Great bodily injury enhancement
Cases
If a court strikes the +3 enhancement, the violent felony classification and 15% cap on credits remain. In In re Pacheco (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1439, the defendant pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury to a cohabitant and admitted the GBI allegation. At sentencing, the court struck the additional punishment for the GBI enhancement pursuant to P.C. §1385. In finding that the defendant was entitled to only 15 percent credits pursuant to P.C. §§2933.1 and 667.5, the Court concluded that the enhancement remained even though the additional punishment was stricken. Note, however, that where a defendant is granted probation he will get the normal credits for any time spent in county jail.
If a court stays punishment for a count with a 12022.7 allegation, the violent felony classification and 15% cap on credits still apply. (In re Pope (2010) 50 Cal.4th 777.)
12022.7 great bodily injury can't be alleged for murder or manslaughter of the homicide victim, but can be alleged for non-deceased victims in manslaughter. (People v. Verlinde (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1146.)
Multiple victims equal multiple GBI enhancements. (People v. Arndt (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 387)
Great bodily injury can be alleged for attempted voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Israel Ackerman, Jun 24, 2024, D082208)
Statute
Penal Code section 12022.7
(a) Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.
(b) Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted felony which causes the victim to become comatose due to brain injury or to suffer paralysis of a permanent nature shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for five years. As used in this subdivision, “paralysis” means a major or complete loss of motor function resulting from injury to the nervous system or to a muscular mechanism.
(c) Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on a person who is 70 years of age or older, other than an accomplice, in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for five years.
(d) Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on a child under the age of five years in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for four, five, or six years.
(e) Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence in the commission of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three, four, or five years. As used in this subdivision, “domestic violence” has the meaning provided in subdivision (b) of Section 13700.
(f) As used in this section, “great bodily injury” means a significant or substantial physical injury.
(g) This section shall not apply to murder or manslaughter or a violation of Section 451 or 452. Subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (d) shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the offense.
(h) The court shall impose the additional terms of imprisonment under either subdivision (a), (b), (c), or (d), but may not impose more than one of those terms for the same offense.
Nature of injury
(5) [§ 354] Nature of Injury. Correlation Table | Tables and Index Supplement (1) Physical Injury. “Great bodily injury” means a “significant or substantial physical injury.” (P.C. 12022.7(f).) (See People v. Guest (1986) 181 C.A.3d 809, 822, 226 C.R. 525 [statutory definition is not unconstitutionally vague].) In People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 C.3d 562, 146 C.R. 859, 580 P.2d 274, the court concluded that a rape victim's injuries did not meet the test of great bodily injury where they were “transitory and short-lived” and not “severe or protracted in nature.” (21 C.3d 588.) People v. Escobar (1992) 3 C.4th 740, 12 C.R.2d 586, 837 P.2d 1100, disapproved Caudillo. (a) Caudillo correctly concluded that the great bodily injury provisions formerly included in the robbery, rape, and burglary statutes required a substantial injury beyond that inherent in the particular offense itself. (3 C.4th 746.) Caudillo erred, however, in concluding that injuries that are transitory and neither severe nor protracted are not “significant or substantial.” (3 C.4th 748, 749.) The significant or substantial physical injury standard of P.C. 12022.7 does not require that the victim suffer permanent, prolonged, or protracted disfigurement, impairment, or loss of bodily function. (3 C.4th 750.) (b) Here, the injury was sufficient. The victim sustained extensive bruises and abrasions to her legs, knees, and elbows, injury to her neck, and soreness in her vaginal area of sufficient severity to significantly impair her ability to walk. (3 C.4th 750.) (See People v. Wallace (1993) 14 C.A.4th 651, 665, 666, 17 C.R.2d 721 [defendant sprayed insecticide-like substance into victim's eyes, vagina, and anus, causing severe burning for 24 hours; evidence was sufficient under Escobar].) (2) Pregnancy and Abortion. In People v. Cross (2008) 45 C.4th 58, 82 C.R.3d 373, 190 P.3d 706, defendant was charged with multiple sex offenses committed against his 13-year-old stepdaughter, who had become pregnant and had undergone an abortion. The jury found that he committed a lewd act with a child under age 14, based on an act of sexual intercourse, and also found that he had inflicted great bodily injury, based on an instruction that either the pregnancy or the abortion could constitute great bodily injury under P.C. 12022.7. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 15 years to life under the one strike law based on the finding of infliction of great bodily injury. Held, affirmed. (a) Pregnancy. A pregnancy without complications from unlawful but nonforcible sexual conduct with a minor may support a finding of great bodily injury. (45 C.4th 63.) Here, evidence that the victim carried the fetus for 22 weeks in her young body leads to a reasonable finding of great bodily injury. Her experience goes beyond the physical injury and pain ordinarily experienced by victims of similar crimes. (45 C.4th 66.) (b) Abortion. Although an abortion may constitute great bodily injury, the court's instruction, while correct in the abstract, is irrelevant because defendant at most facilitated the abortion but did not personally inflict it. However, the erroneous reference to abortion is harmless. The jury was instructed to disregard any instructions that did not apply, and it was specifically instructed that defendant must personally inflict the qualifying injury. (45 C.4th 66.) (See People v. Meneses (2011) 193 C.A.4th 1087, 1090, 123 C.R.3d 387 [evidence of 12-year-old victim's pregnancy, resulting in long, painful labor and delivery, supported finding of great bodily injury arising from lewd act with child under age 14; citing Cross].) (3) Psychological Injury. Caudillo held that, because the statute requires physical injury, psychological or emotional trauma is insufficient. (21 C.3d 582.) Later decisions have continued to require that the injury be physical rather than psychological and have rejected physical manifestations of psychological stress as insufficient. (See People v. Schoenfeld (1980) 111 C.A.3d 671, 681, 168 C.R. 762 [children buried in bus in kidnaping for ransom]; 44 A.L.R.5th 651 [sufficiency of allegations or evidence of victim's mental injury or emotional distress to support charge of aggravated sex crime].) In People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 C.3d 92, 192 C.R. 748, 665 P.2d 520, the court reviewed the emotional trauma involved in Caudillo and Schoenfeld. Both involved the physical manifestation of psychological stress ordinarily caused by the particular crime. But both decisions properly rejected a great bodily injury enhancement. The enhancement, under these circumstances, “would be inconsistent with the statutory purpose of deterring the use of excessive force and the infliction of additional harm beyond that inherent in the crime itself.” (34 C.3d 108.) (4) Illustrations. A number of other decisions have upheld great bodily injury findings, including the following: People v. Wolcott, supra, 34 C.3d 107 [defendant shot robbery victim; bullet struck his calf, and fragments lodged in arms and legs]. People v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 C.A.3d 830, 836, 159 C.R. 771 [child beating victim suffered multiple contusions over her body, causing swelling and severe discoloration, and exhibited evidence of pain]. People v. Williams (1981) 115 C.A.3d 446, 453, 171 C.A. 401 [forcible rape victim was virgin and suffered genital tearing, pain, and bleeding]. People v. Lopez (1986) 176 C.A.3d 460, 462, 222 C.R. 83 [defendant shot two victims, causing one to fall down disoriented and other to feel “fire” in her leg, despite lack of evidence of medical treatment or permanent injury]. People v. Johnson (1986) 181 C.A.3d 1137, 1139, 225 C.R. 251 [transmission of herpes to rape victim]. People v. Harvey (1992) 7 C.A.4th 823, 827, 9 C.R.2d 17 [hot grease injuries, while not permanent, were protracted and far from transitory]. People v. Le (2006) 137 C.A.4th 54, 58, 39 C.R.3d 741 [victim shot in road rage incident suffered great bodily injury where, aside from pain suffered, he was unable to walk, stand, or sit unassisted for weeks after offense; rejecting argument that “mere soft tissue injury” cannot be significant and substantial for purposes of P.C. 12022.7(f)]. SUPPLEMENT (1) Physical Injury. See People v. Medellin (2020) 45 C.A.5th 519, 528, 533, 258 C.R.3d 867 [although evidence was sufficient, reversal was required where prosecutor and CALCRIM, No. 3160 (defining great bodily injury) misstated law by describing required harm as “greater than minor or moderate,” implying that “more than minor harm” was sufficient]; People v. Quinonez (2020) 46 C.A.5th 457, 461, 260 C.R.3d 86 [CALCRIM, No. 3160 was not ambiguous or erroneous where it did not allow jury to find enhancement true on determination that victim's broken nose only constituted “moderate” harm and, unlike Medellin, prosecution did not argue so]; People v. Sandoval (2020) 50 C.A.5th 357, 360, 263 C.R.3d 836 [disagreeing with Medellin; instruction should not be judged by solely picking out single word, i.e., “or”; entirety of instruction accurately describes legal standard]. (2) Pregnancy and Abortion. See People v. Woods (2015) 241 C.A.4th 461, 485, 487, 194 C.R.3d 128 [evidence that victim, age 15, had never been pregnant before and underwent second trimester abortion supported jury's determination that victim's pregnancy constituted great bodily injury; instruction that causing pregnancy can be infliction of great bodily injury was not erroneous]. (4) Illustrations. The following decisions upheld a great bodily injury finding: People v. Saez (2015) 237 C.A.4th 1177, 1188, 189 C.R.3d 72 [victim of attempted murder; there was considerable bleeding, injuries were to victim's head (lacerations on neck and tongue and fractures to bones near eye socket and cheek), and victim was kept in hospital for 2 days to be monitored and receive oxygen]. People v. Medellin, supra, 45 C.A.5th 528, 533 [defendant struck first victim harder than did other aggressors, requiring stitches to repair injury and loosening victim's tooth, and exerted more force when striking second victim, and causing victim to fall backwards]. People v. Edwards (2022) 76 C.A.5th 523, 528, 291 C.R.3d 600 [victim was head-butted, punched multiple times, suffered broken eye socket, and was left bloody and unconscious].