Burglary

Burglary

(Thorn, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 262 [“ ‘immediately contiguous’ requirement ... easily met” where carport area was “situated close to and directly underneath the occupied apartments themselves”]; People v. Harris (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 86, 90 [“[a] garage sharing a roof and a wall with a residence is part of an inhabited dwelling” despite lack of “interior access”]; In re Christopher J. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 76, 80, 78 [“carport appurtenant to the dwelling house,” with a roof and a wall along one side, “was attached to and an integral part of the dwelling house”]; In re Edwardo V. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 591, 594–595 (Edwardo V.) [multi-unit apartment building's common garage constituted inhabited dwelling and citing cases].)

People v. Jimenez (Cal. Ct. App., Apr. 17, 2017, No. A146261) 2017 WL 1376368, at *4

Elements

Inhabited

A deceased person doesn't make it inhabited. (People v. Ramos (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 300.)

As defined in Penal Code, Section 460, a dwelling house is inhabited if a person resides therein even though it may be temporarily unoccupied. (People v. Gilbert, 188 Cal.App.2d 723, 726, 10 Cal.Rptr. 799; People v. Loggins, 132 Cal.App.2d 736, 738, 282 P.2d 961; People v. Allard, 99 Cal.App. 591, 592, 279 P. 182.) However, the dwelling house in the case at bar, at the time in question, was not the residence of a person who was temporarily absent. It was not the residence of the new tenant, of the landlord, or of the old tenant. It was not the dwelling house of either of them. For this reason, we conclude that it then was uninhabited and the verdict should have been limited to burglary in the second degree. People v. Valdez (1962) 203 Cal.App.2d 559, 563 [21 Cal.Rptr. 764, 767]

Hotel or motel room that is being used for temporary habitation. (People v. Villalobos (2006) 145 Cal. App. 4th 310, 321.)

Vacation homes and second homes remain inhabited even where they are used sporadically by their residents. (People v. DeRouen (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 86, 90–92, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Allen (1999) 21 Cal.4th 846, 864–866.)

A house “remains inhabited even if the burglary occurs while the residents are away for an extended period of time.” (People v. Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483.)

“A structure that was once used for dwelling purposes is no longer inhabited when its occupants permanently cease using it as living quarters, and no other person is using it as living quarters.” (People v. Rodriguez (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 121, 132.)

Tent. (People v. Wilson (1992) 11 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1489.)

Hospital room in a locked psychiatric hospital. (People v. Fond (1999) 71 Cal. App. 4th 127, 131-132.)

Inhabited RV. (People v. Trevino (2016) 1 Cal. App. 5th 120, 126.)

Adjacent structures

“‘In determining whether a structure is part of an inhabited dwelling, the essential inquiry is whether the structure is “functionally interconnected with and immediately contiguous to other portions of the house.” [Citation.]’ “‘”Functionally interconnected” means used in related or complementary ways. “Contiguous” means adjacent, adjoining, nearby or close. [Citations.]’” (People v. Thorn (2009) 176 Cal. App. 4th 255, 262.)

Apartment balcony. (People v. Yarbrough, 54 Cal. 4th 889, 894, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3d 164 (Cal. 2012) [“Whenever a private, residential apartment and its balcony are on the second or a higher floor of a building, and the balcony is designed to be entered only from inside the apartment (thus extending the apartment's living space), the balcony is part of the apartment. The railing of such a balcony marks the apartment's ‘outer boundary’”].)

Open carports located underneath apartment complex. (People v. Thorn, supra, 176 Cal. App. 4th at p. 263.)

Attached garage at rear of duplex shared by tenants, not accessible from either duplex and entered only through exterior door. (Thorn, supra, at p. 262.)

Garage used for storing garden tools and equipment, where garage shared roof with house but was not directly connected to it. (Thorn, supra, at p. 262.) Storage rooms in basement under apartment building. (Thorn, supra, at 262.)

Laundry room on ground floor of two-story, U-shaped apartment section, where entry to individual apartments was through unlocked, open-air courtyard in middle of building. (Thorn, supra, at p. 262.)

Storeroom connected by breezeway to house. (People v. Coutu, 171 Cal. App. 3d 192, 193, 217 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1st Dist. 1985).)

Shed connected by breezeway and roof. (People v. Robertson, 2018 WL 2355925, *5 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2018), unpublished/noncitable (May 24, 2018).) Storage shed located at back of apartment complex that shared common wall with apartment complex but could only be entered from exterior door. (People v. Duran, 2005 WL 2901836, *2-5 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2005), unpublished/noncitable (Nov. 4, 2005).) Car parked in guest parking in underground condominium parking garage. (People v. Kasrawi, 65 Cal. App. 5th 751, 765, 280 Cal. Rptr. 3d 214 (4th Dist. 2021), review granted, see Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1115, 282 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 493 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2021) (Case No. S270040), cited for persuasive authority pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.115).

Home office. "His residence and office were under the same roof and shared a common wall. The office was not used as living quarters and there was no interior door connecting the office to the residence. The office and the dwelling had exterior doors leading to the same driveway. The door to the office was four to five feet away from the door to the residence." (People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1105.)

" Accordingly, under sections 459 and 460, we find significant similarities between a garage, a storeroom, a laundry room, and a home office. Entry into a structure that is functionally related to and immediately contiguous to a dwelling qualifies for first degree burglary. This is so even though there is no connecting door to the residence and the structure serves as a storehouse, workshop, or office or serves some other need of the residents. The use of the area need not be limited to the storage or use of property ordinarily related to dwelling places. Whereas a garage or storage area next to a residence typically contains items related to the home and its maintenance (e.g., food, bicycles and other athletic equipment, gardening equipment, a washer and dryer, an extra refrigerator or furniture) and a home office generally contains office-related items (e.g., a computer, fax, phone, printer, desk, files, and bookshelves), we are satisfied the contents of the structure are not determinative. Thus, many of the reasons that make traditional inhabited dwelling burglaries dangerous are present when a home office attached to a main house is burglarized, even though the office is not connected to the home by an interior door. " ((People v. Rodriguez (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1112.)

Commercial laundry room which defendant burglarized, located under same roof as and contiguous to occupied apartments, was an “inhabited dwelling” so as to support first-degree burglary charge; based on its physical placement and its use by tenants, laundry room was an integral part of building's living quarters. ?People v. Woods (App. 4 Dist. 1998) 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 65 Cal.App.4th 345, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied. ?Burglary Key Number 4

Apartment tenants would reasonably expect protection from unauthorized intrusions into commercial laundry room, located in same building and under same roof, that defendant burglarized, and room therefore qualified as “inhabited dwelling” so as to support first-degree burglary charge; room was usually kept locked so that only tenants were permitted access by way of their own keys. ?People v. Woods (App. 4 Dist. 1998) 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 65 Cal.App.4th 345, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied. ?Burglary Key Number 4

First-degree burglary charge arising from burglary of commercial laundry room that was contiguous to and under same roof as apartments in complex was not inconsistent with policy interests underlying the offense of residential burglary; safety and privacy expectations surrounding an inhabited dwelling house were present in the common area laundry room of complex. ?People v. Woods (App. 4 Dist. 1998) 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 65 Cal.App.4th 345, modified on denial of rehearing, review denied. ?Burglary Key Number 4

Statute

Penal Code § 459

Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, tent, vessel, as defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, any house car, as defined in Section 362 of the Vehicle Code, inhabited camper, as defined in Section 243 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary. As used in this chapter, “inhabited” means currently being used for dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. A house, trailer, vessel designed for habitation, or portion of a building is currently being used for dwelling purposes if, at the time of the burglary, it was not occupied solely because a natural or other disaster caused the occupants to leave the premises.

Penal Code § 460

(a)Every burglary of an inhabited dwelling house, vessel, as defined in the Harbors and Navigation Code, which is inhabited and designed for habitation, floating home, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, or trailer coach, as defined by the Vehicle Code, or the inhabited portion of any other building, is burglary of the first degree.

(b) All other kinds of burglary are of the second degree.

(c) This section shall not be construed to supersede or affect Section 464 of the Penal Code.

Penal Code § 461

Burglary is punishable as follows:

(a) Burglary in the first degree: by imprisonment in the state prison for two, four, or six years.

(b) Burglary in the second degree: by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of Section 1170.

Notable Cases

"[C]ourts have explained that the term 'inhabited dwelling house' means a 'structure where people ordinarily live and which is currently being used for dwelling purposes.'" (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 776)

Factors relevant to determining whether a house is "inhabited" include whether the owner or occupant sleeps in the house, keeps personal belongings there, and intends to continue living there. (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 354-355; People v. Aguilar (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 966, 971-972; People v. Hernandez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 438, 442.)

An "open house" showing by a real estate agent does not change an inhabited residence into a commercial residence. (People v. Little (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1364; People v. Tessman (Feb. 18, 2013, D062372) ___ Cal.4th ___ <http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/D062372.PDF>.)

A burglary of a granny flat which is unoccupied, but attached to a main residence which is occupied, is a hot prowl. (People v. Harris (Feb. 25, 2013, No. E058521) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ <http://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E058521.PDF>

"an uninhabited outbuilding, such as a detached garage, is not an inhabited dwelling house. Corona v. Superior Court (June 21, 2001, No. A161369) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ <https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A161369.PDF>

Consent

A juvenile was adjudicated, in the Superior Court, Ventura County, Lawrence Storch, J., to have committed burglary by his forced entry into his father's and stepmother's locked apartment without their consent to take food, a folding mattress, and a sleeping bag. Juvenile appealed. The Court of Appeal, Gilbert, J., held that: (1) there was substantial evidence of the requisite intent to commit burglary; (2) juvenile did not have a possessory claim of right in the particular items he took because his parents had a statutory duty to provide him with the necessaries of life; and (3) the parental obligation to provide for necessaries does not imply a possessory right in the parental residence. (In re Richard M. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 7.)