Burglary

Burglary

(Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [“ ‘immediately contiguous’ requirement ... easily met” where carport area was “situated close to and directly underneath the occupied apartments themselves”]; People v. Harris (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 86, 90 [“[a] garage sharing a roof and a wall with a residence is part of an inhabited dwelling” despite lack of “interior access”]; In re Christopher J. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 76, 80, 78 [“carport appurtenant to the dwelling house,” with a roof and a wall along one side, “was attached to and an integral part of the dwelling house”]; In re Edwardo V. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 591, 594–595 (Edwardo V.) [multi-unit apartment building's common garage constituted inhabited dwelling and citing cases].)

People v. Jimenez (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 17, 2017, No. A146261) 2017 WL 1376368, at *4

Elements

Inhabited

A deceased person doesn't make it inhabited. (People v. Ramos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 300.)

As defined in Penal Code, Section 460, a dwelling house is inhabited if a person resides therein even though it may be temporarily unoccupied. (People v. Gilbert, 188 Cal.App.2d 723, 726, 10 Cal.Rptr. 799; People v. Loggins, 132 Cal.App.2d 736, 738, 282 P.2d 961; People v. Allard, 99 Cal.App. 591, 592, 279 P. 182.) However, the dwelling house in the case at bar, at the time in question, was not the residence of a person who was temporarily absent. It was not the residence of the new tenant, of the landlord, or of the old tenant. It was not the dwelling house of either of them. For this reason, we conclude that it then was uninhabited and the verdict should have been limited to burglary in the second degree. People v. Valdez (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 559, 563 [21 Cal.Rptr. 764, 767]

Statute

Penal Code § 459

Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.

Penal Code § 460

(a)Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined in the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, or trailer coach, as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building, is burglary of the first degree.

(b) All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.

(c) This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect Section 464 of the Penal Code.

Penal Code § 461

Burglary is punishable as follows:

(a) Burglary in the first degree: by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six years.

(b) Burglary in the second degree: by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

Notable Cases

"[C]ourts have explained that the term 'inhabited dwelling house' means a 'structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes.'" (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 776)

Factors relevant to determining whether a house is "inhabited" include whether the owner or occupant sleeps in the house, keeps personal belongings there, and intends to continue living there. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 354-355; People v. Aguilar (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 966, 971-972; People v. Hernandez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 438, 442.)

An "open house" showing by a real estate agent does not change an inhabited residence into a commercial residence. (People v. Little (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364; People v. Tessman (Feb. 18, 2013, D062372) ___ Cal.4th ___ <http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062372.PDF>.)

A burglary of a granny flat which is unoccupied, but attached to a main residence which is occupied, is a hot prowl. (People v. Harris (Feb. 25, 2013, No. E058521) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ <http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E058521.PDF>

"an uninhabited outbuilding, such as a detached garage, is not an inhabited dwelling house. Corona v. Superior Court (June 21, 2001, No. A161369) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ <https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A161369.PDF>

Consent

A juvenile was adjudicated, in the Superior Court, Ventura County, Lawrence Storch, J., to have committed burglary by his forced entry into his father's and stepmother's locked apartment without their consent to take food, a folding mattress, and a sleeping bag. Juvenile appealed. The Court of Appeal, Gilbert, J., held that: (1) there was substantial evidence of the requisite intent to commit burglary; (2) juvenile did not have a possessory claim of right in the particular items he took because his parents had a statutory duty to provide him with the necessaries of life; and (3) the parental obligation to provide for necessaries does not imply a possessory right in the parental residence. (In re Richard M. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 7.)