Hit-and-run

Unconscious driver People v. Flores (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1199

People v. Kroncke (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1535

People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000

Wilkoff v Superior Court (1985) 38 Cal.3d 345.

People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.3d 74

People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425

“Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ The legislative purpose of sections 20001 and 20003 is to prevent the driver of a vehicle involved in an injury-causing accident from leaving injured persons in distress and danger for want of medical care and from attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify oneself. This duty is imposed upon drivers whether or not they are responsible for the accident itself. [Citations.]” (People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387; see People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1123, fn. 10, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.)

Fifth Amendment

California v. Byers (1971) 402 U.S. 424.

Accident

it is clear that the lawmakers intended to extend the application of the provisions of section 20002, subdivision (a), to volitional, intended, and purposeful acts, as well as those resulting from unintentional or negligent conduct. (People v. Laursen (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7.)

Knowledge

"We therefore believe that criminal liability attaches to a driver who knowingly leaves the scene of an accident if he actually knew of the injury or if he knew that the accident was of such a nature that one would reasonably anticipate that it resulted in injury to a person. People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80.)

"Such knowledge may be imputed to the driver of a vehicle where the fact of personal injury is visible and obvious (People v. Blankenship, 171 Cal.App.2d 173, 177, 340 P.2d 34), or where the seriousness of the collision would lead a reasonable person to assume there must have been resulting injuries." People v. Carter (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 239, 241.)

No-contact

‘It seems clear that the word “involved” is there used in the sense of being connected with (an accident) in a natural or logical manner. The statute relates to a driver thus involved in such accident and is in no way made dependent upon whether or not control of a vehicle is retained or lost, or upon who may ultimately be found to be most at fault.’ “ (Bammes, supra, at p. 631, quoting Sell, supra, at p. 523.) “One can be involved under section 20001 in an accident,” Bammes notes, “without being its legal cause.” (Ibid.) People v. Christiansen (Cal. Ct. App., July 30, 2010, No. F057851) 2010 WL 2978816, at *3

People v. Bammes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 626

Nor does the statute require that the driver strike or injure a pedestrian or another vehicle. (People v. Kinney (1938) 28 Cal.App.2d 232, 238, 82 P.2d 203 [construing former § 482, subd. (a), predecessor to § 20003].) People v. Mysin (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 6, 2004, No. C041604) 2004 WL 737529, at *4

Restitution

As condition of probation. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114.)

As part of sentence. (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093

Great bodily injury

PC12022.7 GBI doesn't attach to hit-and-run because the running is the criminal act. (People v. Valdez (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 82.)

Death or permanent, serious injury enhancement

VC20001(b)(2): If the accident described in subdivision (a) results in death or permanent, serious injury, a person who violates subdivision (a) shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than 90 days nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by both that imprisonment and fine. However, the court, in the interests of justice and for reasons stated in the record, may reduce or eliminate the minimum imprisonment required by this paragraph.

Section 20001, subdivision (a) describes a standard of conduct for drivers who are involved in accidents causing injury to other persons, whether or not the drivers are **535 responsible for the accident.3 (See People v. Jimenez (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1611, 1625–1626, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Kobrin (1995) 11 Cal.4th 416, 428, fn. 7, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 895, 903 P.2d 1027.) “The gravamen of a section 20001 offense ... is not the initial injury of the victim, but leaving the scene without presenting identification or rendering aid.” (People v. Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504, 1509, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 579, italics added; see also People v. Corners (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 139, 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387 [“Although a violation of section 20001 is popularly denominated ‘hit-and-run,’ the act made criminal thereunder is not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ ”].) It thus follows that a court may not impose the penalties set forth in subdivision (b)(2) unless the defendant's failure to stop and present identification and render aid causes permanent, serious injury to the accident victim. (Cf. People v. Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387[“[c]ommission of the crime gives rise to civil liability for damages only if the act of leaving the scene proximately causes further injury or death”], quoting Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679, 255 P.2d 802, italics in original.)

We reject respondent's suggestion that any accident that results in permanent, serious, injury triggers subdivision (b)(2). That suggestion contradicts the plain meaning of that provision.4 Moreover, respondent's interpretation would make the degree of punishment for violating *433 section 20001, subdivision (a) entirely dependent on the degree of injury suffered by a person in the initial accident, and, in effect, would allow a defendant to be held liable for the severity of the accident even if the defendant did not cause the accident.5 This interpretation not only ignores but directly contradicts the decisional law that unequivocally holds that the purpose of section 20001, subdivision (a) is to punish “not the ‘hitting’ but the ‘running.’ ” (People v. Corners, supra, 176 Cal.App.3d at p. 148, 221 Cal.Rptr. 387.) Respondent's citation to Corners for the proposition that section 20001 was intended to punish persons attempting to avoid civil or criminal liability for an accident is likewise unavailing. Even if this were true, it does not allow us to interpret subdivision (b)(2) contrary to its plain meaning.

(People v. Braz (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 425, 432–433.)

Death enhancement

VC20001(c): (c) A person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a violation of Section 191.5 of, or paragraph (1) of subdivision (c) of Section 192 of the Penal Code, upon conviction of any of those sections, in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed, shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment of five years in the state prison. This additional term shall not be imposed unless the allegation is charged in the accusatory pleading and admitted by the defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact. The court shall not strike a finding that brings a person within the provisions of this subdivision or an allegation made pursuant to this subdivision.

People v. Calles (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1200

Civil Compromise

No-People v. Dimacali (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 822

Yes-People v. Tischman (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 174