Pleas

A plea of guilty waives any defects in form of the allegations of the accusatory pleading. (People v. Dysart (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 287, 292, 102 P.2d 1091.)

It also waives any variance as to stated value of items taken if they are otherwise correctly described (People v. Blumen (1927) 87 Cal.App. 236, 242-243, 261 P. 1103);

and it waives territorial jurisdiction (People v. Tabucchi (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 133, 141, 134 Cal.Rptr. 245).

People v. Hughes (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 452, 460

A court cannot reject a competent defendant's guilty plea. (People v. Reza (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 647, 653.) But there are some limited exceptions. (See Cronk v. Municipal Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 351; People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486.)

People v. Superior Court (Barke) (1976)

Types of pleas

There are six kinds of pleas to an indictment or an information, or to a complaint charging a misdemeanor or infraction:

1. Guilty.

If the defendant plead guilty: “The defendant pleads that he or she is guilty of the offense charged.” (Pen. Code, § 1017, subd. (1).)

2. Not guilty.

If he or she plead not guilty: “The defendant pleads that he or she is not guilty of the offense charged.” (Pen. Code, § 1017, subd. (2).)

3. Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the court. The court shall ascertain whether the defendant completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as a plea of guilty and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall find the defendant guilty. The legal effect of such a plea, to a crime punishable as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of guilty for all purposes. In cases other than those punishable as felonies, the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, and factual basis for, the plea may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based.

4. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged.

If he or she plead a former conviction or acquittal: “The defendant pleads that he or she has already been convicted (or acquitted) of the offense charged, by the judgment of the court of ____ (naming it), rendered at ____ (naming the place), on the ____ day of ____.” (Pen. Code, § 1017, subd. (3).)

5. Once in jeopardy.

If he or she plead once in jeopardy: “The defendant pleads that he or she has been once in jeopardy for the offense charged (specifying the time, place, and court).” (Pen. Code, § 1017, subd. (4).)

6. Not guilty by reason of insanity.

If he or she plead not guilty by reason of insanity: “The defendant pleads that he or she is not guilty of the offense charged because he or she was insane at the time that he or she is alleged to have committed the unlawful act.” (Pen. Code, § 1017, subd. (5).)

A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of the other pleas. A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of the offense charged; provided, that the court may for good cause shown allow a change of plea at any time before the commencement of the trial. A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the commission of the offense charged.

A defendant may enter multiple pleas. Under Penal Code section 1016, "A defendant who does not plead guilty may enter one or more of the other pleas." For example, a defendant can plead both "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity." If a defendant only enters "not guilty by reason of insanity," but doesn't plead not guilty, under Penal Code section 1016, "A defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty, thereby admits the commission of the offense charged."

Entry of pleas

Penal Code section 1018: Unless otherwise provided by law, every plea shall be entered or withdrawn by the defendant himself or herself in open court. No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall that plea be received without the consent of the defendant’s counsel. No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is not death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole shall be accepted from any defendant who does not appear with counsel unless the court shall first fully inform him or her of the right to counsel and unless the court shall find that the defendant understands the right to counsel and freely waives it, and then only if the defendant has expressly stated in open court, to the court, that he or she does not wish to be represented by counsel. On application of the defendant at any time before judgment or within six months after an order granting probation is made if entry of judgment is suspended, the court may, and in case of a defendant who appeared without counsel at the time of the plea the court shall, for a good cause shown, permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted. Upon indictment or information against a corporation a plea of guilty may be put in by counsel. This section shall be liberally construed to effect these objects and to promote justice.

People v. Moronati (1924) 70 Cal.App. 17, 21.)

People v. Rogers (1931) 112 Cal.App. 615, 619)

(3) Failure To Plead or Offer Evidence Is Waiver. Failure to set up the special plea or to offer evidence in support of it is a waiver. (In re Harron (1923) 191 C. 457, 467, 217 P. 728; People v. Newell (1923) 192 C. 659, 667, 221 P. 622; People v. Memro (1995) 11 C.4th 786, 821, 47 C.R.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305 [former jeopardy must be affirmatively pleaded or ground is not preserved for review]; People v. Franklin (1976) 56 C.A.3d 18, 23, 128 C.R. 94; but see People v. Barry (1957) 153 C.A.2d 193, 200, 314 P.2d 531 [defendant pleaded once in jeopardy to counts I and II, but not to count III; court considered claim of double jeopardy as to count III, and decided it against defendant on merits].)

(4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. In People v. Belcher (1974) 11 C.3d 91, 113 C.R. 1, 520 P.2d 385, supra, § 197, the court held that defense counsel's failure to assert the plea, where it had merit, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel which could be raised on appeal. (11 C.3d at 96.) (See People v. Marshall (1996) 13 C.4th 799, 824, footnote 1, 55 C.R.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 [although failure to raise plea at trial technically constitutes waiver, issue must be considered on appeal to determine if failure was ineffective assistance; following Belcher]; People v. Moore (1983) 140 C.A.3d 508, 511, 189 C.R. 487, supra, § 151 [issue of double jeopardy was properly before Court on Appeal, despite failure to enter plea at trial; failure would constitute ineffective assistance if plea had merit; following Belcher].)

(1) Question of Fact or Law. Ordinarily the issue is submitted to the jury. (People v. Frank (1933) 134 C.A. 211, 214, 25 P.2d 486.) But if, as a matter of law, the prior trial could not constitute former jeopardy, the question is one of law for the court. (People v. Greer (1947) 30 C.2d 589, 596, 184 P.2d 512; People v. Blue (1958) 161 C.A.2d 1, 8, 326 P.2d 183; People v. Mason (1962) 200 C.A.2d 282, 285, 19 C.R. 240.) The same is true where the undisputed facts conclusively show that the defense is good. (People v. Bechtel (1953) 41 C.2d 441, 445, 260 P.2d 31.) (See People v. Bell (2015) 241 C.A.4th 315, 340, 194 C.R.3d 93, citing the text [under P.C. 1041(3) and 1042, any plea of once in jeopardy that presents issue of material fact, including plea based on alleged prosecutorial goading to mistrial (see supra, § 152), must be resolved by jury, unless jury trial is waived; determinative inquiry is whether plea raises issue of material fact].) However, if the offense charged in the first trial is necessarily included in the offense charged in the second, the question whether the acts constituting the two offenses are separate is for the jury, unless as a matter of law the acts are not divisible. (People v. Greer, supra, 30 C.2d at 600.)

(2) Burden of Proof in Unique Circumstances. In People v. Smith (2005) 132 C.A.4th 1537, 34 C.R.3d 472, defendant was charged with 10 counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under age 14. The counts were charged in identical language, and the court did not give a unanimity instruction. Defendant was convicted on a single count, and hence impliedly acquitted on the others. But it was not possible to determine whether all jurors agreed on a particular episode of lewd conduct as the basis for the verdict. Held, reversed for failure to give unanimity instruction. In discussing the double jeopardy problem likely to arise on retrial, the court provided the following directions: Where, as here, a defendant would likely be unable to prove that the defense is attributable to “a deliberate decision by the prosecution to charge, argue, and support instructions … that were inconsistent with the specificity of the evidence,” the defendant will have the initial burden of making a nonfrivolous showing that the charges are the same as those for which he had been placed in jeopardy. If the defendant is successful, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the new charges involve different offenses than those of which the defendant was acquitted. (132 C.A.4th at 1548, 1549.) (See Brown v. Superior Court (2010) 187 C.A.4th 1511, 1528, 114 C.R.3d 804 [in child molestation trial involving multiple counts charged with identical generic language and covering same time periods, jury convicted defendant of lesser offense of battery in one count, acquitted him of others, and hung on all other counts; after defendant showed that he was facing prosecution for crime for which he previously was in jeopardy, double jeopardy principles shifted burden to prosecution and prosecution failed to establish that charges to be retried involved different offenses than those of which defendant had already been convicted or acquitted; following Smith].)

WITCRIM CH XII § 335Witkin California Criminal Law, Fifth Edition Pretrial Proceedings

A defendant who pleads guilty may not enter another plea and is conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the offense was committed, unless the defendant timely moves to withdraw the guilty plea and enter a new plea before trial or before entry of judgment. (See People v. John (2019) 36 C.A.5th 168, 174.)

No contest or nolo contendere pleas

A no contest plea is actually a plea of "nolo contendere". (Penal Code, &1016, subd. (3).) Nolo contendere is Latin for "I do not wish to contend." (Garner, Garner's Dictionary of Legal Usage (3d ed. 2011) p. 607, col. 1.)

A misdemeanor plea of no contest under People v. West is sufficient evidence to prove that a defendant did not obey all laws in a violation of probation hearing. (People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421.)

A court can take judicial notice of a misdemeanor plea of no contest to find that a defendant did not obey all laws in a violation of probation hearing. (People v. Chagolla (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048-1049.)

No contest plea is admissible at penalty phase. (People v. Adcox (1988) 47 Cal.3d 207, 254.)

A no contest plea is admissible as an admission. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1374.)

West plea

WEST PLEA (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.) West is the seminal case discussing the legality of plea bargaining in California, and is cited for many, many legal propositions. However, a "West plea" is most likely to stand for a plea which "does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty." (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1374.) Typically, the defendant stipulates to a factual basis for the plea. (See, e.g., People v. Westbrook (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 220, 223 [factual basis from grand jury transcripts].)

Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting defendant's conviction for rape pursuant to section 190.3, factor (c) (prior felony convictions), because the conviction followed a plea of no contest (§ 1016), which does not constitute an express admission of guilt but only a consent to be punished as if guilty. (North Carolina v. Alford (1970) 400 U.S. 25, 35–36, fn. 8, 91 S.Ct. 160, 166–167, fn. 8, 27 L.Ed.2d 162; People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.) As explained above, the court erred in admitting the conviction resulting from this plea as a prior conviction under factor (c), but the error was harmless because the evidence was admissible as evidence of violent criminal activity under factor (b). (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1374.)

Defendant's entry of a plea of no contest does not alter that circumstance. As we have recognized, section 1016 explicitly provides that the legal effect of a no-contest plea to a crime punishable as a felony is the same for all purposes as a plea of guilty. (E.g., People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 809, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310; see People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 279, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Therefore, evidence of defendant's conviction of rape based upon a no-contest plea properly was utilized as evidence to establish defendant's violent criminal activity. (People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1374–1375.)

Before a defendant pleads guilty or no contest to a charged offense, the trial court must “satisfy itself ... that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (Pen. Code,1 § 1192.5, subd. (c).) This “inquiry may be satisfied by stipulation of [the] parties” that the required factual basis exists. (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 940, fn. 9, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747 (Alvernaz); see People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 603-614, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (West).) Such a stipulation does not require the defendant to admit the factual basis for the plea (Alvernaz, at p. 932, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747), but rather permits them to take advantage of a plea bargain while maintaining their claim of innocence (id., at p. 940, fn. 9, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747; see also People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 (Rauen)). (People v. Alazar (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104, disapproved of by People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549.)

Before a defendant pleads guilty or no contest to a charged offense, the trial court must “satisfy itself ... that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (Pen. Code,1 § 1192.5, subd. (c).) This “inquiry may be satisfied by stipulation of [the] parties” that the required factual basis exists. (In re Alvernaz (1992) 2 Cal.4th 924, 940, fn. 9, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747 (Alvernaz); see People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 603-614, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (West).) Such a stipulation does not require the defendant to admit the factual basis for the plea (Alvernaz, at p. 932, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747), but rather permits them to take advantage of a plea bargain while maintaining their claim of innocence (id., at p. 940, fn. 9, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 713, 830 P.2d 747; see also People v. Rauen (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 421, 424, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 732 (Rauen)).

People v. Alazar (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1104 [326 Cal.Rptr.3d 505, 508] disapproved of by People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 [330 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 564 P.3d 596]

First, a plea entered pursuant to People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409, does not mean that the plea was necessarily a nolo contendere plea. Although the facts of West did involve a nolo contendere plea, West 's holding was not limited to such pleas. In West, our Supreme Court was not concerned with nolo contendere pleas or guilty pleas per se; rather, it was focused on how a defendant came to offer any plea—either a guilty plea or a nolo contendere plea. More specifically, the West court was concerned with plea bargains. As the very first sentence of the opinion makes clear, the underlying purpose of the decision was to legitimize plea bargains and clarify the procedure by which such pleas should be entered: “We undertake here to confirm the legality of the plea bargain and to set up procedures for its acceptance or *836 rejection in the strong light of full disclosure.” (Id. at p. 599, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.)7 Because the court in West was concerned with plea bargains, it repeatedly stressed that its holding applied to “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” (Id. at pp. 600, 604, 610, 612, 613, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.) In other words, when the September 2009 minute order states that Fetters's plea was made “[p]ursuant to People vs. West,” it simply means that the plea was the result of a plea bargain. (See People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 309, fn. 4, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 27 P.3d 726.)

Second, as the court in People v. West, supra, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409, emphasized, whether the bargained-for plea is guilty or nolo contendere, it is an admission of the truth of the facts in the petition: “A defendant who knowingly and voluntarily pleads guilty or nolo contendere can hardly claim that he is unaware that he might be convicted of the offense to which he pleads; his plea demonstrates that he not only knows of the violation but is also prepared to admit each of its elements.” (Id. at p. 612, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.)

Fetters v. County of Los Angeles (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 825, 835–836 [196 Cal.Rptr.3d 848, 857]