Hit-and-run

Unconscious driver People v. Flores (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199

People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535

People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000

Wilkoff v Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345.

People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.3d 74

People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425

“Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ The legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 20003 is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify oneself. This duty is imposed upon drivers whether or not they are responsible for the accident itself. [Citations.]” (People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387; see People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.)

Fifth Amendment

California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424.

Accident

it is clear that the lawmakers intended to extend the application of the provisions of section 20002, subdivision (a), to volitional, intended, and purposeful acts, as well as those resulting from unintentional or negligent conduct. (People v. Laursen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7.)

Knowledge

"We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person. People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80.)

"Such knowledge may be imputed to the driver of a vehicle where the fact of personal injury is visible and obvious (People v. Blankenship, 171 Cal.App.2d 173, 177, 340 P.2d 34), or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries." People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241.)

Involvement

Section 20001, subdivision (a) describes a standard of conduct for drivers who are involved in accidents causing injury to other persons, whether or not the drivers are responsible for the accident.3 (See People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1625–1626, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 428, fn. 7, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027.) (People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425, 432.)

No-contact

‘It seems clear that the word “involved” is there used in the sense of being connected with (an accident) in a natural or logical manner. The statute relates to a driver thus involved in such accident and is in no way made dependent upon whether or not control of a vehicle is retained or lost, or upon who may ultimately be found to be most at fault.’ “ (Bammes, supra, at p. 631, quoting Sell, supra, at p. 523.) “One can be involved under section 20001 in an accident,” Bammes notes, “without being its legal cause.” (Ibid.) People v. Christiansen (Cal. Ct. App., July 30, 2010, No. F057851) 2010 WL 2978816, at *3

People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626

Nor does the statute require that the driver strike or injure a pedestrian or another vehicle. (People v. Kinney (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 232, 238, 82 P.2d 203 [construing former § 482, subd. (a), predecessor to § 20003].) People v. Mysin (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 6, 2004, No. C041604) 2004 WL 737529, at *4

Restitution

As condition of probation. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114.)

As part of sentence. (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093

Great bodily injury

PC12022.7 GBI doesn't attach to hit-and-run because the running is the criminal act. (People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82.)

Death or permanent, serious injury enhancement

VC20001(b)(2): If the accident described in subdivision (a) results in death or permanent, serious injury, a person who violates subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. However, the court, in the interests of justice and for reasons stated in the record, may reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment required by this paragraph.

SB1282 was passed to abrogate Braz.

Appellant's argument rests on a former version of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), inapplicable here. Specifically, appellant, below and here, has relied on the version of that subdivision at issue in People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425 (Braz ). At the time of the 1996 offense (Braz, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 427) at issue in that case, Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), read, in relevant part: “Any violation of subdivision (a) which results in death or permanent, serious injury shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in the county jail for not less than 90 days nor more than one year, ...” (Italics added.)

• 3 Presented with the 1996 version of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), Braz concluded that “a court may not impose the penalties set forth in subdivision (b)(2) unless the defendant's failure to stop and present identification and render aid causes permanent, serious injury to the accident victim.” (Braz, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 432, italics added.) Braz rejected the Attorney General's “suggestion that any accident that results in permanent, serious, injury triggers section 20001, subdivision (b)(2).” (Ibid.)

The legislative history of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), provided evidence contrary to Braz's conclusion, but Braz rejected that evidence. In footnote four in Braz, the court stated, “The summary digest of the Senate bill that added subdivision (b)(2) to section 20001 states: ‘This bill would make it punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 2, 3, or 4 years, or in the county jail for not to exceed one year, ... to fail to comply with the requirements of existing law, if the accident results in death or permanent, serious injury, as defined, thereby imposing a state-mandated local program.’ (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 2374, 4 Stats. 1988 (Reg.Sess.) Summary Dig., p. 402, italics added.) Notwithstanding the import of the italicized language, we may not look to legislative history to create an ambiguity in the otherwise clear and unambiguous language of subdivision (b)(2).” (Braz, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp. 432-433, fn. 4.) We note our Supreme Court denied petitions for review in Braz, but Justices Baxter, Werdegar, and Brown were of the opinion that review should have been granted. (Braz, supra, review den. Oct. 21, 1998, No. S072531.) The legislative history of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2) (not discussed by the parties), reveals that, effective in October 1999, the subdivision was amended to abrogate Braz's holding. Senate Bill No. 1282 (SB 1282) was introduced in the Senate in February 1999. (Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced February 26, 1999.) As introduced, SB 1282 proposed, inter alia, amending subdivision (b)(2), by substituting the phrase “If the accident described in subdivision (a) results in death or permanent, serious injury, any person who violates subdivision (a) (italics added) for the former phrase Any violation of subdivision (a) which results in death or permanent, serious injury[.] (Ibid., italics added.)

Concerning the proposed amendment, the Legislative Counsel's Digest stated, “Existing law requires the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to another person to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and to fulfill specified requirements. [¶] Under existing law, a violation of this provision is punishable as either a felony or a misdemeanor if the violation results in death or permanent, serious injury. [¶] This bill would recast this provision to make a violation of this provision either a felony or a misdemeanor if the accident in which the driver was involved, rather than the failure to immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and fulfill specified duties, results in death or permanent, serious injury.” (Italics added.) (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.).)

SB 1282 was later amended on April 29, 1999, in respects not pertinent to this appeal. A legislative analysis of the amended SB 1282 states that a “key issue[ ]” (capitalization omitted) was “Should the provisions on hit-and-run be changed to make it clear that the penalty is because of an injury occurring as a result of the accident [and] not due to an injury resulting from the running? ” (Sen. Com. On Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 29, 1999, p. 1, italics and bracketed material added; some capitalization omitted.) The analysis stated that a purpose of the bill was to “Clarify that the increased penalty for hit-and-run applies when a death or serious injury results from the accident not from the running.” (Id. at p. 2, italics added.) The above legislative analysis later stated, “Existing case law provides that ‘[Vehicle Code] section 2001, [sic ] subdivision (b)(2) does not apply unless the defendant's failure to comply with subdivision (a) proximately causes permanent, serious injury to another person ...’ (People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App. 4th 425) [¶] This bill would clarify that the accident and not the failure to comply with the stopping requirement would trigger the increased penalty for serious injury or death.” (Sen. Com. On Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 1999, p. 3, italics added and underscoring omitted.)

The above analysis later commented, “a. Background [¶] According to the sponsors: [¶] As the court in People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425 implicitly acknowledged, its interpretation was contrary to the legislation intent behind the statute. (65 Cal.App.4th at 432, fn. 4) The summary digest of the senate bill which added the increased sanctions in subdivision (b)(2) reveals that the legislature intended to focus on the severity of the initial accident, not on whether injuries or death resulted from flight. [¶] ... [¶] b. Clarifying language in the bill. [¶] As noted above, the Braz Court found that the plain language of existing Vehicle Codes 2001(b)(2), [sic ] contrary to the legislative intent, required [sic ] the injury which would result in a larger penalty to have occurred because the person failed to stop at the accident and not because of the accident itself. [¶] This bill redrafts that provision to clearly provide that if the accident that the person did not stop for results in serious physical injury or death then the higher penalty would apply.” (Sen. Com. On Public Safety, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1282 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 29, 1999, pp. 4-5, italics added.) Subsequent legislative analyses contain substantially similar statements, some of which expressly refer to, and reject, Braz.

The language in SB 1282 as introduced in February 1999, amending Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2), as previously discussed, remained unaffected by subsequent amendments. Effective October 10, 1999, SB 1282 was enacted as urgency legislation. (Stats.1999, chapter 854; 2 Sen. Final Hist. (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.), p. 934.) Accordingly, appellant's reliance on Braz is misplaced.

People v. Tillman (Cal. Ct. App., Jan. 29, 2004, No. B163495) 2004 WL 170391, at *2–4

Section 20001, subdivision (a) describes a standard of conduct for drivers who are involved in accidents causing injury to other persons, whether or not the drivers are **535 responsible for the accident.3 (See People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1625–1626, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 428, fn. 7, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027.) “The gravamen of a section 20001 offense ... is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.” (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579, italics added; see also People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387 [“Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ ”].) It thus follows that a court may not impose the penalties set forth in subdivision (b)(2) unless the defendant's failure to stop and present identification and render aid causes permanent, serious injury to the accident victim. (Cf. People v. Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387[“[c]ommission of the crime gives rise to civil liability for damages only if the act of leaving the scene proximately causes further injury or death”], quoting Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679, 255 P.2d 802, italics in original.)

We reject respondent's suggestion that any accident that results in permanent, serious, injury triggers subdivision (b)(2). That suggestion contradicts the plain meaning of that provision.4 Moreover, respondent's interpretation would make the degree of punishment for violating *433 section 20001, subdivision (a) entirely dependent on the degree of injury suffered by a person in the initial accident, and, in effect, would allow a defendant to be held liable for the severity of the accident even if the defendant did not cause the accident.5 This interpretation not only ignores but directly contradicts the decisional law that unequivocally holds that the purpose of section 20001, subdivision (a) is to punish “not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ ” (People v. Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387.) Respondent's citation to Corners for the proposition that section 20001 was intended to punish persons attempting to avoid civil or criminal liability for an accident is likewise unavailing. Even if this were true, it does not allow us to interpret subdivision (b)(2) contrary to its plain meaning.

(People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425, 432–433.)

Death enhancement

VC20001(c): (c) A person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a violation of Section 191.5 of, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the Penal Code, upon conviction of any of those sections, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed, shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment of five years in the state prison. This additional term shall not be imposed unless the allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by the defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact. The court shall not strike a finding that brings a person within the provisions of this subdivision or an allegation made pursuant to this subdivision.

People v. Calles (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1200

Civil Compromise

No-People v. Dimacali (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 822

Yes-People v. Tischman (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 174