiple-murder special circumstances, all of which were found true; 11 were set aside]; cf. People v. Danks (2004) 32 C.4th 269, 315, 8 C.R.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249, supra, § 619 [in contrast to multiple-murder special circumstance, prior-murder special circumstance may be charged for each prior murder conviction suffered by defendant].)
The restriction of the multiple-murder special circumstance only applies to death penalty cases. In People v. Garnica (1994) 29 C.A.4th 1558, 35 C.R.2d 229, defendant was convicted of two murders, and the special circumstance was applied to each, resulting in two concurrent life terms without possibility of parole. He argued that the multiple-murder special circumstance could apply only to a single count. Held, the special circumstance was properly applied to both counts. “Each of the murders is deemed the more heinous because it is one of multiple killings.” The restrictive rule in death penalty cases exists because of the risk that a jury will arbitrarily impose that penalty due to the sheer number of special circumstances charged and found true. That is a concern only where the death penalty is sought, “and it does not change the fundamental truth that all the murders in a multiple-murder crime spree have been deemed worthy of the ultimate penalty precisely because they are part of a multiple-murder sequence.” (29 C.A.4th at 1562, 1563.)
The problem of severance in the context of the multiple-murder special circumstance was discussed in Williams v. Superior Court (1984) 36 C.3d 441, 204 C.R. 700, 683 P.2d 699. The court held that denial of a severance motion constituted an abuse of discretion. A refusal to sever a second murder count is subject to great scrutiny because it is the joinder itself that gives rise to the special circumstance. If the cases are severed, the possibility of a death penalty would arise only if there is a murder conviction in the first case that is tried. (36 C.3d at 454.) (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 C.4th 1229, 1318, 65 C.R.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [in case involving two murders with numerous similarities, trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying severance after hearing extensive argument and scrutinizing evidence closely; citing great scrutiny rule of Williams].) In People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 C.4th 547, 36 C.R.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614, defendant was charged with four separate murders, and three others were alleged for purpose of penalty. He moved for five separate trials, one for each of the current charges and one for the uncharged crimes. He argued that if he were convicted of first degree murder in the first case to be tried and second degree murder in the others, he would not face the death penalty, while if both convictions occurred in a single trial he would be subject to that punishment. The trial judge severed the uncharged crimes but otherwise denied the motion. Recognizing that the law prefers consolidation of charges and applying established criteria for severance motions, the Supreme Court concluded that defendant failed to make a clear showing of potential prejudice, and the trial judge's ruling was not outside the bounds of reason. (37 C.4th at 571, 576.) The court's treatment of the severance issue in Williams suggests that if the defendant is convicted on the murder count first tried in a severed proceeding, the prosecutor should be permitted to amend the information on any murder count tried after that, to allege the prior-murder conviction special circumstance. This approach was followed in Shamburger v. Superior Court (1984) 160 C.A.3d 484, 207 C.R. 586, which held that the prosecution could amend the information at a later murder trial to allege a prior conviction resulting from the severed count, under P.C. 190.2(a)(2) (supra, § 619). (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 C.3d 1104, 1149, 240 C.R. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 [read together, P.C. 190.2(a)(2) and (a)(3) “are plainly complementary, and were evidently intended to define a single basic special circumstance—multiple-murder—which can be satisfied by convictions in a single proceeding or in more than one proceeding”].)
ntent to kill is not an element of the multiple-murder special circumstance, but it must be proved if the defendant is an aider and abettor instead of the actual killer. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 C.4th 635, 688, 691, 66 C.R.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752 [error in failing to instruct on intent was prejudicial where proof of defendant's convictions of four murders at guilt phase was only evidence presented at retrial of special circumstance allegation after hung jury].) This requirement mirrors the rule applicable to felony-murder (infra, § 644). (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 C.4th 826, 891, 48 C.R.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135 [even though capital murder prosecution was based on murders occurring after People v. Turner (1984) 37 C.3d 302, 208 C.R. 196, 690 P.2d 669, holding that multiple-murder special circumstance requires intent to kill, and before People v. Anderson (1987) 43 C.3d 1104, 240 C.R. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, holding that intent to kill is not required except in case of aider or abettor, instruction on multiple-murder special circumstance was correct in requiring intent to kill for only one of two alleged murders, as state law does not require jury to find intent to kill both victims for multiple-murder special circumstance to apply].) The following cases concern intent to kill: People v. Nunez & Satele (2013) 57 C.4th 1, 44, 158 C.R.3d 585, 302 P.3d 981 [when instructing on multiple-murder special circumstance, trial judge's failure to specify that aider and abettor must have had intent to kill was harmless error; other instructions properly informed jury that aider and abettor must have shared that purpose or intent]. People v. Maciel (2013) 57 C.4th 482, 521, 160 C.R.3d 305, 304 P.3d 983 [because ample evidence supported jury's finding that defendant intended to kill one victim and was responsible for killing four others under natural and probable consequences theory, it was unnecessary to determine whether he had intent to four other victims; multiple-murder special circumstance does not require finding of intent to kill more than one victim]. People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 C.5th 838, 929, 207 C.R.3d 228, 378 P.3d 615 [instruction that permitted jury to find multiple-murder special circumstance true without finding that defendant intended to kill human being (if it found that defendant was not actual killer or it could not decide whether he was actual killer or aider and abettor or coconspirator), was harmless error; overwhelming evidence established that defendant intentionally and fatally shot victim]. People v. Mora & Rangel (2018) 5 C.5th 442, 493, 235 C.R.3d 92, 420 P.3d 902 [same; following Covarrubias].
PC1385.1
Notwithstanding Section 1385 or any other provision of law, a judge shall not strike or dismiss any special circumstance which is admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or is found by a jury or court as provided in Sections 190.1 to 190.5, inclusive.
Passed into law as part of Prop 115 in 1990.
People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607
People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 240
Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 52 Cal.2d 282
People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1056
People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267
People v. Henderson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 828
The adoption of Proposition 115 in 1990 abrogated People v. Williams, supra. A judge may not strike or dismiss any special circumstance that is (a) admitted by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere or (b) found by a jury or court as provided in P.C. 190.1 et seq. (P.C. 1385.1.) (See People v. Mendoza (2011) 52 C.4th 1056, 1077, 132 C.R.3d 808, 263 P.3d 1 [P.C. 1385.1 is not limited to cases in which striking special circumstance would alter defendant's sentence]; People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 C.A.4th 1267, 1284, 18 C.R.3d 286 [under P.C. 1385.1, trial court was without authority to strike special circumstance finding; hence, prosecution could raise issue on appeal without objecting in trial court and without separately taking own appeal].) (On special circumstances in assessing punishment for capital offenses, see 3 Cal. Crim. Law (5th), Punishment, § 618 et seq.)
(d) [§ 484] Striking Special Circumstance., 5 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 5th Crim Trial § 484 (2024)
People v. Robertson (1982) 33 C.3d 21, 47, 188 C.R. 77, 655 P.2d 279 [not necessary to charge underlying felony of felony-murder special circumstance as separate count]. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 C.3d 247, 273, 221 C.R. 794, 710 P.2d 861 [although P.C. 190.4(a) requires jury to make “special finding” on truth of special circumstance, it does not require special verdict]. People v. Cash (2002) 28 C.4th 703, 737, 122 C.R.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332 [where robbery-murder special circumstance was alleged but robbery was not charged as separate crime, trial judge was not required, on own initiative, to instruct on theft as lesser included offense of robbery]. People v. Friend (2009) 47 C.4th 1, 76, 97 C.R.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520 [in special circumstances retrial, trial judge did not err in omitting traditional presumption of innocence language from CALJIC, No. 2.90 and refusing to give defense instruction on burden of proof for special circumstance allegation; under CALJIC, No. 8.80, judge properly instructed that special circumstance must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, and traditional language on presumption of innocence might have confused jurors, as defendant had already been found guilty of murder]. People v. Thomas (2011) 51 C.4th 449, 486, 121 C.R.3d 521, 247 P.3d 886 [prosecutor's argument that defendant could be released on parole if special circumstance was not found was improper, but in light of trial judge's admonishment and instructions, no prejudice occurred]. People v. Granger (1980) 105 C.A.3d 422, 427, 164 C.R. 363 [defendant is entitled to jury trial on special circumstance allegation; personal waiver of jury on issue of guilt, but not on special circumstance, preserved right to jury trial on special circumstance]. People v. Felix (2008) 160 C.A.4th 849, 861, 862, 72 C.R.3d 947 [CALCRIM, No. 704 properly defines prosecutor's burden of proof as to special circumstantial allegations where circumstantial evidence is relied on; CALCRIM, No. 706, which cautions jurors not to consider penalty when deciding whether special circumstance is proven, does not prevent jurors from considering whether plea bargain agreement has impaired witness's credibility, when given with other relevant instructions]. (2) Corpus Delicti. Formerly, the corpus delicti rule was held inapplicable to the proof of special circumstances except to the underlying felony in a felony-murder special circumstance. (See People v. Howard (1988) 44 C.3d 375, 413, 243 C.R. 842, 749 P.2d 279 [rule does not apply to financial-gain special circumstance]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 C.3d 983, 1022, 254 C.R. 586, 766 P.2d 1 [rule does not apply to lying-in-wait special circumstance].) Proposition 115, approved in 1990, made the rule inapplicable to felony-murder special circumstances as well. (See supra, § 639.) (3) Corroboration of Accomplice. In People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 C.3d 1142, 259 C.R. 701, 774 P.2d 730, defendant argued that P.C. 1111, which prohibits conviction on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, applies also to the finding of a special circumstance. The court rejected the claim, instead applying the rule it was then following with respect to proof of the corpus delicti: “When the special circumstance requires proof of some other crime, that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But when, as here, it requires only proof of the motive for the murder … the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply.” (48 C.3d at 1177.) (See CALCRIM, No. 707 [Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice]; CALCRIM, No. 708 [Special Circumstances: Accomplice Testimony Must Be Corroborated—No Dispute Whether Witness Is Accomplice].)
(a) [§ 655] In General., 3 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 5th Punishment § 655 (2024)
Cisneros next argues that his LWOP sentence violates the federal and California constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment, based on his age, his intellectual limitations, and the nature of the offense and his personal situation and characteristics. In a constitutional challenge to a statutorily mandated sentence (see § 1385.1; People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 240, 257), “ ‘we are authorized to consider proportionality [of punishment] based on the facts,’ ” and “ ‘determine ourselves, on de novo review, whether defendant's sentence was cruel or unusual.’ ” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 722 (Baker).) “[A]ny factual findings the trial court could make in [the defendant's] favor ... we can (and do) assume ....” (Id. at pp. 721–722.) But “[t]he significance of those facts under the federal and state Constitutions ‘presents a question of law subject to independent review; it is “not a discretionary decision to which the appellate court must defer.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 722.) 1. Legal Principles The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “ ‘flows from the basic “precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned” ’ to both the offender and the offense. [Citation.]” (Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 469 (Miller).) “ ‘[T]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.’ ” (Miller, at p. 469, quoting Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 59.) “And we view that concept less through a historical prism than according to ‘ “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” ’ [Citation.]” (Miller, at p. 469.)
- 5 Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, unlike the Eighth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” (Italics added.) This is “a distinction that is purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic.” (People v. Carmony (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1085 (Carmony).) A sentence violates California's prohibition if it is “so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (Lynch.) “A petitioner attacking his sentence as cruel or unusual must demonstrate his punishment is disproportionate in light of (1) the nature of the offense and the defendant's background, (2) the punishment for more serious offenses, or (3) punishment for similar offenses in other jurisdictions.” (In re Nunez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 725, citing Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425, 431, 436.) “The weight afforded to each prong may vary by case,” and “ ‘[d]isproportionality need not be established in all three areas.’ ” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.)
Ultimately “[i]t is a rare case that violates the prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment.” (Carmony, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 1072; People v. Abundio (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1221 (Abundio).)
People v. Cisneros (Cal. Ct. App., July 5, 2024, No. H050584) 2024 WL 3311257, at *4–5, review denied (Sept. 18, 2024)
“The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ and ‘contains a “narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to noncapital sentences.’ “ [Citations.] That principle prohibits “ ‘imposition of a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime’ “ [citations], although in a noncapital case, successful proportionality challenges are “ ‘exceedingly rare.’ “ [Citation.] “A proportionality analysis requires consideration of three objective criteria, which include ‘(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentence imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.’ [Citation .] But it is only in the rare case where a comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality that the second and third criteria come into play .” (People v. Meeks (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 695, 707 (Meeks ) .)
Brousseau v. Central California Women's Facility (E.D. Cal., Mar. 10, 2014, No. 2:13-CV-0301 JAM GGH) 2014 WL 931861, at *19
The Eighth Amendment contains a narrow proportionality principle that applies in noncapital sentences. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 155 L.Ed.2d 108 (2003) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996–97, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991)). Successful Eighth Amendment challenges to the proportionality of noncapital sentences are exceedingly rare. Id. at 290–91. The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have rejected Eighth Amendment challenges to sentences of life without the possibility of parole for crimes less severe than felony murder. See e.g., Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996 (possession of 672 grams of cocaine); United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 708 (9th Cir.2005), (possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute); United States v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.1991), (possession of 152 grams of cocaine). Given the greater severity of Petitioner's crime, it is unlikely that evidence of Petitioner's alleged syndrome would have affected the constitutionality of her sentence under the United States Constitution.
Davis v. Cavazos (S.D. Cal., Aug. 7, 2012, No. 11-CV-1193-H MDD) 2012 WL 3237443, at *11
LWOP for a murder is not cruel and unusual under the 8th Amendment. (Harris v. Wright (9th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 581.)
LWOP is not cruel or unusual under California Constitution. (People v. Christensen (July 30, 2025, G062920).)
Statutes
Penal code section 195
Homicide is excusable in the following cases: 1. When committed by accident and misfortune, or in doing any other lawful act by lawful means, with usual and ordinary caution, and without any unlawful intent. 2. When committed by accident and misfortune, in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or upon a sudden combat, when no undue advantage is taken, nor any dangerous weapon used, and when the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
Penal code section 196
Homicide is justifiable when committed by peace officers and those acting by their command in their aid and assistance, under either of the following circumstances: (a) In obedience to any judgment of a competent court. (b) When the homicide results from a peace officer’s use of force that is in compliance with Section 835a.
Penal code section 197
Homicide is also justifiable when committed by any person in any of the following cases: (1) When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person. (2) When committed in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person therein. (3) When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of a spouse, parent, child, master, mistress, or servant of such person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he or she was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was committed. (4) When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways and means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the peace.
Penal code section 198
A bare fear of the commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2 and 3 of Section 197, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.
Penal code section 198.5
. Any person using force intended or likely to cause death or great bodily injury within his or her residence shall be presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily injury to self, family, or a member of the household when that force is used against another person, not a member of the family or household, who unlawfully and forcibly enters or has unlawfully and forcibly entered the residence and the person using the force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry occurred. As used in this section, great bodily injury means a significant or substantial physical injury.
Penal code section 199
The homicide appearing to be justifiable or excusable, the person indicted must, upon his trial, be fully acquitted and discharged.
Loose notes
See People v Stanley (2006) 39 C4th 913, 956, 47 CR3d 420; People v Prieto (2003) 30 C4th 226, 256, 133 CR2d 18 (error to use “or” instead of “and”).
The second element is designed to exclude situations in which the defendant intended to commit murder and only incidentally committed one of the designated felonies. People v Rundle (2008) 43 C4th 76, 156, 74 CR3d 454; People v Marshall (1997) 15 C4th 1, 40–41, 61 CR2d 84; see People v Raley (1992) 2 C4th 870, 902, 8 CR2d 678. The second element does not require that the primary motivation for the murder be the furthering of the felony; a concurrent intent to kill and to commit an independent felony is sufficient. People v Bolden (2002) 29 C4th 515, 557–558, 127 CR2d 802; People v Michaels (2002) 28 C4th 486, 518, 122 CR2d 285. Bolden supersedes language in People v Thompson (1980) 27 C3d 303, 322, 165 CR 289, that defendant’s “primary criminal goal” must be to kill. 29 C4th at 557–558. Some examples follow.
• It is not burglary-murder under subsection (a)(17) to break into the victim’s house in order to kill the victim. See People v Garrison (1989) 47 C3d 746, 778, 254 CR 257; People v Morris (1988) 46 C3d 1, 31, 249 CR 119, disapproved on other grounds in 9 C4th 535, 545 n6 (special circumstance inapplicable when “primary criminal goal” is not to steal but to kill).
A defendant who robs the victim of clothing and other personal property in an attempt to conceal the murder is not subject to a robbery-murder special circumstance. However, when the intent to steal is independent of the murder and not merely a means of concealing it, subsection (a)(17) applies. People v Robertson (1982) 33 C3d 21, 51–52, 188 CR 77. The independent purpose need not be the sole one. In Robertson, the defendant robbed rape murder victims of their underwear, partly to conceal their identity and partly because he collected such items. That qualified as a robbery-murder special circumstance. In contrast, taking a letter written to the victim by a store in order to have a memento of the killing does not form a basis for a robbery-murder special circumstance, which “applies to a murder in the commission of a robbery, not to a robbery committed in the course of a murder.” People v Marshall, supra, 15 C4th at 41.
• The defendant killed the victim at the request of defendant’s girlfriend and recruited a confederate by telling him he could have his choice of the victim’s property. The confederate had the victim’s earrings when he was arrested. The evidence sufficiently shows robbery-murder. People v Michaels, supra, 28 C4th at 518.
• The defendant shot the victim following a dispute and immediately after demanding the victim’s car keys at gunpoint. This is sufficient evidence of robbery-murder. People v Koontz (2002) 27 C4th 1041, 1080, 119 CR2d 859.
• Robbery requires force or fear; when a defendant only decides to take the victim’s property after killing the victim, this requirement is not met. See People v DePriest (2007) 42 C4th 1, 46, 63 CR3d 896. However, when the murderer is later found in possession of the victim’s property, there is an inference that the victim was robbed. 42 C4th at 47.
In case of kidnap-murder and arson-murder involving specific intent to kill, the second element is eliminated. Pen C §190.2(a)(17)(M). See CALCRIM 731–732; CALJIC 8.81.17.1. Subsection (M) applies only to crimes committed on or after March 8, 2000. See Stats 1998, ch 628, §3, requiring voter approval for the change to become effective; Ballot Proposition 18 (March 7, 2000)
The actual killer need not have had an intent to kill as long as the murder was in furtherance of the felony. Pen C §190.2(a)(17), (b); see also discussion in People v Bolden (2002) 29 C4th 515, 560, 127 CR2d 802; People v Thornton (2007) 41 C4th 391, 436, 61 CR3d 461. A premedita ted killing can be felony-murder. People v Prince (2007) 40 C4th 1179, 1262, 57 CR3d 543.
The prosecution must charge and prove the felony underlying the special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt under the general law that applies to the trial and conviction of that crime. Pen C §190.4(a). Felony murder itself, as differentiated from a special circumstance, may be
charged simply as murder with malice. People v Moore (2011) 51 C4th 386, 412, 121 CR3d 280; People v Brasure (2008) 42 C4th 1037, 1057, 71 CR3d 675. For example, in a rape-murder capital case the prosecution may charge murder with malice, without specifying the rape, and may separately charge the rape and the special circumstance of murder in the commission of rape. People v Kipp (2001) 26 C4th 1100, 1131, 113 CR2d 27.
Felony murder and premeditated murder need not be pleaded separately and the jury need not unanimously agree on a theory of first degree murder as either felony or premeditated murder. People v Morgan (2007) 42 C4th 593, 617, 67 CR3d 753; People v Nakahara (2003) 30 C4th 705, 712, 134 CR2d 223.
Pleading to avoid death. People .v Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486
98.6(5), 98.9 (4), People v. Ward (2006) 36 Cal.4th 186
Daily transcripts are mandatory beginning with the preliminary hearing. Pen C §190.9; People v Arias (1996) 13 C4th 92, 159, 51 CR2d 770 (admonishing trial courts to comply meticulously with Pen C §190.9); Abernathy v Superior Court (2007) 157 CA4th 642, 647 650, 68 CR3d 726 (defendant charged with murder and special circumstances is entitled to daily preliminary hearing transcript even if prosecution has not yet stated whether it will seek death penalty).